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Struggles for Power and Unity: Constitutional Designs in the 
Palestinian Authority 
Introduction: The Palestinian context 
The topic of this thesis is the interplay between political context and Palestinian constitutional 
development from the inception of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1993 until the aftermath of 
the collapse of the National Unity Cabinet in June 2007. The thesis traces the drafting and various 
amendments of Palestinian Basic Law, which was to serve as a temporary constitution for the PA 
until the establishment of an independent state and a permanent constitution could be achieved.  
The PA was the result of the so-called Oslo Accords, a series of agreements between the 
state of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from 1993 until 1995. Here, the 
PLO recognized the state of Israel in return for recognition of the PLO as a negotiating partner for 
the future.
1
 The PA was an interim body that was to administer the Palestinian Territories for a 
transitional period of five years, during which the PLO and Israel were to negotiate a permanent 
settlement. The Basic Law was to be drafted by the PLO and to be adopted by the Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC) as soon as the first parliamentary elections had been held.  
The process of drafting a constitution for an independent Palestine had started a few years 
earlier. With the Palestinian declaration of independence in 1988, the PLO Central Council was 
given the authority to approve a Palestinian Basic Law.2 The resolution remained sleeping until 
the Oslo Accords provided for the establishment of the PA in 1994. The PLO was again 
authorized to draft a Basic Law which was to serve as an interim constitution. However, when the 
PLC convened for the first time in the summer of 1996 after the first Palestinian elections, the 
Basic Law had still not been completed. The PLC decided to take on the completion of the Basic 
Law themselves, rather than wait for the cabinet to formally present them with a finished draft.3  
At this point, the Palestinian leadership lost control over the drafting process. By engaging 
in an increasingly publicized drafting process an emerging reform coalition of Palestinian 
parliamentarians and intellectuals sought a different kind of Arabic political system. They aimed 
to undermine the emerging authoritarianism of the PA by creating a Basic Law which would 
                                                 
1
 For a further discussion on the implications of this asymmetry, see Burhan Dajani, ―The September 1993 
Israeli-PLO Documents: A Textual Analysis,‖ Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Spring 1994), 6-9. 
2
 Nathan J. Brown, Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Politics (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003), 67. 
3
 Brown, Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords, 71. 
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provide for a progressive democracy with real limitations on executive power.4 A total number of 
eight drafts were made before the PLC produced the ninth, also known as the First Reading. A 
number of revisions resulted in the Third Reading in October 1997, which was passed by the PLC 
in 1997. During this period, the various drafters received comments from legal experts, scholars, 
activists and foreign advisers.5 Then President Yasser Arafat6 refrained from ratifying the 
document until he came under pressure to introduce reforms in 2002. Since then the Basic Law 
has been amended twice.  
The Basic Law was written during the post-Cold War resurgence of constitution making 
as part of a broad political reconstruction after the downfall of the Soviet Union led former East 
Bloc countries to replace Communist party rule with parliamentary democracy. The democratic 
transition in the old East Bloc countries sparked new optimism and faith in the possibility of 
creating democracies. During the second half of the 1990s, more than a billion dollars was spent 
on rule of law projects all over the world,7 and ―democracy has been marketed aggressively as a 
product that ought to be available to everyone‖.8 Constitutions were seen as vital contributions in 
these transitions. At the same time the PA is geographically situated in the Middle East, where 
constitutional history has been shaped by the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the presence of 
the Great Powers.9 Constitutions were designed to enable existing regimes through fiscal reforms, 
to define new relationships with the imperial powers or establish sovereignty, to resolve issues of 
succession, or to proclaim new ideological directions.10 In short, Arab constitutions aimed at 
strengthening and enabling the state, not at limiting the executive.11  
The PA has, however, never been a state. The PA is an interim administrative body which 
presides over an undefined territory. It only represents part of the Palestinian population, it cannot 
enter relations with other states, and it does not maintain the monopoly of armed force within its 
own territories. The Basic Law itself expanded on the political system that was outlined in the 
                                                 
4
 Brown, Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords, 78; and Naseer H. Aruri and John J. Carroll, ―A New 
Palestinian Charter,‖ Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4. (Summer 1994), 5-17.  
5
 For a full account of the drafting process, see Adrien Katherine Wing, ―The Palestinian Basic Law: Embryonic 
constitutionalism,‖ Case Western Reserve Journal Law, Vol. 31, No. 2&3 (Spring 1999), 402-404; and Brown, 
Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords, 70-71. 
6
 For English versions of Arabic names, I have chosen the set of spelling forms that appears most frequently in 
my source material.  
7
 Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Reconstruction (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 2.  
8
 Donald L. Horowitz, ―Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes,‖ in The Architecture of Democracy, 
ed. Andrew Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 16. 
9
 See Nathan J. Brown, Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for 
Accountable Governments (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002).  
10
 Brown, Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World, 15-16, 35-36, 41, 62, 67, 89. 
11
 Daniel Brumberg, ―Liberalization versus Democracy,‖ in Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the 
Middle East, eds. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2005), 23. 
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various agreements between Israel and the PLO. The most important of these was the Israeli-
Palestinian Interim Agreement of 1995,12 which outlined detailed specifications on the limitations 
of the PA‘s jurisdiction during a transitional period not to exceed five years (Preamble). Words 
like ―constitution‖, ―minister‖ and ―cabinet‖ were carefully avoided so as to avoid hinting at 
Palestinian statehood. Furthermore, the Israeli occupation imposed major constraints on even the 
autonomy that the PA was supposed to possess. The PA can be seen as a transitional regime that 
was designed to meet Israeli security needs.13 The security imperative entrenched the existing 
penchant for executive centralization of power within the PLO into the PA, which was to exercise 
extremely limited powers within an «autonomous» area. This authority presided over a 
fragmented geographical area interspersed with settlements and Israeli military zones over which 
the PA had no jurisdiction. This raises the question of whether constitution building, or 
constitutional development, is a meaningful concept in analysis of a nonsovereign entity in 
general, and the PA in particular. My interest lies with the nature and effect of the attempt – not in 
its potential for success. Although Palestinian constitution building has taken place in the context 
of limited autonomy under military occupation, constitutional drafters have grappled with the 
same kind of choices and available models as have constitutional drafters in nascent states. Their 
constitutional choices have been of consequence, irrespective of the real or perceived futility of 
the initial project. 
                                                 
12
 The Israeli Palestinian Interim Agreement, Washington, D.C.; 28 September 1995. Israel  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/ 
THE+ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN+INTERIM+AGREEMENT.htm (last accessed 15 February 2008). 
13
 Roland Friedrich, Security Sector Reform in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2004), 
23. 
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Palestine is, in short, a model liberal democracy. Its most significant flaw is that it does not exist.  
- Nathan J. Brown 
1. Theoretical framework and methodological concerns 
Research question 
The formal side of Palestinian politics has generally been considered insignificant compared to 
the informal power structures. Little attention has been devoted to the formal aspects of the 
political system and how these have been affected by internal power struggles, external 
intervention and the demand to secure Israel. Nonetheless, constitution making has been a 
constant process throughout the whole political life of the PA. Similar processes in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have been subject to a great deal of consideration, but the PA‘s constitutional process 
has been ongoing since 1993. That provides a good opportunity to observe the mutual relationship 
between constitutional development and domestic and international politics in the PA. 
The Palestinian Basic Law was written in the intersection between local power struggles 
and great power politics. Both the U.S. and the European countries pursued multiple agendas and 
interests where democracy was one of several competing goals.14 For Israel, the overall goal was 
to achieve security. For Palestinians, the overall goal was sovereignty. My first main question is 
how these various interests have affected Palestinian constitutional development. More 
specifically, I aim to discuss the development of the executive as envisioned in the Basic Law, 
and whether the PA has evolved in the direction of constitutionalist or nonconstitutionalist rule. 
By constitutionalist I refer to the idea that executive power should be limited. Conversely, a 
nonconstitutionalist constitution would not limit, but enable executive power. The distinction will 
be elaborated on later in this chapter. 
Secondly, I wanted to explore whether the Basic Law has been able to affect political 
outcomes. I decided to approach this matter by focusing on the 2003 amendment of the Basic 
Law, which converted the Palestinian political system from a presidential to a semi-presidential 
system by furnishing the executive with a prime minister. The aim was to empower a reform 
cabinet and restrict the powers of the presidency. The second main question is whether the 
empowered cabinet has been able to exercise its powers as laid out in the Amended Basic Law.  
                                                 
14
 Carothers and Ottaway, ―The New Democracy Imperative,‖ in Uncharted Journey,eds. Carothers and Ottaway 
6; and Nathan J. Brown, ―Requiem for Palestinian Reform: Clear Lessons from a Troubled Record,‖ Carnegie 
Endowment Democracy and Rule of Law Program, Middle East Series, No. 81 (Washington: February 2007), 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp_81_palestine_final.pdf (last accessed 20 January 2008), 14. 
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Main theoretical assumptions 
A study of Palestinian constitutional reforms requires a multidisciplinary approach drawing on 
theories of institutional design, democratization processes and constitutional law. Below is an 
outline of the main theoretical perspectives that I lean on. In addition, I have prioritized literature 
on Palestinian politics and history and Arab constitutions in order to minimize the risk of 
misinterpreting the legal texts or miscalculating their origins and effects in a Palestinian context.  
Constitutions are not above politics 
A constitution ―consists of a set of rights, powers and procedures that regulate the relationships 
between public authorities in any state, and between the public authorities and individual 
citizens‖.15 There are several approaches to constitutions and how they work. Whereas liberal 
theories see law as unaffected by political context, the realist approach conceives of law as 
intimately related to politics.16 In a realist view, constitutions are seen as bargains which reflect the 
prevailing power balance at the time of drafting.17  In such a view, major divisions and conflicts 
can be a main incentive to settle for a common constitutional framework.18  Consequently, conflict 
is vital to reach a broad acceptance for a constitutional framework. 
According to the idealist view, constitutions express the state‘s fundamental political 
arrangements and determine the identity of the political identity. Constitutions are the foundation 
of the democratic order.19 They transcend their political origins and provide a fundamental break 
with the old.20 Whereas realist theories conceive constitution making as the result of 
considerations of partisan advantages,21 idealist theories see constitutions as the result of 
normative, impartial debates over desirable outcomes.22 Kenneth Ka-Lok Chan has pointed out 
that in reality, ―institutions are attributable to the interplay between normative arguments and 
partisan considerations‖.23 According to Ruti Teitel, neither idealist nor realist theories fully 
explain the role of constitutions under periods of political change. Teitel coins the concept of 
―transitional constitutionalism‖ to analyze constitutionalism in periods of political change. During 
political transitions, ―transitional constitutionalism not only is constituted by the prevailing 
                                                 
15
 David Robertson, The Routledge Dictionary of Politics, third edition (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2004), 115. 
16
 Ruti Teitel, ―Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation,‖ Yale Law Journal, 
Vol. 106, No. 7 (May 1997), 2057. 
17
 Jon Elster et.al., Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 77.  
18
 Stephen Holmes, ―Gag Rules,‖ in Constitutionalism and Democracy, eds. Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, third 
edition, Studies in Rationality and Social Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 28, 37. 
19
 Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions do (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 6. 
20
 Horowitz, ―Constitutional Design,‖ 26. 
21
 Elster et.al., Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies, 77.  
22
 Sunstein, Designing Democracy, 7. 
23
 Kenneth Ka-Lok Chan, ―Idealism versus Realism in Institutional Choice: Explaining Electoral Reform in 
Poland,‖ West European Politics, Vol. 24, No. 3 (July 2001), 70. 
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political order, but is also constructive of the perception of political change [...] and effect further 
political change in the system‖.24 Under such political transitions, constitution making often 
begins with a provisional constitution pending subsequent and more permanent constitutions.25  
Here, idealist and realist theories are jointly applied. Idealist theories focus on the practical 
aspects of constitutional design.26 Giovanni Sartori has for example compared institutions to 
―engines‖ that are ―unlikely to work‖ unless they employ the right combination of punishments 
and rewards.27 Constitution making according to Sartori is ―an engineering-like task‖.28 Sartori 
provides useful tools for conceptualizing and contrasting the various stages in Palestinian 
constitutional development. His theories on constitutional design will here be applied in a 
discussion of the technical aspects of the Palestinian political system and distribution of power as 
laid out in the Basic Law. Realist theories, on the other hand, are more concerned with the actual 
process of constitution-drafting. This approach will underpin my discussion on why certain 
choices were made at the expense of others. 
The Basic Law was written by Palestinian constitutionalists who had little backing among 
an ambivalent leadership who feared that the Basic Law would be an obstacle to maximum 
flexibility in the nationalist struggle.29 The PA was also under heavy external pressure to subdue 
leftist and Islamist factions who rejected the Oslo Accords. From an Israeli perspective, a fully 
developed Palestinian democracy might be detrimental to Israeli security.30 Within the Palestinian 
political elite, there was disagreement as to whether democracy was prerequisite to liberation, or 
whether liberation would have to be achieved first. The Basic Law would have to reflect the needs 
to obtain democratic legitimacy and enable the executive at the same time.  
Menachem Klein has pointed out that after the establishment of the PA, ―classical 
concepts like armed struggle, revolution and steadfastness were marginalized in favor of new 
concepts such as institution building, democratic legitimization, election, representation, and 
realism‖.31 However, it is highly unlikely that drafters of the various documents or the Basic Law 
were informed by a common and consistent idea of what these concepts were to entail. While 
                                                 
24
 Teitel, ―Transitional Jurisprudence,‖ 2025. 
25
 Teitel, ―Transitional Jurisprudence,‖ 2057. 
26
 Chan, ―Idealism versus Realism in Institutional Choice,‖ 60. 
27
 Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and 
Outcomes, second edition (New York: New York University Press, 1994, 1997), ix. 
28
 Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, 198. 
29
 Brown, Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords, 83; and Barry Rubin, The Transformation of Palestinian 
Politics: From Revolution to State-Building (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 53. 
30
 Khalil Shikaki, ―The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the Transition to Democracy in Palestine,‖ 
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Winter 2006), 9-10. 
31
 Menachem Klein, ―By Conviction, Not By Infliction: The Internal Debate Over Reforming the Palestinian 
Authority,‖ Middle East Journal, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Spring 2003), 199. 
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there may have been no clear and consistent design, there were long term goals on behalf of 
politically relevant actors. The Palestinian politically relevant elite consists of actors that are in a 
position to make ―strategic decisions or participate in decision making on a national level, 
contribute to defining political values (including the definition of ‗national interests‘), and directly 
influence political discourse on strategic issues decision making on the national level.‖ 32 In the 
Palestinian context, this comprises the ―international community‖, which will here refer to the 
donors and the Quartet.33 Both the US and the European countries had multiple agendas and 
interests where democracy was only one of several competing goals.34 For Israel, the overall goal 
was to achieve security. For Palestinians, the overall goal was to achieve sovereignty. By signing 
the Oslo Accords, they opted to try Palestinian institution building as a main strategy to achieve 
their respective goals.  
The drafting process cannot be seen as disconnected from the immediate political context 
of the occupation by Israel and the internal power struggles within the PA. Both external 
constraints and domestic concerns bore on what alternatives were available. An analysis of the 
Basic Law will reveal adherence to democratic ideals, realistic considerations of what is possible 
in the Palestinian context as well as group interests and perceived possibilities of personal gain. 
Constitutions can be nonconstitutionalist 
Teitel points out that there is a ―normative proposition that various legal responses should be 
evaluated on their prospects for democracy‖.35 One of the challenges in this study has been to 
determine how far I should go in discussing the democratic potential of the Basic Law. There 
seemed to be several good reasons to avoid this path. Firstly, democracy can be defined in any 
number of ways spanning from minimalist procedural definitions to wider definitions comprising 
economic and social relations.  
Secondly, it would make little sense to discuss the Basic Law in light of one clearly 
defined notion of democracy, when it seems unlikely that the drafters of the Basic Law and the 
various interests they had to consider were informed by a uniform vision of what democracy is or 
                                                 
32
 See Ahmed Badawi, ―Policy Failure, Power Relations and the Dynamics of Elite Change in Palestine,‖ Orient, 
No. 4 (2003), 555-566. Also available from Miftah (The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global 
Dialogue & Democracy), http://www.miftah.org/PrinterF.cfm?DocId=4406 (last accessed 12 Februray 2008), 
pages unnumbered. 
33
 The donor community is coordinated by the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC), which was established in 
1993. It is chaired by Norway, and the World Bank serves as its secretariat. Additional members are Canada, 
European Union, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and United States. The Palestinian Authority, Israel, Egypt, 
Jordan, Tunisia and the United Nations are associated members. The Middle East Quartet was established in 
2002 as a response to the second Intifada. It consists of the UN, the USA, the EU and Russia. 
34
 Carothers and Ottaway,―The New Democracy Imperative,‖ 6. 
35
 Teitel, ―Transitional Jurisprudence‖ , 1011. 
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how the PA should function. It remains contested whether democracy in whatever form was even 
a priority on behalf of the politically relevant elite.36 Thirdly, part of this discussion rests on the 
point that even if constitutions are central to democratic development, constitutions may well 
serve nondemocratic ends. Nathan J. Brown has pointed out that there is no causal relation from 
having a constitution and separation of powers to democracy. Although democracy does require 
some form of constitutionalism, constitutionalism does not require democracy. Brown defines 
constitutionalism as the ideologies and institutional arrangements that promote the limitation and 
definition of means of exercising state authority. However, constitutions may organize power 
without limiting it. They may serve to enhance governmental power and make it more efficient, or 
they may be designed to strengthen different groups of the political elite, as reflected in the 
relationship between for instance the parliament and the president. Constitutions not intended at 
limiting government can be referred to as nonconstitutionalist. 37 
The Basic Law will here be evaluated on its constitutionalist and nonconstitutionalist 
qualities, not on its prospect for democracy. The Basic Law was to function as a constitution for 
the PA in the transitional phase. The idea of transition implies a shift from one regime to another. 
As for the PA, it was not clear where the transition would lead in terms of territory or degree of 
independence. The PA was tasked with institution building before independence had been 
achieved, a state described by Glenn Robinson as an incomplete revolution.38 In such a setting, a 
major challenge is to reconcile the concept of constitutionalism with revolution. Teitel has pointed 
out that: ―Revolutionary periods and their aftermath are times of political flux, and, as such, 
present tensions with constitutionalism, which is ordinarily considered to bind the political 
order.‖39 The Palestinian leadership as embodied in the PA executive and the PLO Executive 
Committee has generally been anxious to avoid limitations on executive power. By contrast, 
reformists within Fatah40, the PLC and the NGOs have seen accountable and delimited institutions 
with strong parliamentary oversight capabilities as an alternative route to independence and 
prerequisite to post independence democracy. In the case of the PA, the relationship between 
                                                 
36
 Mushtaq Husain Khan, ―Evaluating the emerging Palestinian state‖ in State Formation in Palestine: Viability 
and Governance during a Social Transformation, eds. Mushtaq Husain Khan et. al. (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 43. 
37
 Brown, Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World, 8-13, 92. 
38
 Glenn E. Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution, Indiana Series in Arab and 
Islamic Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 176-177. 
39
 Teitel, ―Transitional Jurisprudence,‖ 2051. 
40
 Fatah was formally founded in Kuwait in 1959 by Yasser Arafat and associates. They advocated armed 
struggle to liberate all of Palestine by Palestinians, while remaining independent of all Arab governments. 
Fatah came to be he largest and most important faction within the PLO. For more on Fatah‘s founding and 
ideology, see  Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 
1949-1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 71, 80 87. 
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constitutionalism and revolution has as of today not been resolved. The Basic Law will here be 
seen as reflecting both constitutionalist and nonconstitutionalist ideas. 
Evaluating constitutional reform 
The Palestinian Basic Law was designed to last for the transitional period. When the transitional 
period expired in 1999, the Basic Law had still not been ratified by President Arafat, but was 
promulgated as late as 2002 as part of a broader reform effort. In 2003, it was amended in order to 
conform to international reform demands on the PA. The Basic Law was further amended in 
2005, where all references to the interim period were eliminated. This process of drafting and 
amending conforms to Teitel‘s observation that constitution making under transitions is an 
evolutionary process whereby constitutions are created in fits and starts: ―Despite our ordinary 
notions of constitutional law as the most forward-looking and enduring of legal forms, transitional 
constitution-making is frequently impermanent, and involves gradual change.‖41 Consequently, 
the concept of reform is central to this discussion. The 2003 amendment was part of a whole 
range of measures aimed at streamlining the Palestinian security sector, enhancing financial 
transparency and reforming Palestinian institutions. Reflecting a wide array of political agendas, 
the Palestinian political system was converted from a presidential to a semi-presidential system. 
Here, Palestinian constitutional development will be measured against the expressed goals of the 
2003 amendment, which was to enhance cabinet power and weaken the presidency.  
In an essay on Middle Eastern reform, Marina Ottaway distinguishes between cosmetic 
and significant reforms. Cosmetic reforms are reforms that do not affect the distribution of power, 
but that are deliberately designed to give the appearance of change, while at the same time 
preventing change.42 Reforms are significant when they ―start altering the distribution of power 
and the character of the political system‖.43 Ottaway argues that significant reforms must induce a 
political paradigm shift whereby those in control, and also their opponents, abandon ―old 
assumptions about the fundamental organization of the polity, the relation between the 
government and the citizens, and thus the source, distribution, and exercise of political power‖.44 
Reform measures should have an effect in a five year perspective, not in the distant future.45 
Significant reforms affect or have the potential for affecting ―the distribution of power and to 
                                                 
41
 Teitel, ―Transitional Jurisprudence,‖ 2057. 
42
 Marina Ottaway, ―Evaluating Middle East Reform: How Do We Know When It Is Significant?,‖ Carnegie 
Endowment Democracy and Rule of Law Program, Middle East Series, No. 56 (Washington: February 2005), 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CP56.Ottaway.FINAL.pdf (last accessed 22 January 2008), 11. 
43
 Ottaway, ―Evaluating Middle East Reform,‖ 3. 
44
 Ottaway, ―Evaluating Middle East Reform,‖ 6. 
45
 Ottaway, ―Evaluating Middle East Reform,‖ 9. 
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make power subject to a popular mandate. They must contribute to limitations on the executive, 
allow the emergence of other centres of power and introduce an element of pluralism‖.46  
Glenn E. Robinson has pointed out that the main ruling strategies for the old PLO elite 
were personalization and deinstitutionalization of politics.47 In the context of the PA, reforms that 
would challenge old assumptions about power would be reforms that strengthened institutions on 
behalf of individuals. I will discuss whether the constitutional amendment was able to play such a 
role. Ottaway‘s criteria will be applied whenever relevant to the discussion. 
Previous research 
Literature on the Oslo Accords and the PA has become increasingly critical. One strand of the 
literature has focused on the political culture within the in the PA. The emphasis has been on 
corruption, clientelism and the authoritative leadership style of the late president Arafat.48 Another 
strand of criticism has been directed towards the terms of the Oslo agreement itself and the 
impossibility of building functioning institutions under the conditions of the occupation and 
expansion of settlements.49  
Constitutional and legal issues in the PA have been treated extensively in As‘ad Ghanem‘s 
The Palestinian Regime:  A Partial Democracy. Published one year prior to the promulgation of 
the Basic Law, The Palestinian Regime shows how the negligence of constitutional and legal 
issues in the initial years of the PA hampered democratic development. Ghanem argues that the 
local political structures that had emerged under the first intifada were ―frozen‖ by the Oslo 
Accords, and that the new structure set up by the PLO was undemocratic and noncompetitive.50 
Ghanem provides a thorough presentation of the internal decision making procedures within the 
PLC, the formal power structures of the PL and the first Palestinian elections.  
Nathan J. Brown has written extensively on Arab constitutions in general and the 
Palestinian Basic Law in particular. In Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional world: Arab Basic 
Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Governments, the Palestinian Basic Law is discussed in 
the broader context of Arab constitution making from the 19
th
 century until today. In Palestinian 
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Politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine, he provides a detailed account of 
Palestinian legislative affairs with a focus the domestic dimension of Palestinian political 
development and reform efforts. Brown specifically aims to gain an understanding of Palestinian 
politics that transcends the conflict with Israel. In exploring the prospects for accountable 
governance, democracy and the rule of law, he emphasizes the Palestinian past and its links with 
its regional counterparts.51 Brown shows how the dialectic relationship between domestic and 
international affairs affects Palestinian constitutional development. However, Palestinian Politics 
after the Oslo Accords does not cover the 2003 and 2005 amendments, which are central in this 
thesis. These topics have been dealt with by Brown in a number of recent reports by Brown,  and 
this thesis leans heavily on his work. 52 
Nigel Parsons‘ The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa53 gives an 
account of the transformation of the PLO from a liberation movement to a national authority. 
While the Basic Law itself is not a central topic in this work, it provides detailed accounts of 
decision making procedures within the PA, the PLO and Fatah as well as PA legislation. This 
forms a crucial background to an understanding of constitutional development in the PA. 
A number of recent reports have also provided vital information. Brown has written 
extensively on the Basic Law and reform efforts in the PA. In a PASSIA publication, Roland 
Friedrich presents the security laws, which is closely related to the constitutional reform of 
2003.
54
 A Special Nordem Report by Nils Butenschøn and Kåre Vollan in 2006 gives a thorough 
presentation of the electoral system in the PA and by extension useful insight into legal and 
constitutional issues from 1993 to the present.
 55
  
While of a newer date, this literature does not specifically address the effect of the 
emergence of Hamas on constitutional development. Brown‘s reports are a marked exception, but 
his reports focus on the post-electoral effect of Hamas‘ political participation. This thesis, 
however, attempts to show how Hamas‘ participation and internal troubles in Fatah affected the 
broader constitutional framework in a process that started prior to the elections.  
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Methodological concerns 
My approach to analyze Palestinian constitutional development is a combination of semi-
structured interviews and text analysis of constitutional texts. In analyzing the constitutional texts, 
I try to explain why changes were made in the text. This points to underlying agendas that are not 
explicit in the text. The next question is then how this has affected the text. I approached the texts 
with the basic assumption that the choices were motivated by a blend of normative and partisan 
considerations. By systematically checking for continuity in the constitutional texts, we can 
describe the evolution of the Palestinian political system. Divergences between the written 
constitution and stated goals hint at other motives that might have been controversial or 
irreconcilable.56 Brown points out that ―discerning the origin of an idea is often an exercise in 
unearthing archeological layers‖.57 Whereas the Roadmap was imposed on the Palestinians by the 
Quartet, many of the provisions in it had been borrowed from domestic ideas and documents. 
These domestic agendas were in turn influenced by various international experts. Here, the focus 
will not be to trace the sources of ideas, but to pinpoint how these ideas have been transplanted 
into the various legislative texts. In order to investigate why the Basic Law turned out the way it 
did, or whether it has been able to affect political outcomes, it is also necessary to go beyond the 
text. Oral sources can be a useful supplement to written sources. Field interviews with political 
actors may further contextualize help to place the written material.58  
Fieldwork  
In order to discuss the political context of the constitution, I draw on a compilation of secondary 
sources: periodicals, reports, news items, periodicals and monographies. In addition, I conducted 
about 30 semi-structured qualitative interviews in Gaza and Ramallah. Most of the interviews 
were conducted during a field work specifically made for the purpose of this thesis during the 
summer of 2005. I also draw on my experience as an observer to the PLC elections in 2006 and 
previous trips to Palestine. After my last visit in 2006, I have conducted e-mail interviews. 
I conducted my field work in July and August 2005, almost two years previous to some of 
the main events that this thesis aims to explain. At that time, a new election law was being drafted, 
proposals for further amendments of the Basic Law were being discussed, and Hamas was 
performing very well in the municipal elections that had been initiated after the death of Arafat in 
2004.59 These topics were often touched upon by my informants, also when I did not specifically 
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ask in advance. As the events of 2006 and 2007 played out, I discovered that this material was 
also applicable in an analysis of the post-election events. With recordings and transcriptions of the 
interviews, it was possible to reread the material. As I then had a clear idea of what I was looking 
for, there is a danger that I was predisposed to interpret the transcripts in a certain way. A skewed 
approach is, however, a danger to any level of the qualitative field work from the initial 
formulation of questions and selection of informants to the final analysis. I can only hope that 
going over the material again with a new focus served to enhance my understanding, rather than 
narrowing it.  
In order to obtain credible information, it is vital that your informants have direct access to 
the information requested.60 I had decided to interview politicians from as many factions as 
possible, preferably on cabinet as well as PLC level in order to ensure informants who had been 
close to decision making processes. I had also decided to seek informants from within the PLO, 
and as high up as possible. In addition, I wanted to talk to representatives from the NGO sector, 
academe and media. The idea was to find out as much as possible about the internal decision 
making processes and relative power distribution within and between these various sectors.  
Interviews with informants tend to introduce new topics of interest. 61 My plan was to 
conduct qualitative and semi-structured interviews with selective use of an interview guide which 
would allow me to pose new and potentially more interesting questions. Informants may also 
provide access information that is not generally known.62 In verifying such information, I was able 
to obtain written material that is not readily available, such as legislative proposals and websites 
that are now offline.  
The hospitality and helpfulness of my informants made it possible to interview members 
of the PLO Revolutionary Council and Executive Committee, the Fatah Central Committee, 
independent PLC members63, Fatah PLC members, representatives of Fida, Fatah, Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad64, former cabinet ministers, employees in the PA bureaucracy, local journalists, 
academics and representatives from the NGO sector. I was confronted with a variety of 
perspectives on the ongoing political processes. Views and facts were offered by individuals who 
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were either knowledgeable about Palestinian politics, or who had themselves participated in the 
political process on the executive level in the PA or the PLO, or as lawmakers. The interviews 
form an indispensable backdrop for my discussion and helped me to place, correct and deepen my 
understanding of the written texts. 
Whenever I discovered that sources had provided me with factual mistakes, this would 
indicate to me whether a source was credible. In order to ―recognize distortions, fabrications, and 
omissions‖,65 I consciously asked the same specific questions to various sources to see if they 
would provide me with the same answers. Whenever the informants made conflicting or 
controversial statements, I asked follow-up questions to confirm their statements or explain 
apparent inconsistencies. I would also ask other informants to comment so that I had several 
sources for topics that I was particularly interested in. Transcripts may also be compared to other 
sources of information, such as documents and news clippings and academic literature. I have 
worked consciously to check information obtained from my informants against secondary 
literature and original sources that could be obtained in English.  
The texts 
As anticipated, the interviews conducted in 2005 did in fact bring about new questions of interest. 
I became more interested in legal and constitutional reforms as opposed to the informal power 
structures. The selection of written sources was gradually broadened as my understanding of the 
topic and knowledge of available data was enhanced. Simultaneously, my focus narrowed. I have 
looked exclusively at paragraphs relating directly to the relative power distribution in executive-
legislative relations, intra-executive relations, and PA-PLO relations. The PLO is included as it 
represents the higher reference of the PA. How the PLO Executive Committee perceives and 
plays its role bears directly on what kind of role the successive Palestinian cabinets have been able 
to play. While the PLO operates beyond and above the Basic Law, the PLO Executive Committee 
played a key role in determining the rules of competition by choosing the electoral system and 
offsetting the first Palestinian council. The PLO also provided the early drafts for the Basic Law. 
The statutes and political culture of the PLO furnish the PA with a body of rules and norms that 
define the internal parameters for the application and interpretation of the Basic Law during and 
potentially beyond the Israeli occupation.  
Legislative texts are of a normative character and reflect what parties were able to agree 
on at a given time. Additional sources are needed to tell us to what extent they were implemented. 
Many laws passed by the PLC were not signed; those that were signed were not implemented; and 
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the presidency and other bodies in the executive moved completely outside the formal legal 
framework when they wished.66 An analysis of Palestinian legislative texts will not provide 
answers to questions like «what is really going on?» or «what is the true address of power?» It 
certainly will not tell us how politics is conducted in the PA. What it will tell us is which 
constitutional choices have been made during the course of the PA. Whereas motives and 
deliberations may be hard to check, written changes, omissions and proposals are verifiable. 
In some instances, rejected or omitted articles have been more reflective of the way power 
is really exercised than the texts that were eventually ratified. Omitted clauses regarding the role 
of the PLO are examples to that. In other instances, rejected proposals were implemented by 
presidential decree, as was the case with the proposed inclusion of a National Security Council in 
the Basic Law in 2005. In some instances the texts or amendments of them have contravened 
either the Oslo Accords or the stated intention of reform drafts, such as the privilege of the 
president of the PA to appoint diplomats. In cases where implementation diverged from the stated 
goal, it leads us to a better understanding of the underlying agendas behind the reform proposals.  
The 2002 Basic Law (hereafter referred to as ―the PLC Basic Law‖) was written by the 
PLC and was the last of a total of nine drafts. I contrast and compare this draft with the third and 
fourth drafts, which were written by the PLO. The translations of the PLO drafts are provided by 
the Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre (JMCC), which features a compilation of 
various historical agreements and documents on their website. The JCMM is a well known and 
established institution, and I therefore consider the translations found there to be reliable. Ideally, I 
would have compared the total chain of drafts, but it would have been a daunting task, and these 
were the only drafts that were publicly available in English. It seems likely that they were no less 
representative of PLO constitutional thinking than the first and second drafts. The PLC Basic Law 
is compared and contrasted with the current Basic Law as it was amended in 2003 (hereafter 
referred to as the Amended Basic Law or the 2003 Basic Law) and the proposed and actual 2005 
amendment of the Basic Law.67 The 2002 Basic Law is drawn from the webpage of Miftah, an 
NGO run by PLC member Hanan Ashrawi, so I find the translation to be reliable. The translations 
of the 2003 and 2005 amendments are taken from the webpage of Bir Zeit University‘s al-Muqtafi 
legal database. The various drafts, proposals and amendments vary in ways that reveal the 
tensions between the different agendas pursued by the drafters as well as their intended audience.  
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Table 1. Main primary sources 
Name Status Access 
The PLO 1994 third draft for 
Basic Law 
Not passed 
http://www.jmcc.org/politics/ 
pna/basic2.htm 
The PLO 1995 fourth draft 
for a Basic Law 
Not passed 
http://www.jmcc.org/politics/ 
pna/basic1.htm 
The PLC Basic Law 
Passed by the PLC in 1997, 
ratified by Arafat in 2002 
http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm? 
DocId=790&CategoryId=7  
The Amended Basic Law Ratified in 2003 
http://muqtafi.birzeit.edu/ 
data/txt/2005/14860.htm 
2005 amendment proposals Rejected 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070608180556/ 
http://www.palestinianbasiclaw.org/2005-
proposals 
The 2005 amendment Ratified in 2005 
http://muqtafi.birzeit.edu/ 
data/txt/2005/14860.htm 
 
Translations and usage 
Names of government branches and the PA vary in different draft laws, laws, document and 
agreements. These variations reveal conflicting ambitions on behalf of Israeli and Palestinian as 
well as the different phases of the Oslo process and how the various branches of the PA came to 
perceive themselves. For the sake of readability I will, except in cases of direct quotation, refer to 
the various entities in the following manner: The Palestinian Interim Self-Government has been 
referred to as the Palestinian Authority (PA), the National Authority and the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA). I will refer to it as the Palestinian Authority (PA). The Executive has been 
referred to as Council of National Authority, Cabinet, Government, or Council of Ministers. I will 
refer to it as the cabinet. The president has sometimes been referred to with the Arabic term rais, a 
term which will not be used here. The term ―council‖ will here only refer to the Palestinian 
Legislative Council, the PLC. In the early drafts, the prime minister was been referred to as chief 
minister, a term which will not be used here.  
Names of ministerial portfolios have varied slightly due to shifting cabinet formations. 
These distinctions are not relevant to my topic and will not be discussed. There is, however, one 
significant exception concerning the field of foreign affairs, which the PA under Oslo was not 
supposed to conduct. External affairs were conducted under various portfolios dubbed external 
affairs, negotiations, planning, international planning and various combinations of the above. 
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After the 2003 amendment of the Basic Law, the Ministry of Negotiations was transformed into a 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Nabil Shaath assumed the title of foreign minister. The issue 
goes beyond semantics. The emergence and role of a Palestinian minister of foreign affairs came 
to be contested in a way that highlights the gray constitutional area between the PLO and the PA. 
This will be thoroughly discussed in chapter six. 
Thesis outline 
The chapters of this thesis are grouped in three sections. In the first section, chapters two through 
four deal with the drafting of the Basic Law with a focus on which forces and agendas shaped the 
final result. In chapter two, early PLO drafts are compared to the PLC drafted Basic Law in their 
quality as legal texts. The nature of the Palestinian political system is outlined with a focus on 
executive-legislative relations and PA-PLO relations. We see how the Basic Law has been 
affected by the political context surrounding the drafting process. Chapter three focuses on the 
2003 constitutional amendment, which converted the Palestinian political system from a 
presidential to a semi-presidential type of government. The presidency was constitutionally 
weakened to the advantage of the cabinet and the prime minister. The various agendas that drove 
the reforms and the related amendment are presented along with the immediate impact of the new 
premiership. The 2003 amendment is discussed in light of the criteria for significant reforms. 
Chapter four focuses on constitutional development from 2005 to 2006 with emphasis on the 
development of the presidency and the 2005 amendment of the Basic Law and the new election 
law in relation to Hamas‘ decision to participate in elections, and whether developments presents 
a continuity or a break with the 2003 amendment.  
The second section of the thesis relates to the second main question, which is whether the 
Basic Law has been able to affect political outcomes. The main focus is on the impact of the 2003 
amendment, and whether the ―empowered reform cabinet‖ was able to exercise its powers as laid 
out in the Amended Basic Law. Chapter five focuses specifically on the field of security. The 
2003 amendment was explicitly aimed at consolidating the security forces under the cabinet. The 
chapter discusses how the president immediately set out to undermine the reforms, and how 
perceptions of the usefulness of such a reform changed after the death of President Arafat in 2004. 
This gives an understanding of whether the reforms were cosmetic or real. Chapter six takes on 
the challenge posed to the cabinet by the PLO, which has also been headed by the PA president. A 
less known aspect of the 2003 reforms was the effort to establish a Palestinian foreign ministry 
and to restructure Palestinian diplomacy under the PA cabinet. The formation of a Hamas cabinet 
in 2006 highlights how deliberate vacillation between PLO and PA legitimacy was not only a 
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strategy employed by Arafat, but by all parties involved in dealings with the Palestinians. This is 
relevant to whether or not the cabinet was able to exercise its powers as ascribed in the Amended 
Basic Law, and whether the reforms were cosmetic or real. 
Section III returns to the first main question, which is how political interests have 
influenced constitutional development. As Fatah was reduced to a minority in the PLC, efforts to 
influence constitutional development shifted from constitution drafting to constitutional 
interpretation. Chapter seven outlines the process to pass the High Constitutional Court Law that 
favored the presidency in nominating judges for the Constitutional Court. The drafting process 
and final amendments made by the president is discussed in light of the gist of the 2002-2003 
reforms. Finally, chapter eight deals specifically with the constitutional aspects of the intra-
executive conflict between President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh‘s two 
successive cabinets and the split between Gaza and the West Bank in the summer of 2007. The 
various prerogatives claimed by Abbas and Haniyeh are discussed in light of the 2003 
amendment. 
I will argue that the 2003 amendment was gradually reversed in a process that accelerated 
with the increasing influence of Hamas. In the immediate aftermath, President Arafat actively 
sought to undercut it. Prior to the 2006 parliamentary elections, decisions were made that aimed to 
stem Hamas‘ performance, and to bolster Fatah and the PA president. This furthered undermined 
the amendment. After the election victory in 2006, the reversal was complete with the 
international boycott of the PA cabinet in favor of the presidency. 
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PART I: DRAFTING AND AMENDING THE BASIC LAW 
The governing system in Palestine shall be a democratic parliamentary system based on political 
and party pluralism.  
- Article 5 of the PLC Basic Law 
2. 1994-1997: The Logic of the Palestinian Basic Law 
This part of the thesis concerns how various political interests shaped the Basic Law. Before the 
Basic Law, the PA institutions were based on signed agreements with Israel, and there was a 
widespread desire to supplant this basis with Palestinian laws.68 While the Israelis were hoping 
that the autonomy project would serve as a safety vault for Palestinian frustrations and solve 
Israeli security concerns, Palestinians were trying to supersede the limitations of Oslo and create 
institutions that would survive the Interim period and symbolically herald Palestinian 
independence. The Basic Law echoes a more ambitious vision of the PA with stronger institutions 
and references to future statehood than what the Oslo Accords allowed for.  
Internally, there were also conflicting visions of the purpose of the Basic Law. PLO 
chairman and PA President Yasser Arafat and the PLO Executive Committee did not necessarily 
want to be constricted by a strong and independent elected assembly. The PLC, on the other hand, 
wanted to create a Basic Law that would ―channel permanent arrangements in liberal and 
democratic directions‖.69 In other words, the PLO drafters wrote with a nonconstitutionalist Basic 
Law with few limitations on the presidency, whereas the PLC sought a constitutionalist Basic 
Law with real limitations on the executive.  
Bearing the constitutionalist-nonconstitutionalist dichotomy in mind, I will now compare 
the 1994 and 1995 PLO drafts of the Basic Law to the PLC drafted Basic Law which was passed 
by the PLC in 1997. As the drafting process moved on, the PLO gradually lost control of the 
process to the advantage of the elected PLC. What were the main features of the political system 
envisioned in the various drafts, and what were the main interests that bore on the texts?  
The Palestinian electoral system 
Before proceeding to define the nature of the Palestinian political system, we must briefly 
consider the electoral system. Electoral systems are an integral part of the architecture of new 
constitutions and bear directly on the choice of type of government. They are highly manipulative 
instruments, and they directly affect the party system and the ―spectrum of representation‖.70 
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Broadly speaking, the main choices are between majority based elections and proportional 
representation.71 In majority based systems, the candidates need at least 50 percent of the votes to 
be elected. In proportional systems, parliament seats will be distributed as close as possible to the 
number of votes cast by the electorate. Generally, proportional elections are associated with 
parliamentary systems, while majority based elections are associated with presidential forms of 
government. Comparative studies have showed that while majoritarian elections are likely to 
produce two-party systems, one-party governments and dominant executives, proportional 
elections are likely to foster multiparty systems, coalition governments and more equal executive-
legislative power relations.72 
Proportional systems seek to translate the vote into a distribution of seats that reflects the 
voting distribution, while majoritarian systems seek a clear winner. Whereas in proportional 
systems, winning is shared, the party gaining a national majority in a majoritarian election will 
tend to be overrepresented in terms of parliamentary seats.73 This also makes it hard for smaller 
parties to obtain representation under majoritarian elections. The debate over proportional versus 
majoritarian systems concerns the relative importance attached to representativeness of 
government versus the capacity to govern.74 I do not aspire to contribute to this debate, and both 
systems can be seen as equal in their potential for democratic development.75 The aim here is to 
examine the correlation between stated objectives and actual choices. 
The two most common majority based systems are the so-called ―First past the post‖, 
where the candidate with the most votes in a single member constituency wins the election, and 
the so-called ―block vote‖, which takes place in multi-member districts where the voters have as 
many votes as there are seats to be filled.76 The latter kind of system is the one that was chosen for 
the first Palestinian electoral law, Elections Law No 13 of 1995. As majoritarian systems are 
generally known to favor two party systems, the block vote is unusual in multi party elections.77 
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Kåre Vollan points out that: ―If the party structure is well defined and the voters are loyal to a 
party, this system will not guarantee a large minority seats in the Council. On the contrary: the 
largest party would get all their candidates elected if the voters were loyal to their parties.‖78 In the 
first PLC elections, there was a real chance that hardly any opposition candidate would get 
elected. The system did, however, give popular individuals a chance to get elected.79 Hani al-
Hassan, member of the Fatah Central Committee and former interior minister, refers to the 
inclusion of pro Fatah independents as a ―tactic to win the public‖: ―Sometimes you are popular 
within Fatah, but if you go to elections you don‘t win, because you need the support of the 
community, and the community is based on families and tribes.‖80 The block vote system was 
chosen in order to deliver a majority for Fatah and pro-Arafat independents. The system favored 
large notable families and wealthy individuals with a regional power base. Critics claimed that the 
system was unsuitable in a new democracy that had just emerged from a national crisis, and that it 
would not motivate the smaller factions to enter the race.81 
In the first PLC elections, Fatah won 68 out 88 seats. Independent seculars won 12 seats, 
political Islam-oriented independent candidates won 7 seats, whereas a small secular party 
managed to secure 1 seat.82 According to Butenschøn and Vollan, Fatah could have taken almost 
all the seats if they had wanted, but they allowed Fatah candidates to run as independents rather 
than official Fatah candidates so as to avoid seeming to organize ―a pure Fatah election‖.83 One of 
the reasons given for the choice of this kind of system was that it would ensure a stable ruling 
majority in the council.84 The Basic Law‘s stated goal of pluralism was not met as a result of 
electoral representation. Rather, pluralism was dispensed by the president as he co-opted parts of 
the opposition into positions in the cabinet or bureaucracy as a way of maintaining pluralism 
while at the same time neutralizing the opposition.85  
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The Palestinian system of government 
I will argue that the Palestinian political system was presidential until 2003, when an amendment 
to the Basic Law turned it into a semi-presidential system. It is also possible to argue that the 2003 
amendment turned the PA from a semi-presidential into a parliamentary rule.86 The viability of the 
concept of semi-presidentialism is contested. Robert Elgie criticizes Sartori‘s definition because it 
refers to relational properties and thereby introduces an element of subjectivity into the 
classification process.87 Alan Siaroff argues that the concept of semi-presidentialism is 
superfluous, and offers a set of criteria to measure the relative powers of the president vis-à-vis 
parliament, rather than vis-à-vis the cabinet.88  
Definition matters because it determines classing, which in turn determines what 
conclusions can be drawn about the performance of a certain kind of regime.89 The goal here is 
neither to add to the body of conclusions as to semi-presidential systems, nor to contribute to the 
discussion of whether semi-presidentialism is a valid category. The aim is to broaden our 
understanding of Palestinian constitutional history. I have chosen to apply the definitions offered 
by Sartori, as they to my opinion provide the most useful tool for discussing the various 
components of executive-legislative relations in the PA. By that particular set of definitions, the 
PA has evolved from a purely presidential to a semi-presidential system.  
The Basic Law explicitly states that the PA is to be a parliamentary system. However, the 
distribution of authorities within the PA does not confer to that of a parliamentary system. 
―Parliamentarism‖ refers to several variants of executive-legislative arrangements. The lowest 
common denominator for all these forms is the presence of power sharing, as opposed to the 
separation of powers that characterizes presidential systems. Separation of power requires that the 
executive is separated from parliamentary support, whereas power sharing means that the 
executive is dependent on parliamentary support in order to govern.90 Whereas a parliament-
created government ―is, at least in intent and origin, a part of parliament,‖ a ―president-created 
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government is its counterpart‖.91 For a system to be called parliamentary, it requires the presence 
of a prime minister to head the cabinet.  
Sartori defines three sets of criteria for a political system to be defined as presidential. In a 
presidential system, the president must be elected in a direct and popular election for a fixed term, 
the president cannot be discharged by a parliamentary vote, and the president directs the 
governments that he or she nominates and appoints. ―When these three conditions are jointly met, 
then we doubtlessly have a pure presidential system – or so says my definition.‖92 Under the PLC 
Basic Law, the president is directly elected for the interim period, the president cannot be 
discharged by the PLC, and the president appoints and directs the cabinet. Consequently, the PLC 
Basic Law will here be seen as providing for a presidential system. Although the early PLO drafts 
for a Basic Law did provide for a prime minister, the PLO drafts will also be seen as introducing 
presidentialism. The argument will be elaborated on below.  
According to Sartori, the one defining and necessary requirement for semi-presidentialism 
to exist is that the president must share power with a prime minister, who in turn must obtain 
continuous support from parliament. The semi-presidential system must have a dual authority 
structure and establish a diarchy between a president who is head of state, and a prime minister 
who heads the government.93 Sartori stipulates that a system is semi-presidential when the 
following characteristics jointly apply: 1) the head of state (president) is elected by a popular vote 
for a fixed term of office, 2) the head of state shares the executive power with a prime minister, 3) 
the president is independent from parliament, but is not entitled to govern alone and directly, 4) 
the prime minister and his cabinet are president-independent in that they are parliamentary-
dependent: they are subject to either parliamentary confidence or no confidence, and they need the 
support of a parliamentary majority, 5) the dual authority structure of semi-presidentialism allows 
for different balances of power within the executive, provided that the ‗autonomy potential‘ of 
each component unit of the executive subsists.94 According to the criteria above, the 2003 
amendment of the Basic Law will here be seen as introducing a semi-presidential system in the 
PA by creating a prime minister. The role of the prime minister will be further elaborated in 
chapter three. 
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The PLO drafts: Nonconstitutional presidentialism 
The PLO drafts discussed below are the third and fourth drafts, dated 1 May 1994 and 11 
December 1995. There are two interesting features to the drafts. The first is how the drafters 
envisioned the linkage between the PLO and the PA, which would have served to entrench the 
role of the PLO elite and provide the president with multiple sources of authority. The second is 
the role of the chief minister (hereafter prime minister), which hinted at a dual power structure 
within the executive. I will now describe what kind of political system was envisioned in the 
drafts and discuss to what extent they would have limited executive power. 
Both PLO drafts state that the Basic Law ―shall not affect the powers and duties of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization and its organs including its powers to represent the Palestinian 
people in foreign and international relations and relations with foreign governments and 
international organizations‖ (Art 103, 1994 PLO draft; Art 117, 1995 PLO draft). This article 
places the PLO beyond the oversight of the PLC, which is due to the limited representativity of 
the PA as opposed to the PLO. However, it also provided President Arafat with a source of 
authority whereby he could legitimately act above the limitations of a constitutional framework. 
Critics at the time argued that the 1994 draft would impose the old order on the new 
political regime and embed the PLO, its chairman and the PLO bureaucracy in the new system.95 
In response to this criticism, several disputed paragraphs were removed in the 1995 draft. The 
omitted paragraphs are noteworthy because in spite of their disappearance, they are more 
reflective of the way politics was in fact conducted than were later drafts. The 1994 draft 
establishes the PLO Executive Committee as a ―reference authority‖ to the council (Art 58). 
Especially interesting is Article 50, which states that:  
The Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO shall be the President and the head of the National 
Authority and shall exercise the powers prescribed for him in the Basic Laws of the PLO, the resolutions of 
the Palestine National Council, the Central Council of the PLO and the Executive Committee of the PLO as 
well as the powers prescribed in the Basic Law. 
 
While the provision is not to be found in later drafts, this was in fact how Arafat came to exercise 
his power. Arafat had a dual position as PA and PLO leader, and he consistently refused to make 
clear in which capacity he was acting on particular measures.96 On the level of principles, the 
implications of Art 50 were of a different nature. While allowing the president to consciously 
draw on the legitimacy of the PLO in actions only pertaining to Palestinians living within PA 
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jurisdiction, it also placed the PA within the broader context of liberation and independence. The 
1994 draft of the Basic Law aimed at confirming the PLO‘s role as a larger political entity 
representing millions of refugees that remained outside of PA jurisdiction. The PLO firmly 
positioned itself as a political player with powers beyond the limited authorities vested in the PA. 
Art 63 of the 1994 draft states that ministers would also answer directly to the Executive 
Committee, and not to the president or the prime minister (Art 63, 1994 PLO draft). This setup 
would leave the prime minister with ministers that he cannot fire, and that he does not appoint. 
Moreover, while the prime minister has the authority to convene council meetings, so does the 
president (Art 68, 1994 PLO draft). Cabinet meetings are to be presided over by the president if 
he is present, and if not, by the prime minister (Art 68, 1994 PLO draft). Art 64 does state that the 
prime minister is to direct the work of the council, but in light of the actual authorities awarded to 
the prime minister, he cannot be considered as ―really in charge‖.97 In the 1995 draft, these tasks 
are not referred to at all. The prime minister is awarded the authority to deputize for the president 
in the opening of parliamentary sessions (Art 53, 1995 PLO draft). He neither appoints nor 
dismisses ministers, but may propose a motion of no confidence in the cabinet before the council 
(Art 84, 1995 PLO draft). The president, not the prime minister, is to open each session of the 
council and lay out the program of ―his government‖ (Art 53, 1995 PLO draft). The president 
appoints the cabinet, although approval must be obtained by the council (Art 78.2, 1995 PLO 
draft).  
Art 78.3 mirrors Art V.4.c from the Interim Agreement, stating that the president may 
appoint a number of nonmembers of the elected council as ministers not exceeding 20 percent. 
Unelected ministers would owe their position to the president, and not to the electorate. The prime 
minister and the cabinet are here jointly and individually responsible to the president and the 
council (Art 83, 1995 PLO draft). The president serves for a fixed term (Art 52, PLO draft; Art 
70, 1995 PLO draft). He is commander in chief of the Palestinian forces (Art 54, 1994 PLO draft; 
and Art 72, 1995 PLO draft), and exercises his power through resolutions and decrees (Art 57, 
1994 PLO draft, Art 75, 1995 PLO draft). The president‘s legislative power is spelled out in 
further detail in the 1995 draft: ―The President has the power to initiate or propose laws to the 
council or issue secondary legislation, including Orders and Regulations if authorised to do so by 
the primary law‖ (Art 73.2, 1995 PLO draft). In conclusion, the role of the prime minister was 
weakened from the 1994 to the 1995 drafts. Conversely, the role of the president became stronger 
and more defined. 
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Juan Linz has stated that ―parliamentary systems may include presidents who are elected 
by direct popular vote, but they usually lack the ability to compete seriously for power with the 
prime minister‖.98 In this case the prime minister would not be in a position to compete with the 
president. This position was in fact progressively weakened throughout the drafting process, and 
neither of the PLO drafts can be seen as introducing a dual power structure. We have here a 
directly elected president who sits for a fixed term (the interim period), and who for all practical 
purposes leads the government that is nominated and appointed by the PLO Executive 
Committee, who in this case is also the president. Hence, two of Sartori‘s three criteria for a 
purely presidential system are met.  
I will now outline the requirements for parliamentary oversight and limitations on the 
executive in the PLO drafts, which relate to Sartori‘s third criteria of parliamentary support. Semi-
presidentialism would require the presence of a prime minister, but it would also require that the 
prime minister depends on continuous support from parliament99 In the case of the 1994 draft, 
there is a prime minister post, but no requirement of parliamentary support. In the 1995 draft, Art 
60.6 and 60.7 states that the council is to approve the appointment of cabinet ministers and 
withdraw confidence in the cabinet or individual ministers. At least 10 members of the council 
may propose a vote of confidence in the cabinet, and a simple majority would require the 
presentation of the cabinet or minister‘s resignation to the president (Art 84). Art 77 states that the 
president has the power to accept resignations, but he may not be required to do so. While Art 
60.6 states that the council is to approve the appointment of ministers, there are no provisions 
specifying how or when such approval is to be obtained, or what would happen if confidence was 
not granted. Art 60 states that the council is to approve laws, debate the policy of the cabinet, and 
approve the budget. The council is not awarded a central lace in lawmaking, but is consigned to 
proposing ―the enactment of laws‖ (Art 59) or rubber stamping laws that are proposed by the 
ministers (Art 87.4) and the president (Art 73.2). 
Both drafts refer to the existence of an audit office, a judicial authority with a supreme 
court, a chief justice, and an attorney-general. Nomination, appointment and endorsement 
procedures are not referred to, leaving an obstruction free zone for the president to use such 
appointments for patronage (Art 91, 94, 96 and 101 in the 1994 PLO draft; and Art 105, 108-109, 
110 and 115-116 in the 1995 PLO draft).  
The PLO drafts provided for an elected assembly and allowed for a dual power structure 
by the introduction of a prime minister. At first glance, it might seem that the PLO drafts provide 
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for a semi-presidential kind of system. However, Sartori has argued that political systems ―hang 
together … on account of a system logic of their own: ―Thus, before reassigning presidentialism 
to another class – whether semi-presidentialism, near-parliamentarism, and the like – we must 
check whether a given variance violates that logic or not.‖100 As argued above, the PLO drafts 
provided for a weak elected council with diffuse legislative powers, undefined procedures for the 
granting of confidence to the cabinet, which cannot question the president, and with no clearly 
defined role in accepting appointments for key positions in the judiciary or other public councils 
and institutions. While the council‘s role was enhanced from the third to the fourth draft, the 
prime minister was correspondingly weakened. Even while it could be argued that the presence of 
a dual power structure would allow for a semi-presidential system, the underlying system logic is 
purely presidential. Furthermore the drafts did not enable the parliament to efficiently control the 
executive. By enabling the president while leaving the PLC and the prime minister with a vague 
and limited role, the PLO drafts would have provided for a nonconstitutionalist presidency. 
The PLC Basic Law: Constitutional presidentialism 
With the PLC elections in 1996, a new power center was established in the Palestinian political 
system. By discarding the PLO drafts, the PLC gave itself the opportunity to strive towards a 
stronger role within the PA. The PLC‘s Basic Law differs markedly from the PLO drafts in 
several ways. The Palestinian leadership realized the symbolic value of having a constitution, but 
they were reluctant to be constrained by formalities during an existential struggle. In contrast, 
Palestinian constitutionalists wanted a constitution that would impose real limitations on executive 
power, seeking to establish a normal political life in which not all matters were subordinate to the 
national struggle. They feared that postponing a real institutionalization of power would establish 
deep seated practices that would be detrimental to a future Palestinian liberal democracy.101 The 
Basic Law as it was passed by the PLC in 1997 provided for a strong presidency, but was more 
dominated by constitutionalism than had been the early PLO drafts. 
The main differences between the PLO and the PLC drafts lie in the near total absence of 
the PLO in the PLC draft, the total absence of the prime minister, and the considerably more 
detailed role awarded to the council. Whereas the PLO drafts had formalized the PLO as an 
important point of reference for the PA, the PLC Basic Law only mentions the PLO in Art 8, 
stating that ―The flag of Palestine shall be in four colors and in accordance with the dimensions 
and measurements approved by the Palestine Liberation Organization.‖ In reality, Arafat imposed 
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the PLO Executive Committee on the PLC and the cabinet respectively. This he did by 
demanding that Executive Committee members be awarded speaking rights in council sessions.102 
He also refused to meet the cabinet alone, but insisted on conducting joint leadership meetings 
with the cabinet and the Executive Committee.103 This weakened the cabinet as an institution, 
even though individual ministers wielded considerable personal power as part of the core 
leadership.104 
I will now briefly outline the presidential role as designed by the PLC, before I proceed to 
present the role of the council. Art 68 states that ―Ministers are responsible to the President of the 
National Authority‖ and the Cabinet ―is jointly responsible before the Legislative Council‖. Art 
62 authorizes the president to appoint and remove ministers and to preside over cabinet meetings. 
In removing the prime minister, these articles provide for a purely presidential regime, in which 
the president appoints and leads the cabinet. The president retains his rights to initiate and propose 
laws to the council (Art 58). Art 57.2 gives the president the opportunity to return a law to 
parliament with objections, in which case it would require a two thirds majority to pass the 
legislation. 
As for decisions and orders, Art 60 states that the president ―shall have the right in 
exceptional cases, which cannot be postponed, and while the Legislative Council is not in session, 
to issue decisions and decrees that have the power of law‖. In such cases, the decisions issued 
must be presented to the PLC in the first session convened after the issuance of the decision. If the 
PLC refuses to approve the decisions, ―they shall cease to have the power of law‖ (Art 60). This 
clause was designed to minimize the president‘s ability to act independently from the PLC in 
creating legislation. The intention was to prevent the president from marginalizing the PLC by 
creating legislative facts on the ground under a state of emergency.105  
The PLC Basic Law introduces emergency provisions, which had not been provided for in 
the PLO drafts. Presidents are generally awarded more extensive emergency powers than prime 
ministers in parliamentary systems.106 The Palestinian emergency provisions are, however, fairly 
strict. The president may declare a state of emergency by a decree when there is a threat to 
national security caused by war, invasion, armed insurrection, or a time of natural disaster for a 
period not to exceed thirty days (Art 101.1). The president needs an approval of two thirds of the 
legislative council in order to extend the state of emergency (Art 101.2). The decree must state the 
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purpose of the state of emergency and define what territories it applies to (Art 101.3). The PLC is 
authorized to review all or some of the procedures implemented during the state of emergency 
(Art 101.4). States of emergency have been used to shut down parliaments indefinitely.107 In order 
to prevent such misuse of emergency provisions, Art 104 states that the PLC cannot be dissolved 
or suspended during states of emergency. 
The legislative authority is dealt with in chapter three of the Basic Law. Art 43 elaborates 
on the requirements for parliamentary support. Whereas the 1995 draft Art 60.6 had stated that the 
council was to approve the appointment of cabinet ministers, it did not specify how confidence 
was to be obtained, or what would happen if ministers were not approved. In the PLC Basic Law, 
such procedures are defined. The Basic Law requires the president to present the cabinet to the 
legislative council ―in the first session for a vote of confidence, after listening to a Ministerial 
statement that defines the Governments policy and program‖ (Art 64.1). The affirmative vote of 
confidence requires an ―absolute majority of the Council‖ (Art 64.2).108 If confidence is not 
achieved, the president must then find a new ministerial candidate to be presented for a new vote 
in the PLC (Art 64.2-3). Sub clause 4 explicitly states that ―No Minister shall assume the duties of 
his position before obtaining the confidence of the Legislative Council.‖ In addition to requiring 
parliamentary support, the PLC Basic Law specified what would happen if such confidence was 
not granted. This aimed to ensure that parliamentary confidence would in fact be sought, and to 
prevent the president from stalling the process. The 1995 PLO drafts had given PLC members the 
right to question the government or individual ministers (Art 59). Also in this instance, the PLC 
Basic Law is considerably more detailed, stating that council members have the right to: 
Address inquiries and interrogatories to the Government or to any Minister, or alike. Interrogatories shall be 
discussed only seven days after submission, unless the addressee agrees to reply promptly or within a shorter 
notice. However, this period can be curtailed to three days in case of urgency as per the approval of the 
President of the National Authority (Art 43.2). 
 
After an interrogation, ten members may propose a vote of no confidence (Art 44.1). A council 
majority ―shall result in terminating the term of the party in whom confidence was lost (Art 44.2). 
The intention would be to prevent ministers from stalling requests from the PLC, and to provide 
the PLC with more efficient tools to hold ministers accountable. 
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While the 1995 PLO draft had stated that council members ―may propose the enactment 
of laws‖ (Art 59), the PLC Basic Law states that council members have the ―right to propose 
laws‖ (Art 43.1). Article 57 referring to the promulgation of laws by the president as considerably 
more detailed. In addition to requiring the president to promulgate laws after approval by the 
council, the president is obligated to return the laws to the council with comments and objections. 
If the president declines to either promulgate or return the law to the council within the specified 
time limit, the law shall be considered approved. If returned to the council, the council must 
debate it again and pass it with a two thirds majority (Art 57.1-2). In other words, the PLC Basic 
Law did not just state that the president could return laws to the PLC, but also stipulated 
procedures for what would happen next. This aimed to ensure the PLC a more defined role in the 
legislative process. 
The PLC Basic Law strengthened the role of the PLC in several ways, i.e. by introducing 
a role for the PLC in endorsing appointments for the Attorney General (Art 98), the Governor of 
the Monetary Authority (Art 84.2) and Chief of the Financial and Administrative Bureau (Art 87). 
As was the case in the PLO drafts, the PLC is to be presented with the budget at least two months 
before the beginning of the financial year (Art 61, 1995 PLO draft; Art 48, PLC Basic Law). The 
1995 PLO draft had stated that the budget cannot be operative unless it is approved by the council. 
However, there were no specified procedures as to how objections from the council should be 
handled, except that ―spending shall continue on the basis of monthly allocations of one twelfth of 
the previous budget for each month‖ (Art 103, 1995 PLO draft). The PLC Basic Law, however, 
states that if the budget is not ratified prior to the start of the new fiscal year, it should be sent back 
to the government within a month. (Art 48.2). ―The returned budget shall include the Council‘s 
comments, in order to complete the necessary requirements and return it to the Council for 
approval.‖ We see that the role of the elected council was enhanced, and the procedures regulating 
role in oversight became more detailed. On the other hand, it remained impossible to impeach or 
even question the president. According to Abdul Jawad Saleh, independent member of the first 
PLC member and former Minister of Agriculture (1996-1998), he proposed to include the 
possibility of impeachment in the Basic Law, but ―nobody even bothered to discuss it‖.109  
The PLC Basic Law does not provide for a dual power structure within the executive. The 
president is directly elected for a fixed term and cannot be discharged by a parliamentary vote, nor 
can he be questioned by parliament. The president appoints the cabinet and heads its operations. It 
is clear that by Sartori‘s definition we are dealing with a purely presidential system. We are also 
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dealing with a system that would have imposed real limitations on the presidency, albeit with a 
strong presidential role.  
Paradoxes in Palestinian constitutional design 
Kirsti Samuels has pointed out that constitutions need to result from participatory process rather 
than processes whereby ―the spoils‖ are divided between the political elites.110 A study by the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) on twelve cases of 
transitional constitution building indicates that the more representative and more inclusive 
constitution building processes resulted in constitutions favoring free and fair elections, greater 
political equality, more social justice provisions, human rights protections, and stronger 
accountability mechanisms.111 On the other hand, ―processes dominated by one interest or faction 
tended to result in constitutions favoring that interest or consolidating power in the hands of 
certain groups‖.112 The differences between the PLC drafts and the PLC Basic Law seem to 
confirm Samuels‘ observation, that participatory processes provide for stronger accountability 
mechanisms, where as processes dominated by one party tend to entrench the interests of that 
party. The Basic Law drafting process started out as an exclusive and PLO dominated process, but 
the PLO did not manage to maintain its hegemony over the drafting process. The PLO drafts 
provided for a nonconstitutionalist presidential regime which aimed to enable the president, while 
the PLC drafts provided for a constitutionalist presidential regime with real limitations on 
presidential power.113 
I have stated that both presidential and parliamentary systems will here be regarded as 
equal in their potential for democracy. However, if the PA was to evolve in the direction of 
parliamentarism, different choices would have had to be made. Neither draft provided for 
parliamentarism, in spite that all Palestinian constitutional drafts have laid claim to a 
parliamentary system based on party pluralism. In addition, the electoral system chosen was a 
majority system, which is usually considered favorable to presidential regimes and two party 
states. How might these inconsistencies be explained?  
Donald Horowitz has argued that constitutional drafters generally act on ―inchoate and 
partially worked-out ideas‖. In addition to the contest of explicitly stated theories regarding the 
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virtues and nonvirtues of types of political and electoral systems, there are ―more influential, 
implicit theories espoused by their practitioners‖. Horowitz further contends that ―of now we lack 
a theory of their theories‖.114 A few general observations might still be made. Jane Grugel has 
pointed out that in the debate over the relative merits of presidentialism versus parliamentarism, 
the case for parliamentary systems in nascent democracies is strengthened by the fact that the 
successful Southern European countries are parliamentary democracies, while post-Communist 
systems feature mixed systems, and the more ―problematic‖ Latin American and African cases 
generally have presidential systems.115 There is no consensus in this debate. From the resulting 
texts, however, it seems reasonable to deduct that while the Palestinian leadership sought the 
legitimacy that is associated with a parliamentary democracy, they also sought the government 
capacity that is associated with a presidential form of government.  
In light of Grugel‘s observation, it would have been politically very difficult for the PA as 
well as the international community to explicitly state that they aimed to build a strong presidency 
with maximum flexibility for the leadership to take unpopular decisions. Marina Muskhelishvili 
has pointed out that politicians need to ―validate his/her power publicly by certain public interest 
values‖, and that ―in the public domain, politicians cannot justify their own action by using 
conflicting arguments. She argues that politicians will generally aim to strengthen their own 
power and enhance their authority, but that these motives are not suited to secure public 
legitimacy for a course of action. 116 
Finally, the issue is not really whether or why the PA evolved in the direction of 
presidentialism or parliamentarism respectively, but to what degree it would have to be 
authoritarian in order to pursue its various tasks. Mushtaq Husain Khan has argued that ―executive 
centralization was a design feature of the quasi-state created under Oslo, and was required to 
ensure the security-first conditions that Israel insisted on‖.117 The security drive was further 
reinforced after the 11 September 2001 terror attacks, and the 2002-203 reform drive was very 
much a part of a new democracy imperative that has been driven by Western security concerns.118 
It was perceived as necessary to ensure that the Palestinian leadership would be able to prevent 
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the opponents of the Oslo Accords from achieving their political goals. The Oslo Accords 
effectively closed the formal political space for anyone who rejected Oslo and required a political 
system that provided room for cooptation as well as exclusion of the opposition. In the words of 
Nigel Parsons: 
Reinforcing the capacity to co-opt, both the PA and Israel continued to coerce: by late 1996 an estimated 
1,200 Palestinians had been jailed by the PA, with 7 tortured to death, and a further 6,000 imprisoned by 
Israel, which retained the right to arrest and detain ‗suspects‘ in those areas in which it retained security 
control (areas B and C). Indicative of realities on the ground, of those Palestinians then in Israeli jails, some 
3,000 had been arrested after the signing of the DoP [Declaration of Principles].
119
  
 
The Palestinian leadership sought to bolster their own personal power within the territories by 
their allegiance to Arafat. Their interests converged with the interests of the international 
community, who also sought to bolster Arafat. The overlap of interests was embodied in the 
nonconstitutionalist spirit of the PLO drafts of the Basic Law. In the end, these interests impacted 
on the Basic Law primarily by making it possible to ignore it.120 Until the second Intifada erupted, 
Arafat received no perceivable signals from the international community that his ruling without 
any constitutional limitations was unacceptable. 
As the PLO/PA leadership lost control over the drafting process, they also lost interest in 
the document itself, and the PLC found that it was helpless in forcing Arafat to actually 
promulgate the Basic Law. In fact, Arafat argued that while the PLC was mandated to ―discuss‖ a 
constitution, but not to actually ―draft one‖.121 Even though the PLC drafted a constitutionalist 
Basic Law, the constitutional limitations imposed on the executive did not serve to diminish 
authoritarianism. Instead, instead, authoritarianism ―simply moved outside legal channels‖.122 The 
PLC did threaten to suspend its own work or bring down the government over a list of issues 
including the Basic Law in 1997 and 1998, but in the end, they chose to leave the matter be and 
focus on making an impact in other areas.123 Only in 2002, as the reform coalition received 
massive support from abroad, was the Basic Law ratified by President Arafat as part of a broader 
reform effort. Just a few months after its promulgation in 2002, the Basic Law was amended to 
provide for a semi-presidential system. This reconfigured the Palestinian political scene and 
shifted the axis of conflict from president-parliament conflict to conflicts between the president 
and prime minister, which presided over a weak and technocratic cabinet. This reform is the topic 
of the next chapter. 
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When Bush made his great speech, he said that the Palestinians need a constitution, probably to 
remove some power from Arafat. But they did that through an amendment of the Basic Law, so 
now the Americans are not talking about a constitution anymore. 
- Mudar Qassis 
3. The 2003 amendment: De-Arafatizing Palestinian politics  
The years from 1997 until 2002 years were marked by increased Palestinian frustration over the 
lack of progress towards Palestinian independence and disappointment over the widespread 
corruption and inefficiency within the PA. In 1999, the so-called transitional period expired, 
without the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The mandate for the PLC expired 
with the transitional period, and the PA continued to function in a constitutional limbo. In 
September 2000, the so-called al-Aqsa Intifada, broke out in the Palestinian territories. For the 
next 20 months, armed Palestinian resistance and Israeli military operations culminated in Israel‘s 
Operation Defensive Shield in March-April 2002. The initial Israeli response to the uprising had 
primarily been to target Palestinian security installations and infrastructure hinting at future 
sovereignty, such as the airport in Gaza. With Operation Defensive Shield, all major West Bank 
towns, except Heron and Jericho, were invaded and reoccupied. This offensive also targeted the 
PA‘s civilian infrastructure, such as the PLC offices and various PA departments. President 
Yasser Arafat was twice put under siege in his headquarters in Ramallah, first in March-April, and 
then again in September. The events would trigger a variety of responses, with demands for 
reform as the lowest common denominator. 124 
Outside the PA, doubts arose as to the intention and capacity of Arafat to quell violence 
and reign in the armed factions. Israel reached the conclusion that Arafat was no longer a ―partner 
for peace‖. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon referred to him as ―irrelevant‖, and even 
threatened to assassinate him. The international community, which had formerly depended on 
Arafat to ―sell‖ Oslo to the Palestinians, came to regard Arafat as an obstacle to peace. 
Domestically, an existing Palestinian reform camp, frustrated over the perceived mismanagement 
by PA, had been unable to impose their vision of accountability on the Palestinian leadership. 
Their arguments gained new impetus by the PA‘s failure to provide for basic needs and services 
to the population under the Israeli military offensive. In addition, the Palestinian security forces 
were neither able to repress the uprising, nor to engage decisively in fighting the occupation.125 
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Consequently, calls for reforming the PA started emanating simultaneously from the US, 
from Israel, from leading figures within the PA and a range of individuals and groups from the 
opposition and civil society.126 As Arafat himself had gradually emerged as the focus of concern, 
reforms were most likely to be successful insofar as they were directed at him personally, 
meaning public finances and constitutional reform.127 This chapter primarily deals with the 
constitutional aspect of the reforms, namely the 2003 amendment of the Basic Law. The 2003 
amendment was first of all directed towards weakening Arafat. It was believed that the most 
efficient way of doing so by way of constitutional means would be to introduce a prime minister 
to share power with the president. The question is how comprehensive the constitutional 
amendment was intended to be, and whether it was allowed to play a significant role. The 
amendment must be seen in light of the broader wave of reforms that were initiated in 2002 and 
2003.  I will briefly outline the main aspects reforms and the internal and external agendas that 
inspired the reforms. What choices were made in 2003 regarding to the amending of the Basic 
Law, and how can these choices be explained? 
The 2003 amendment of the Basic Law 
In 2002, the Middle East Quartet was established to promote an end to the violent conflict. They 
started working on a comprehensive set of reforms, which came to be known as the Roadmap. 
The document, ―A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-state Solution to the Israel-
Palestinian conflict‖,128 was presented to the Palestinians on 30 April 2003 after intense 
negotiations between the USA and the three other members of the Quartet.129 The reform plan 
outlined comprehensive changes to the Palestinian political system and aimed directly at 
weakening the role of Arafat. The Roadmap does not mention the presidency, but contains 
references to an ―empowered prime minister, ―an empowered interior minister‖ and ―an 
empowered reform cabinet‖. Within May 2003, the PA was to start working on ―comprehensive 
political reform‖ to prepare for statehood. Furthermore, the document states that the PA should 
start working to produce a draft constitution to be circulated for public debate by a constitutional 
committee. The Roadmap explicitly states that the constitution was to be ―based on strong 
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parliamentary democracy and cabinet with empowered prime minister‖. While there were efforts 
to complete a new constitution,130 this was put aside in favor of a less comprehensive measure: 
amending the existing Basic Law. The following is an outline of the main features of the 2003 
amendment. The main focus is on intra-executive relations as the reforms primarily concerned the 
distribution of powers between the presidency and the cabinet  
The 2003 amendment provided for a directly elected president to serve for a fixed term 
(Art 34, 36). The introduction of a prime minister brought a dual power structure with a prime 
minister alongside the president, and the Palestinian political system was changed from a purely 
presidential system into a semi-presidential system. In such a system, the president and prime 
minister will have to agree over who is to control so-called residual rights. Residual rights can be 
defined as the right to exercise discretionary power in situations that are not explicitly regulated 
by formal procedures.131 As far as residual rights are concerned, the 2003 amendment explicitly 
favored the cabinet. In the Amended Basic Law the issue of residual rights is addressed in Art 38 
and 63. Art 38 states that the president ―shall exercise his executive duties as specified in this 
law‖. Art 63 stipulates that all powers that are not explicitly awarded to the president under the 
Basic Law shall fall under the competency of the cabinet by default.  
The president‘s role was restricted in several additional ways. The PLC Basic Law 
promulgated in 2002 had explicitly provided the president with the right to propose laws. In the 
2003 Amended Basic Law, there is no such role specifically assigned to the president, but he 
retains his right to propose amendments (Art 41). He also retains his right to issue decrees ―that 
have the power of law‖ in ―cases of necessity that cannot be delayed, and when the Legislative is 
not in session‖ (Art 43). Such decrees are to ―be presented to the Legislative Council in the first 
session convened after their issuance, otherwise they will cease to have the power of law‖. If the 
PLC does not approve the decrees, ―they shall cease to have the power of law‖. This was intended 
to diminish the presidential role in the legislative process. 
The president appoints the prime minister and authorizes him to form his government. The 
president may dismiss the prime minister (Art 45), in which case the existing cabinet is to 
continue in a caretaker capacity until a new cabinet is granted confidence by the PLC (Art 78.3). 
While there are limits as to what the president can do, he may not be questioned by the PLC. 
Also, the president is still authorized to declare a state of emergency, without consulting with the 
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prime minister or PLC speaker (Art 110). While the prime minister is intended to be a strong 
figure, the president remains insulated from parliamentary oversight. The ability to unilaterally 
declare a state of emergency is significant, although it should not be overestimated as the 
president‘s ability to act under the state of emergency remains limited. 
The 2003 amendment enhanced the role of the prime minister, but also of the cabinet as a 
whole. Art 63 provides for the ―empowered cabinet‖ called for in the Roadmap and states that: 
The Council of Ministers (the ―government‖) is the highest executive and administrative instrument; it 
shoulders the responsibility for implementing the program that has been approved by the legislative branch. 
Except for the executive powers of the President of the National Authority, as specified in this Basic Law, 
executive and administrative powers shall be within the competence of the Council of Ministers. 
 
In other words, powers that are not specifically addressed in the Basic Law fall to the cabinet, and 
not the president. In addition, Art 69.7 states that the cabinet is ―responsible for maintaining 
public order and internal security‖, while the president retains his role as ―Commander-in-Chief of 
the Palestinian forces‖ (Art 39). The cabinet is specifically authorized to ―establish or dissolve 
agencies, institutions, authorities and similar administrative units belonging to the executive 
apparatus of the government, provided that each shall be regulated by law (Art 69.9.a) and to 
appoint heads of institutions and agencies mentioned above (Art 69.9.b). Previously, 
establishment of such organs and their respective heads were to happen ―according to law‖ (Art 
77, PLC Basic Law), a much vaguer provision. Furthermore, the areas of responsibilities of the 
ministries were to be specified by the cabinet.  
With the 2003 amendment significant powers were transferred from the president to the 
prime minister, such as appointing, dismissing and accepting the resignation of ministers (Art 
68.1), presiding over sessions of the council of ministers (Art 68.2), and signing and issue 
regulations that are approved by cabinet (Art 68.7). The amendment did not introduce a 
parliamentary system. Rather, the new system fulfills Sartori‘s criteria for semi-presidentialism. 
The president is head of state and is elected for a fixed term. The president is independent from 
parliament. He or she shares executive power with the prime minister, but cannot act alone. The 
prime minister heads the government and is dependent on parliamentary support while doing 
so.132  
PLO-PA relations were not directly addressed in the amendment. The one provision 
concerning the PLO remained unchanged. One characteristic feature informal political life would, 
however, change. The joint PLO-PA ―leadership‖ meetings that were held by Arafat prior to his 
siege in his headquarters in Ramallah, were not reactivated after the creation of the prime 
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minister. On the other hand, both Mahmoud Abbas (Fatah) and his successor, Ahmed Qureia 
(Fatah) knew that every PA cabinet meeting chaired by them was followed by a PLO Executive 
Committee meeting chaired by Arafat. Both the Fatah Central Committee and the Executive 
Committee might also be convened upon prior to important PLC sessions in order to define a 
common approach. Consequently, the PLO retained its position as the ―highest reference‖ in 
Palestinian politics.133  
The articles concerning the PLC were also not changed in the 2003 amendment. A strong 
parliament is characterized by being institutionally central. 134 That implies that the parliament is 
awarded a genuine political role within an accepted and established constitutional framework. 
Secondly, a strong parliament is featured by institutional capacity, meaning that they have 
sufficient staff, material resources and expertise. The Roadmap contained elements of both. It 
required the Israeli government to facilitate travel of Palestinian officials for PLC and Cabinet 
sessions, training, electoral and other reform activity and other supportive measures related to 
reform efforts.135 As for institutional centrality, the position of the PLC was only indirectly 
strengthened by the allocation of more powers to the cabinet, which – unlike the president – can 
be questioned and brought down by the PLC. The main intention of the amendment was, 
however, to strengthen the cabinet. 
Immediate impact: Abbas resigns  
Once the constitutional amendment had been approved by the PLC, Abbas assumed his tasks as 
the first Palestinian prime minister on 29 April 2003. Until the 2003 amendment, the Palestinian 
cabinet had not met regularly as a single entity. The PA cabinet and the PLO Executive organs 
were overlapping in both membership and functions.136 From the PA started operating in 1994, 
President Arafat made sure that PLO Executive Committee members were included in PA 
cabinets. On the eve of the first PLC elections in 1996, Arafat started to hold joint meetings with 
the cabinet to set PA policy. This eroded the cabinet and robbed it from any independent political 
power. Indirectly, it also undermined the authority of the PLC, which the cabinet was partially 
drawn from.137 The 2003 amendment was intended to enable the cabinet to assert itself as a 
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distinct institutional entity as opposed to the presidency and the PLO respectively. In reality, the 
introduction of the new office immediately unleashed a series over disputes over the powers of the 
prime minister, the formation of a new cabinet, and the policies it would pursue.138  
While presidential systems are prone to conflict between the president and the legislative, 
semi-presidential systems are generally prone to conflicts between the president and a parliament-
supported prime minister. Conflicts between the president and the prime minister are described by 
Oleh Protsyk, who refers to them as ―intra-executive conflicts‖ over policy issues, the right to 
issue executive orders and regulations, appointments and dismissals of government officials, and 
whether or not the president should participate in cabinet meetings. No legal document can lay out 
all aspects of intra-executive relations in every minute detail. The right to exercise discretionary 
power in situations that are not specifically regulated by formal procedure has been referred to as 
residual rights. Such residual rights require that the president and prime minister are able to agree 
about who controls them.139  
Abbas and Arafat were not able to agree, and Abbas‘ tenure would be an extraordinarily 
short one. Already on 6 September, Abbas presented Arafat with his letter of resignation. It is 
noteworthy that in his resignation speech to the PLC, Abbas stated that: ―I became prime minister 
with a mandate from the Central Committee, and if the committee decides to withdraw that 
mandate, my cabinet would fall. This would be proper.‖ Dismissing all charges that the PLO had 
been sidelined, Abbas reminded the council that he had been entrusted the premiership by a 
unanimous votes ―in both the PLO and Fatah Executive Committees, as well as by the unanimous 
vote of the Central Council‖, and that he ―even won 51 votes in your esteemed chamber‖.140 
While recognizing the PLC‘s right to authorize ministers, Abbas also submitted to the principle 
that the PLO has the first choice. Abbas‘ resignation speech spoke volumes on the cabinet‘s 
inability to exert their powers as stipulated in the Amended Basic Law: 
Yet every day I receive a new decree signed by Abu Ammar [Arafat] telling that I do not know what to do 
with [sic]. The embassies are not for us to interfere with. What is the job of the foreign minister? No one 
knows. Provincial governors are not our affair, so, why have an interior ministry? The airport is outside our 
jurisdiction. So who should run the airport? The PLO? This means that ministers have no authority over their 
employees; promotions, appointments, demotions, and dismissals are all taken care of by the leadership. I 
have not heard of anything like this anywhere in the world, where ministers are not responsible for their 
employees.
141
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On the level of cabinet-president relations, Abbas and Arafat crashed over policy issues relating to 
how the armed resistance groups should be dealt with. Arafat wanted to keep his options open, 
whereas Abbas had become convinced that the militancy of the second intifada had come to 
endanger Palestinian national interests.142 According to Abbas himself, the difference between the 
two was that Abbas would have preferred better coordination between the various armed groups, 
whereas Arafat directly opposed any kind of coordination. Abbas further claimed that 
consolidating the security forces in three branches was a specifically external demand, and feared 
that confronting the armed fractions would lead to civil war.143 There were also clashes over 
bureaucratic appointments. Attempts at dismissing head of the PA Employees Bureau, Abu 
Sharia, and replace him with Sakhr Bseiso, were not only ignored, but in fact overturned when 
Sharia in the words of Abbas used ―his goons to keep himself in office‖. Arafat, apparently, did 
not intervene. Attempts at appointing a minister of sports were contravened by Arafat, who stated 
that ―Appointing ministers is the responsibility of the PLO and its president!‖144  
Arafat also had personal motives to work against the reform as he feared the impact of the 
combination of a prime minister and strong international backing with a security chief enjoying 
both foreign support and powerful domestic influence.145 Accordingly, Arafat made efforts to 
prevent power from being redistributed, and Abbas chose to back down. He was replaced by 
former PLC Speaker Ahmad Qureia, a member of the Fatah Central Committee who proved to be 
a considerably more compliant minister than Abbas had been. Before Abbas resigned, he had 
managed to negotiate a truce which ended the second intifada. With Arafat‘s death in November 
2004, the perceived main obstacle to reform was removed. Arafat‘s demise in combination with a 
relative calm caused international society to devote less effort to internal Palestinian affairs. After 
Abbas‘ resignation, the reform wave gradually lost pace.  
Qureia served as prime minister from October 2003 until February 2005, when 
presidential elections were held following the death of Arafat. The elections were a major test for 
the Basic Law, and procedure was followed to the letter. However, the new president – which had 
publicly committed himself to the reform, was now constitutionally in a weaker position to 
actually promote it Brown points out that Qureia had spent much effort in mediating between 
reformers and Arafat, ―which in many cases meant deflecting calls for reform‖.146 The limitations 
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that had been imposed on the presidency by the 2003 constitutional reform led president Abbas to 
work around the prime minister in order to promote further reforms.  
January 2006 marked a major turning point in Palestinian political history as the 
parliamentary elections brought the Islamic movement Hamas147 to a majority in the parliament. 
This would bring about a reinstatement of the strong Palestinian presidency. Also the Hamas 
cabinet would prove unable to impose its will on the bureaucracy. The combination of strikes and 
international sanctions crippled the work of the new PLC and the Hamas led cabinet. The level of 
conflict between the cabinet and the president were brought to unprecedented heights and had a 
major impact on the prospects of the 2003 amendment and related reform effort. The immediate 
aftermath was, however, that the first prime minister resigned over such residual rights as were 
outlined above, and that Palestinian cabinets have remained weak.  
Cosmetic or real? 
A majority of the Palestinian political elite saw the appointment of a prime minister as ―a 
necessary prerequisite to resuming the peace process and PA reconstruction, or both‖.148 However, 
the feasibility of a premiership based political system is questionable. This derives from the 
indispensable role played by Arafat in pushing through the very reform that was specifically 
designed to weaken his position. The combination of nationalistic concerns related to the 
incomplete liberation and Arafat‘s symbolic significance made it difficult to undercut his position. 
Said one PLC member to the ICG: ―Under circumstances in which Israel and the U.S. are actively 
seeking to undermine our legitimate and elected national leader, however, we considered it 
inappropriate to excessively reduce Arafat‘s role.‖149  
But the reform discourse also glossed over internal power struggles over access to power 
and resources. This complicated the reform effort itself and masked the true intentions of the 
various actors. By calling for reforms, it was possible to align oneself with the Americans while at 
the same time maintaining a populist image. In the words of Palestinian academic Rema 
Hammami, ―reform for such figures means that one can strike an ‗oppositional‘ pose while 
attempting to recoup one‘s lost ground within the existing power structure‖.150 Palestinian local 
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journalist Talal Awqal points out that ―Nobody will say that they are against reform. Nobody. 
Because all the people want reform, so who is going to say that I am against?151 A report by 
International Crisis Group (ICG) points to the lack of a clearly defined message in the reform 
agenda: 
The confusion and overlap between the domestic agenda for institutional change, internal struggles over the 
political direction of the Palestinian national movement and international pressure to undercut Arafat helped 
muddy the picture. Naming a prime minister was one of the demands of those favoring greater accountability 
and decision-making procedures in the PA, but it also – and perhaps principally – represented ―a calculated 
political initiative by the PA to secure its position in view of the impending war in Iraq and the expected 
release of the Quartet Roadmap thereafter.‖152  
 
The strong verbal commitment among Palestinian politicians to liberal democratic government as 
well as a growing body of written plans, laws, committees, and proclamations demanding reforms 
clouded the fact that the domestic reform coalition was fragmented and heterogeneous, and that 
the external and domestic reform agendas were not aligned. 153 This makes it hard to evaluate the 
real extent of reforms. Similarly, the external actors who pushed for reform represented varying 
agendas. European donors believed that only a capable and institutionalized PA would be an 
effective partner in a renewed peace process. The USA sought to weaken Arafat‘s authority as 
they held him personally responsible for domestic problems in general and the second intifada in 
particular. Thus, the USA tended to support measures that would weaken Arafat, such as the 
establishment of a prime minister and increasing cabinet control over security and the budget.154 
This agenda was motivated by personal and not institutional considerations. 
Ottaway has argued that significant reforms should make power more accountable to a 
popular mandate.155 The 2003 amendment had this potential as it transferred powers form the 
president to a prime minister which the PLC could hold accountable. The importance of this 
would depend on whether the cabinet was in fact able to exercise its powers. As Arafat directly 
counteracted the reforms, significant power remained with the president, who was not accountable 
to the elected PLC. Strengthening the popular mandate would also require elections for the PLC, 
which had served since 1996. This did not happen until 2005, probably due to the likelihood that a 
new election would reinforce Arafat‘s legitimacy, and this would be detrimental to the objective 
of weakening him.156 Ottaway has further pointed out that significant reforms must impose 
                                                 
151
 Talal Awqal, interview, Gaza, 5 July 2005. 
152
 ICG, ―A Middle East Roadmap to Where?‖ 11. 
153
 Brown, ―Evaluating Palestinian Reform,‖ 5; and Brown, ‖Requiem for Palestinian Reform,‖ 9, 15. 
154
 Brown, ―Evaluating Palestinian Reform,‖ 9. 
155
 Ottaway, ―Evaluating Middle East Reform,‖ 10. 
156
 ICG, ―Who Governs the West Bank? Palestinian Administration under Israeli Occupation, ―ICG Middle East 
Report, No. 32 (Amman: 28 September 2008), 
43 
 
limitations on the executive.157 By contrast, the stated aim of the 2003 amendment according to 
the Roadmap was to achieve a redistribution of power within the executive by empowering the 
cabinet vis-à-vis the presidency. An empowered cabinet was to quell violent opposition and 
comprise of moderates willing to negotiate. Hence, the amendment did not in fact serve to limit 
executive power.  
Additionally, significant reforms should allow new centers of power to emerge. There was 
a debate between reformers who wanted a powerful minister and Arafat loyalists who sought to 
protect their own power and subsequently wanted a weak prime minister. There was also a debate 
between senior PA officials who wanted a technocratic cabinet and those who wanted a senior 
Fatah figure in the post.158 Reformists saw wresting the PA from Fatah dominance as one of the 
goal of the reforms.159 Forming ―technocratic‖ cabinets composed of unaffiliated members with 
professional expertise was seen as one way of accomplishing this. Abbas was widely expected to 
appoint such a cabinet in 2003, but his cabinet comprised a number of Fatah heavyweights, as did 
Qureia‘s first cabinet.160 
Two things should be noted. Technocrat governments would have to be largely drawn 
from non-PLC members, and the Interim Agreement explicitly states that only 20 percent of 
ministers can be appointed from outside of the PLC (Art V.4.c). Secondly, while the concept of 
technocrat cabinets in the Palestinian context tends to be associated with professional government, 
such cabinets can in fact be symptomatic of fragmented and weak parliaments.161 Technocrat 
cabinets will likely consist of ministers who lack power bases within the established fractions. In 
2005, the first PA technocrat cabinet was appointed, and its track record would confirm the 
argument above. The technocrat cabinet was brought about as a compromise by various factions 
within Fatah whereby no leading figures were to be ministers, with the notable exceptions of 
Qureia and Central Council member Nabil Shaath. The government was not able to gain a 
monopoly on power, and the security situation grew gradually worse.162 According to Abdul 
Mahdi Hadi, chairman of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs 
(PASSIA), Palestinians were ―stuck with political elites, moderates [with a] weak, business-like 
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mentality‖ in lack of national pride.163 This led to widespread internal discontent, and in October 
2005, the PLC demanded the government‘s resignation. The PLC did have the constitutional 
power to bring the cabinet down, but stopping short of a vote of no confidence, the PLC simply 
asked President Abbas to dismiss the cabinet. Abbas refused, arguing that there would be a new 
government after the January 2006 elections. The 2003 amendment had aimed to empower the 
cabinet at the expense of the presidency. Instead, the PA came to be ruled by its weakest cabinet 
to date, consisting of ministers who did not have independent power bases within Fatah.164  
Brown points out that Arafat‘s demise in 2004 ―illustrated some of the problems with 
personalizing reform‖. The new institutional setup was designed to bring Abbas to influence and 
weaken Arafat. The reforms were ―political‖ rather than ―reformist‖165 and did not enter into any 
long term vision for the Palestinian political entity. Arafat had been able to limit the impact of the 
constitutional reforms that had been aimed primarily towards weakening him, but the presidency 
as an institution had been weakened in a way that made it more difficult for his successor to move 
reform forwards without overstepping his constitutional boundaries.166  
The 2003 amendment and its potential for significance must be seen in light of the relative 
importance attached to the goals of Israeli security and Palestinian democracy and liberation. Two 
main approaches can be distinguished: Reformists who seek to enhance democratic control, and 
restructurists who pursue a personalized agenda aiming to enhance the powers of their current 
allies or their own personal interests.167 For Israel, security was the primary goal, whereas 
Palestinian democracy and liberation were seen as secondary or irrelevant. Democracy and 
liberation were perceived by Israel as having low instrumental value in realizing the goal of 
security, compared to the advantages of military force. For the PA, liberation was primary, and 
democratization was secondary, where Israeli security was seen as secondary or irrelevant.  
There was, however, disagreement among Palestinians as to the instrumental value of 
democracy and Israeli security in the realization of the primary goal, which was liberation. The 
Basic Law as well as its amendments displays inconsistencies that are best explained in the light 
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of these conflicting agendas. While this may seem trite, the effects on Palestinian constitutional 
developments have been considerable. It means that there was not enough critical mass, even 
within the PA, to push through a truly reformist agenda. Under the combined leadership of Prime 
Minister Qureia and President Arafat, the reform wave gradually petered out. However, as the 
truce negotiated by Abbas as prime minister held, pressure on the PA to reform subsided. After 
Arafat‘s death, reform agendas would have to be reconsidered.168 The next chapter deals with 
constitutional development under President Abbas. 
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The conference recommends to the Legislative Council that it take steps to amend the legislative 
elections law, relying on an equal division (of seats) in a mixed system… 
- The Cairo Declaration 
4. The 2005 amendment: Preparing for Hamas 
In November 2004, President Yasser Arafat passed away. As stipulated in the Amended Basic 
Law (Art 37), PLC Speaker Rawhi Fattouh assumed the PA presidency in a caretaker fashion, 
while Abbas was appointed as PLO Chairman by the PLO Executive Committee. On 9 January 
2005, Abbas won the elections for the Palestinian presidency. As president, Abbas committed 
himself to pursue the reforms that had been initiated in 2003, and to seek an implementation of the 
Roadmap. A number of laws that had been passed by the PLC and ignored by Arafat were now 
signed. Local elections in Gaza and the West Bank were initiated, and the cabinet and the PLC 
started working on legislation for the judiciary and the security forces.  
Parallel to legislative efforts and the holding of local elections, Abbas worked to integrate 
Hamas into the institutionalized decision making process. He knew that in order to make progress 
with the Israelis, he would have to show ability to quell Palestinian armed resistance. As 
disarmament by force was inconceivable, Abbas worked to persuade Hamas to pursue their 
interests by way of the political institutions. As part of the PLC, Abbas figured that Hamas would 
no longer ignore laws emanating from the PLC.169 The effort succeeded with the Cairo 
Declaration170 in March 2005, when all the factions except Islamic Jihad declared their intention to 
enter the political system and exert influence through institutionalized channels on a national 
level. Hamas had already engaged in the political process by entering local elections, starting in 
December 2004.171 The Cairo Declaration was the culmination of months of negotiations. There, 
representatives of the Palestinian leadership and all the Palestinian factions signed a document 
that committed the factions to a unilateral truce and the Palestinian leadership to hold local and 
PLC elections and to initiate a process to restructure the PLO.  
As the date of elections for the PLC, originally scheduled for August 2005 drew nearer, it 
became increasingly evident that Hamas would perform very well. A significant indicator was an 
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ongoing series of local elections in which Hamas gained control of a number of municipalities.172 
Fatah was split in a number of issues with members working to promote personal, party and 
national interests without any coherent order or priorities attached to each of the above. In the 
words of Fatah Central Committee member, Sakhr Habash: ―You can‘t make a decision in the 
Central Committee for most of the members of Fatah to act [in a certain] way. They won‘t accept 
that. …Everybody is thinking of his own power.‖173 Roughly, individuals and groups within Fatah 
were working to get reelected and ensure the party‘s continued hegemony in the PA. At the same 
time, Fatah was ridden by an internal struggle related to the lack of internal democracy in the 
movement and the holding of Fatah sixth General Conference with elections for the Fatah 
Revolutionary Council and Central Committee.174 The process leading up to the amended 
elections law and proposals for amendments of the Basic Law indicates that groups and 
individuals were aiming at limiting the influence of Hamas within the PLC. Intentions are difficult 
to verify, but the factors mentioned above would explain why a number of proposed laws, laws 
and policies in this period did not continue the logic of the 2003 reforms.  
In August, the new election law set the term of the presidency and the council to four 
years, deleting previous references to ―the transitional period‖. A related 2005 amendment was 
minimal and only affected Articles 36, 47, 48, and 55.175 However, the PLC‘s legal committee had 
initially proposed amendments that went far beyond the necessary adjustments and would have 
given the president extensive powers in the areas of legislation, security and public 
administration.176 In this chapter, I will discuss how the heralded participation of Hamas in 
Palestinian institutions influenced the Basic Law and the further outcome of the 2003 amendment. 
My focus is on the adoption of a new election law and the 2005 amendment to the Basic Law. 
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The 2003 amendment and related reforms had been directed towards enhancing cabinet power. In 
contrast, a number of the 2005 proposals were related to the president and the legislative 
council.177 Two questions emerge: What prompted the 2005 proposals in the first place, and why 
were they rejected?  
Passing a new election law 
The Palestinian 1995 Law of Elections had been specifically designed for one election only. As 
the interim period expired in 1999, and the pressure for new elections for Palestinian institutions 
increased, it became necessary to pass a new election law for the Palestinians. This had been part 
of the Roadmap, but external fears that elections would reinforce Arafat‘s legitimacy combined 
with internal problems in Fatah led to repeated delays in the period from 2003 until 2005. When 
serious work on the new law began, two issues were of concern: party and candidate restrictions, 
and the translation of votes into seats.  
Constitutional practices influence which groups and individuals will be able to compete 
effectively for positions of authority.178 Accordingly, exerting influence over the electoral system 
is exerting influence over who will be able to compete for institutionalized power, and whose 
interests will be pervasive. The original Palestinian election law specifically barred parties and 
candidates who advocated racist attitudes from participating in the elections. This was not enough 
to meet the demands of the Interim Agreement, which also excluded candidates, parties or 
coalitions who pursued the implementation of their aims by ―unlawful or nondemocratic means‖, 
aka terrorism and armed resistance (Annex II, Art 3.2, Protocol Concerning Elections). This 
discrepancy between the Interim Agreement and the 1995 Law of Elections was largely ignored 
because the Islamic opposition which these articles referred to had decided to boycott the 
elections anyway.179 A proposed draft for a Political Parties‘ Law presented by the PLC in 1998 
would have banned any party which seeks to topple the constitutional government, threatens the 
independence and unity of the country, calls for war and international violence, or jeopardizes 
democratic political life and regional and social unity (Art 8). Article 16 would have given the 
Ministry of Justice the right to prevent any party from registering if its basic system and 
documents were in contradiction to Palestinian law. According to Mohammed Yaghi, the draft 
law would also have required that legal political parties would have to be member of the PLO. 
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That meant that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad would have had to join the PLO and register 
with the Ministry of Justice before being considered legal.180 The Political Parties‘ Law was never 
enacted. Hence, the 2005 decision of Hamas to participate in elections reintroduced the question 
of whether or not the armed factions should be pressed for concessions in order to be allowed to 
run for elections.  
Fatah members resented the Cairo settlement and argued that Abbas should have 
demanded recognition of the 1998 Algiers declaration, where the PLO formally endorsed a two-
state solution. They also argued that Hamas should renounce attacks on targets outside of the 
occupied territories, and that specific measures on disarmament were taken.181 Abbas countered 
that Hamas would have to be integrated into the political institutions before they could be 
persuaded to give concessions. Israel argued that the Cairo Declaration did not satisfy their 
demands by denouncing violence. They threatened to obstruct the elections if Hamas were to 
participate and to end cooperation with the PA if Hamas should join the cabinet. On behalf of the 
international community there was, however, a growing realization that Hamas would have to be 
reckoned with, and that Abbas was not about to disarm them by force. During a visit to 
Washington in May 2005, Abbas argued that a clean Fatah victory would deal a blow to Sunni 
Islamist militancy in the Middle East.182 The U.S. simultaneously argued that while Hamas‘ 
participation in the political process would require recognition of Israel, disarmament and 
renunciation of violence of terror, electoral participation could be also be a prelude to such 
concessions.183 They also feared demanding an exclusion of the armed factions from PLC 
elections could endanger the truce.184  
When the international community later began to realize Hamas‘ full electoral potential, 
they recognized that it would be too late to extract concessions and focused instead on making 
strategies for the post-election situation.185 U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice stated that 
the process had to be ―a Palestinian process‖,186 and that: ―We do, I think, need to give the 
Palestinians some space to try and reconcile their national politics, but they‘re going to eventually 
                                                 
180
 Yaghi, ―Political Participation and Palestinian Legislative Elections,‖ PeaceWatch #524, 31 October 2005. 
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ 
templateC05.php?CID=2388 (last accessed 27 January 2008).  I have not been able to find any requirements 
for PLO membership in the draft provided by ARD, but Yaghi refers to a 1998 draft whereas the translation by 
ARD is from 1997. 
181
 ICG, ―Enter Hamas,‖ 4. 
182
 ICG, ―Enter Hamas,‖ 10. 
183
 ICG, ―Enter Hamas,‖ 29. 
184
 ICG, ―Enter Hamas,‖ 9-10. 
185
 ICG, ―Enter Hamas,‖ 31. 
186
 Condoleezza Rice, Press Availability After Middle East Quartet Meeting, United Nations Headquarters,New 
York City, 20 September 2005. U.S.Department of State, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/53612.htm 
(last accessed 20 February 2008).  
50 
 
have to disarm these groups […] They can‘t have it both ways.‖187 Israel grudgingly accepted this 
course of action. Hence, whereas the 2003 amendment corresponded to specific demands from the 
Quartet, the 2005 drafting of a new election law was primarily dominated by domestic concerns.  
The former election law provided for a block vote system in multi-member constituencies, 
where voters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled.188 There had been earlier attempts 
to redraft the election law, with the debate mainly focusing on whether to choose a majoritarian or 
a proportional system.189 In 2004 the PLC Legal Committee recommended a compromise 
whereby 50 percent of the seats would be elected from constituencies and 50 percent from a 
territory-wide proportional list election. The 50-50 percent distribution in a mixed system was 
also part of the Cairo Declaration, which recommended that the PLC amend the Law of Elections 
―relying on an equal division (of seats) in a mixed system‖.  
The draft law was hotly debated and passed through three prolonged readings. A majority 
of the PLC members were opposed to the 50-50 model and favored a system where one third of 
PLC members would be elected on one proportional list and two thirds on constituency lists.190  
Within Fatah there were, however, those who feared that this system would favor Hamas 
disproportionately.191 Also the cabinet and Hamas were leaning towards a more proportional 
system, as had been agreed upon in the Cairo Declaration. On May 9, the cabinet proposed to 
eliminate the mixed system altogether in favor of a proportional system on one national list, but 
the proposal was rejected.192 After a protracted struggle, the new law was finally passed by the 
PLC during an extra reading on 18 June 2005. The PLC changed the system from a purely block 
vote system into a system with 66 seats elected from proportional lists and 66 from 
constituencies.193 
 In explaining the final result of the debate over the election law, Butenschøn and Vollan 
place emphasis on the perceived need to provide a system that could compensate for the lacking 
internal democracy within Fatah. The two systems had not been thoroughly evaluated against the 
needs for reform, and there was no systematic discussion on how voter influence on candidates 
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could be combined with a proportional system with open lists. In these questions Fatah was split 
along multiple lines. Some Fatah members were concerned that without a party democracy and 
primaries, a closed proportional list would ensure that the Fatah lists would be filled by the old 
guard of Fatah and PLO cadres who lacked a local electoral base and would perform badly in 
constituency elections.194 The leadership was concerned with the overall performance of Fatah in 
the elections, reformists were keen to prevent party lists from being dominated by the old guard, 
whereas individual PLC members simply favored the system they thought would be more likely 
to secure their reelection.  
Salah Abdel Shafi, director of the Economic Development Group in Gaza, argued that 
―the motivation of the members was a very egoistic and personal motivation by having 30 percent 
proportional and 70 percent districts. Because they think they [will] have better chances to be 
elected‖.195 According to journalist Talal Awqal ―most of the members of Fatah were against a 
new democratic law‖, and that they ―were defending their benefits‖.196 Ghazi Hamad, editor of the 
Islamist newspaper al-Risalah, intended in 2005 to run for the PLC on the Hamas list. He 
described a Fatah of ―different colors‖: 
Historical people in Fatah say the proportional [system] is good, because people in Gaza and the West Bank 
will vote for me. But some people who are not well known say I am known in my area, so I prefer two thirds 
… so I think you will find different opinions inside Fatah regarding the election law.‖197  
 
Hamad further stated that, Abbas was ―shocked‖ when the PLC did not accept the cabinet‘s 
proposals and passed a law that stipulated two thirds on district lists and one third on a national 
list. According to Palestinian political analyst Mohammed Yaghi, Abbas had been greatly 
influenced by the Central Committee, who ―gave him the legitimacy‖.  
If the Fatah Central Committee had not suggested that Abbas be president, Abbas would never have been a 
candidate for the presidency. Who would support him? So he needed them. At the same time, they wanted his 
support to keep them as the Central Committee for Fatah and to establish rules that supported them. […] 
Abbas at the same time needed approval for his suggestions from the PLC members, and the PLC members 
had different approaches, different interests.
198
  
 
Fatah‘s PLC members and Fatah Central council members disagreed over the 2005 Law of 
Elections. According to Yaghi, the disagreement should be seen in light of the individual political 
interests of the relevant parties: ―Many current Fatah PLC members see little chance for reelection 
as part of a national list because many of them are not well known beyond their district and 
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clans.‖ They would not only have hard time winning, they would also have a hard time being 
favored by the Central Committee for competitive slots on a national list. Yaghi also points out 
that the old guard‘s interest would be best preserved by being placed high on Fatah‘s national list 
due to their lack of local support. 199 Yaghi argued that the cabinet and the Central Committee 
thought that one single national district with proportional elections would be the best way of 
limiting the number of seats Hamas could win in the coming elections. Another advantage would 
be that a proportional system would ensure representation by the smaller parties and might help 
bring Fatah and the smaller parties into an alliance against Hamas.  
It is unclear whether or not Hamas themselves had a firm point of view on the actual 
system. If Hamas thought that they would get fewer votes than Fatah, it would make sense for 
them to demand that a higher part of the PLC to be elected by a proportional system.200 Most 
likely, their first priority was to prevent further delays of the election date. For this reason they 
were opposed to any proposed changes to earlier agreements. Hamad stated that: ―I think it does 
not matter. Hamas is not afraid of the election and the result of the election. But sometimes they 
become very angry when Fatah wants to create a new law according to their own interest.‖201 
As it turned out, electoral manipulation can be an unwieldy instrument. On the technical 
level, the system worked as intended by creating a clear winner. On the other hand, it became 
clear that individual Fatah members who fought for this system had vastly overestimated their 
potential for reelection on the constituency lists. Hamas won 45 out of 66 seats from the district 
level and 29 out of 66 seats from the national level. Fatah won 17 seats from the district level and 
28 from the national level.202 The system generated a clean victory, but not for the intended party. 
For the first time in Arab parliamentary history, a parliament was dominated by a party other than 
the presidential party. This was the unintended outcome of a calculated process where other 
options were in fact considered and consciously rejected. 
The 2005 Law of Elections was not designed with a view to secure representativity, but 
governability. It was not intended to meet Ottaway‘s criteria for a significant reform by 
introducing an element of pluralism.203 The smaller parties and independents were in fact 
marginalized as the number of votes was translated into seats. Hamas‘ electoral victory did, 
however, show that under the new law, it was possible for new groups to gain access to the 
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political institutions. This was not due to reformist intentions, but to circumstances over which the 
legislative drafters lost control. The drafting of the new election law demonstrated how the 
internal conflicts in Fatah spilled over into the arena of constitutional lawmaking. Fatah politicians 
who sought either to enter elections for the first time or who aimed at reelections pursued 
whatever electoral system that seemed to maximize their chances of capturing a seat. The Fatah 
leadership sought to secure a clear margin for the electoral winner, and not even Hamas expected 
anyone but Fatah to win the majority of votes.  
Rejected proposals for amending the Basic Law 
The 2005 Law of Elections set the term of the presidency and the PLC to four years and stipulated 
that elections were to be held every four years on a regular basis. The Basic Law, however, had 
set the term of the presidency and the PLC to the transitional period. Consequently, the Basic Law 
would have to be changed. During the summer of 2005, the PLC discussed a number of proposals 
for a more comprehensive amendment.204 The proposals were provided to me by Kåre Vollan, 
who served as an adviser to the PA. I have not been able to establish who wrote each of the 
various proposals, other than that they were prepared by the PLC Legal Committee,205 and that 
President Abbas requested the inclusion of a vice presidency. Even so, it is possible to make some 
observations as to the political ends the proposals were intended to serve, and why they were 
rejected. At this point, Fatah was still a majority in the PLC. The proposals reflect a reality where 
influencing the constitutional text was a potential strategy to achieve political goals for Fatah as a 
movement, and for Fatah politicians on an individual basis. The fact that the proposals were not 
ratified underlines the perceived unlikelihood of a Fatah electoral defeat, in spite of Hamas 
looming on the horizon. The proposals that were struck down provide valuable insight into the 
relationship between political context and constitution making in the PA at that particular time.  
One of the proposals would have provided for a directly elected vice president (proposed 
amendment to Art 5 and 34). The vice president was to assist the president in his duties, and act 
on the president‘s behalf when the president so allowed. The president would also have been able 
to delegate some jurisdictions to the vice president (proposed new article). In case of vacancy, the 
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vice president would assume the powers and duties of the presidency (new), and Art 54.2 
assigning this duty to the Speaker would consequently be cancelled. The authorities of the vice 
president vis-à-vis those of the prime minister were not clearly outlined in the proposal, but it 
seems likely that a vice president would be able to sideline the prime minister. The request for a 
vice president was submitted directly by Abbas to the PLC, as well as in a draft amendment 
formulated by the PLC Legal Committee.  
The motion had been cleared by Fatah in advance.206 Several Fatah figures were rumored 
to be potential candidates for the post, icluding then Fatah chairman Farouq Qaddoumi, then 
Prime Minister Qureia then Civil Affairs Minister Mohammed Dahlan and then PLC member and 
Fatah Revoulutionary Council member Nabil Amro.207 The idea allegedly arose after Abbas was 
admitted to hospital with a heart condition. According to Ziad Abu Ziad (Independent), head of 
the PLC Legal Committee, the amendments would increase stability by creating a contingency 
plan in case something would happen to president Abbas.208 This seems an unsatisfactory 
explanation, as vacancy of the presidency is already covered by the Amended Basic Law. Art 
37.2, which states that the PLC Speaker is to assume the duties and powers of the president until 
new elections can be held within 60 days. This provision was successfully put to the test with 
Arafat‘s death in 2004.  
The proposal to was interpreted by Jihad Harb and Khalil Shikaki at the Palestinian Center 
for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) as an attempt to ensure Fatah control over the presidency 
should something happen to Abbas.209 They argued that the request could be interpreted as an 
attempt by the president and certain elements within Fatah to weaken the legislature and 
strengthen the president in order to maintain Fatah‘s dominance should Hamas do well in the 
January 2006 elections. However, the PLC did not review the proposal favorably.210 Independent 
PLC member Hassan Asfour argued that the proposal would create an unnecessary and ―honorary 
position, without work‖ that would ―negatively affect the work of the prime minister and 
parliament‖.211  
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Had they been passed, the 2005 proposals would also have strengthened the president‘s 
legislative powers. Art 38 of the Amended Basic Law states that ―The President of the National 
Authority shall exercise his executive duties as specified in this law‖. The proposal was to add 
that ―The President has the right to issue decrees and administrative and organizational decisions 
as deemed necessary for the public interest in accordance with the provisions of the law‖ 
(proposed amendment to Art 38). Harb sidelines this provision with ―going back to 2002 [before 
the 2003 amendment]‖.212 In the 2002 PLC Basic Law, Art 58 gave the president the power to 
―issue regulations‖. With the 2003 amendment, this authority was exclusively assigned to the 
prime minister and the cabinet (Art 68.7 and 70). Harb argues that the 2005 proposals even moved 
beyond the presidential prerogative of 2002 in proposing to give the president the authority to 
issue ―administrative and organizational decisions on the basis of public interests‖. Harb argues 
that administrative decisions should not be taken by the president: ―They are usually taken by the 
police, by the security services, by the ministries – but not the president.‖  
A proposed new article would have given the president ―the right to call for general 
referendum regarding signing agreements or treaties and issues that concern the higher interests of 
the homeland‖ (new). This refers to issues of permanent borders, sovereignty, refugees, water and 
Jerusalem. The referendum was to be conducted through a law which was to be ratified by the 
PLC. Its results would be binding if they got the relative majority of the votes of people 
participating in the referendum (new). Harb points out that giving the president enhanced power 
would allow him to ignore the PLC, where he correctly assumed that Hamas would be influential: 
―[It would] transform the system where the PLC was a strong council and where we had strong 
responsibilities and power for the cabinet to an Arabian system as the Egyptian and the Syrian – 
where both the government and the PLC are weak‖.213  
Sartori points out that ―the line that separates use and abuse is – in the case of referendums 
– a very fine line‖. In the most extreme cases, presidents have used it to submit to a referendum 
any bill rejected by parliament.214 A referendum call under the 2005 proposal would require a 
ratification by the PLC – although the draft does not specify whether by an absolute or a two 
thirds majority. It might enable to bypass cabinet by going to the PLC and asking for a 
referendum, but this option would be of limited relevance if the cabinet is backed by a majority in 
the PLC. A deterrent for the president to actually resort to a referendum under this provision 
would be that the referendum would be considered binding as opposed to advisory, and the 
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president could risk loosing. By contrast, the president‘s ability to act independently in states of 
emergency would have been reduced by this proposal. A suggested amendment to Art 98 would 
require that the president consult with the PLC speaker and the cabinet before issuing decrees to 
declare a state of emergency. Whereas the president under 2003 Amended Basic Law is 
empowered to call a state of emergency for 30 days, requiring a majority in the PLC for extending 
the emergency, the 2005 proposal would have obliged the president to consult with the PLC 
speaker and the cabinet before declaring the state of emergency in the first place.  
As passed by the PLC, the 2005 amendment served to fix the term of the PLC and the 
presidency. By contrast, the rejected proposals would have introduced a number of mechanisms to 
trigger early elections due to a ministerial crisis, a voluntary resignation of the entire council, or 
the absence of quorum. In case of a ministerial crisis – that is, if the appointed prime minister 
proved unable to form a cabinet within the constitutional time limit, the president would have 
been provided with the option of asking the PLC to ―to ratify a law that allows holding early 
elections within 90 days of that date‖ (new). In such cases, the PLC would be furnished with a 
countermove in asking the president to appoint a specific prime ministerial candidate to make a 
second attempt at forming a cabinet. Only after such an attempt, the PLC would be required to 
vote whether or not to dissolve itself. The law specifies a timeframe for these procedures.  
Secondly, for reasons not mentioned in the proposal, the council could decide to resign by 
an absolute majority of its members. The decision would take form of a law. Thirdly, more than 
two members of the members of the PLC could request the president to call for early elections by 
decree in the case of absence of quorum or due to vacant seats in the PLC because of death or 
resignation. The proposals also would have provided the PLC with the option of extending their 
own term in cases of emergency where elections cannot be held on the set date. This would 
require a majority of two thirds of PLC in the form of a law. On the question of dissolution 
powers, Sartori argued that as a principle, presidential systems based on power separation as 
opposed to a system where the executive depends on parliamentary confidence, should not 
include dissolution rights to the president. Even so, dissolution rights have been awarded to the 
president in attempts at reinforcing presidential and semi-presidential regimes.215  
Eventually, the PLC opted for a minimum solution. On 27 July they passed an amendment 
that set the term of the council and presidency to four years, with no openings for early elections. 
Instead of setting the number of PLC members to 88, the number of PLC members was now to be 
specified in the Law of Elections, as was the system of representation.216 There might be several 
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reasons why the 2005 proposals were rejected by the PLC. The proposals signaled growing 
concerns within the Fatah Central Committee and the PLO Executive Committee that the 
elections would not guarantee Fatah a comfortable margin in the PLC. Short of anticipating a 
Hamas victory, it still seems likely that they would favorer dissolution powers as a tool to 
discipline a potentially unruly legislative assembly. Fatah parliamentarians would naturally be less 
inclined to accept such a solution. This might explain why the proposals were rejected.  
Supporters of the proposals were motivated in part by the fear of losing influence after the 
coming PLC elections and voted as they were instructed by the Fatah leadership. Some were also 
in favor of the proposals because they were displeased with the performance of the sitting cabinet. 
Others based their support on personal interests. According to Harb, there were ―promises for 
them to be head of institutions‖.217 He argues that ―in Fatah there is no agenda […] because 
everyone has personal issues […] The beneficiaries from Arafat will be against strengthening Abu 
Mazen [Abbas] and give him more power.‖ Saleh argues on the other hand that Arafat‘s 
beneficiaries will try to strengthen their position by supporting Abbas. Saleh was present under a 
PLC Legal Committee‘s discussions of the proposals. He observes the following: 
Arafat was not a person. He represented a class, beneficiaries. And these beneficiaries have not disappeared 
with him. They are there. And today, when I – we were talking about the amendments – I felt that this man 
[one of the lawmakers present] is really defending his cause by trying to give Abu Mazen [Abbas] the same 
rights, the same jurisdiction as Arafat. […] They know their – not rights – but their privileges.218  
 
Harb points out that some of the supporters of the proposals, like Sadi al-Krunz, and Abdul Karim 
Abu Salah, had also supported the weakening of the president in 2003. ―After two years, they 
want to change the system. Two years is not enough to change your thoughts.‖219 Both Karim and 
al-Krunz have traditionally been close to Abbas and served as ministers in Abbas‘ short lived 
cabinet.220 Harb laments the personal nature of some of the conflicts that have shaped even 
Palestinian constitutional law: ―In 2003 we amended the Basic Law because Arafat wanted Abbas 
to be prime minister. And when Abbas has become president, he wants to amend the Basic Law. 
Two amendments for one person. Why? […] Is there one person in the Palestinian people?‖221 
The 2005 proposals in light of the 2003 amendment 
Neither the proposals nor the rejection of them seem to reflect a conscious approach to the nature 
of the Palestinian political system. For instance, introducing a vice presidency into an already 
                                                 
217
 Harb, interview, 2005. 
218
 Salah, interview, 2005. 
219
 Harb, interview, 2005. 
220
 Fishman, ―A New Palestinian Cabinet.‖ 
221
 Harb, interview, 2005. 
58 
 
conflict prone system appears to be an ad-hoc tactic to provide the president with an ally that 
would enhance his ability to undermine the prime minister, or the other way around. The 
preceding drafting process of new election law had been shaped primarily by a combination of 
personal interest on behalf of individual PLC members and partisan interests on behalf of Fatah. It 
seems reasonable to conclude that while the 2005 proposals were motivated by the need to bolster 
the presidency and provide the president with tools to dissolve an uncooperative parliament, the 
rejection of these proposals were motivated by PLC members who did not wish to grant the 
president these authorities. The desire to limit the presidency was part driven by concerns that 
such dissolution powers might be abused, and part by the desire to maximize power within one‘s 
own branch of government.  
The 2005 proposals were part of a gradually accelerating breakaway from the 2003 
amendment that reflected the changed political scene after the demise of President Arafat. Had the 
Basic Law been amended along the lines of the 2005 proposals, it would have turned the PA into 
a hybrid sort of semi-presidential system with a vice president alongside a prime minister. Such a 
system would not fit neatly into the presidential and semi-presidential categories as defined by 
Sartori. The proposals would have edged the system towards a stronger presidency, and were not 
concurrent with the 2003 reforms. The president would still be constitutionally impossible to 
question or impeach, but there would be ways of dismissing the parliament. One could for 
instance imagine a scenario where the largest party could force the parliament‘s dissolution in 
order to trigger new elections.  
With hindsight, the proposals would prove strikingly relevant. In the events following the 
2006 elections, President Abbas exercised his perceived constitutional prerogatives along the lines 
of a variety of earlier proposals, most significantly on the early PLO drafts and the 2005 
proposals. For instance, he 2006, he called for a referendum, threatened to dissolve the parliament 
by calling for early elections and installed an emergency cabinet without PLC approval. This will 
be explored in depth in the last chapter of this thesis. For now, suffice it to say that the 2005 
proposals along with the Oslo Accords and the PLO drafts for a Basic Law provide a ―pool‖ of 
prerogatives for the president to draw on, whether they were in fact enacted by parliament or not. 
This seems to indicate a lacking commitment to decisions made. It also reveals the constraints 
posed on the PA by the international community, which at all times requires the cabinet to adhere 
to a specific political platform including recognition of Israel and nonviolence. 
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SUMMARY PART I 
When comparing the various constitutional drafts, laws and amendments, we see that Palestinian 
constitutional development has been influenced by external and domestic interests respectively. In 
the early stages of the drafting process, the PLO played a significant part, and consequently 
drafted proposals which awarded the PLO a crucial position, and the PLO chairman was endowed 
with broad powers in his capacity as PA president. The PLO‘s skepticism towards constitutional 
limitations is visible in the nonconstitutionalist nature of the document, which would have enabled 
a strong presidency while providing the PLC with only a vague and limited role. The PLC Basic 
Law was drafted by the Palestinian elected parliament and provided the parliament with a much 
stronger and defined role.  
A strong presidency was in concord with international demands that required the PA to 
quell armed resistance by way of co-option or repression. This both required and generated 
executive centralization. Not until the security situation grew untenable from an Israeli point of 
view there were real demands on President Arafat to even pass the Basic Law. In response to the 
armed uprising in 2000, international society joined Palestinian constitutionalists in demanding 
institutional reform. At this time, Arafat had come to be seen as part of the problem, and no longer 
a moderate negotiating partner. A broad reform coalition agreed on a number of reforms to 
weaken the president and transfer the responsibility for guaranteeing security to the cabinet. The 
2003 reforms included a constitutional amendment that provided the PA with a prime minister to 
share power with the president. While this had the potential to constitute a significant reform, the 
first prime minister resigned almost immediately as it proved very difficult for the cabinet to 
exercise power in line with the constitutional amendment.  
The death of President Arafat and the decision of Hamas to enter the political institutions 
altered the political situation, and the reform coalition gradually dissolved along with the 
momentum for reform. Pending the second PLC elections, proposals were made to introduce the 
possibility of dissolving parliament and refurnishing the presidency with powers that had been 
removed in 2003. The effect on this on the Basic Law itself was minimal, most likely because the 
Fatah parliamentarians did not realize how precarious their positions were. Even though the 2005 
proposals were rejected, their contradictions with the 2003 reforms mirror how the new political 
context bred new strategies. While the political situation did not generate significant change in the 
Basic Law itself, it did affect the electoral system and the 2005 Law of Elections. The resulting 
electoral victory by an opposition party was unprecedented in the Arab world, but this was an 
unintended outcome of political deliberations, and cannot be seen as a significant reform.  
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PART II: CABINET POWER AFTER THE 2003 REFORM 
The constitution says that the internal security apparatus must be under control of the cabinet 
office or the interior minister. I believe this is clear.  
- Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas 
5. 2003-2007: Reforming the “security chaos” 
This part of the thesis is related to the question of whether the Basic Law has been able to 
influence political outcomes. I have chosen to limit the discussion to the areas of security and 
foreign affairs as these were centerpieces of the 2003 reform effort. In the field of security, the 
Palestinian cabinet is challenged from within by the various armed factions and from without by 
Israeli military incursions. The PA‘s ability to maintain a monopoly of power lies at the heart of 
all agreements with Israel and is prerequisite to gain international legitimacy for the PA.  
The Palestinian security apparatus had initially been set up as a part of the Oslo Accords 
with the objective of assimilating and repressing the armed Palestinian factions, thereby 
guaranteeing Israeli security.222 Arafat‘s divide and rule-strategy, and the absence of a clear 
security doctrine contributed to what political scientist Roland Friedrich at PASSIA (Palestinian 
Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs) described as a ―chaotic scenario that is 
characterized by the absence of any clear differentiation between the various agencies, massive 
functional overlaps, and the blurring of the distinction between the spheres of police and 
military‖.223 In order to emasculate Arafat, a plan was conceived to consolidate the security forces 
under the control of the Ministry of Interior.224  
In April 2003, ―A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict‖ was presented to the Palestinians by the Middle East Quartet.225 The 
so-called Roadmap stated that the security forces were to report to the Ministry of Interior, while 
the 2003 amendment of the Palestinian Basic Law placed the area of security within the domains 
of the cabinet. The subsequent 2003 amendment of the Basic Law introduced a prime minister 
specifically so that he could compete effectively with the president and to create a stronger 
cabinet. In April 2003, Abbas was sworn in as the PA‘s first prime minister. From its inception, 
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Abbas‘ cabinet was ridden by conflicts with Arafat over who was to be interior minister, and what 
would be the powers of the Ministry of Interior. This chapter takes on whether the Basic Law was 
able to affect political outcomes in the field of security. More specifically, was the ―empowered 
reform cabinet‖ and the interior ministers able to exercise their powers as ascribed in the 
Amended Basic Law?  
Constitutional framework 
Originally, the Palestinian security forces were defined by the Interim Agreement as ―The 
Palestinian Police‖. Art XIV.3 stated that ―Except for the Palestinian Police and the Israeli 
military forces, no other armed forces shall be established or operate in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip‖. Annex I Art II.1a stated that ―The Palestinian Police is the only Palestinian security 
authority‖. The Palestinian police was to assume responsibility for public order and internal 
security of Palestinians, whereas Israel was to carry the responsibility for external security (Art 
VIII. 1a). Art IV outlined the duties and functions of the Palestinian police. Art IV.2a stipulates 
that the Palestinian Police was to ―consist of one integral unit under the control of the council‖ 
and to be organized in six branches. All members were to be subordinated to one central 
command in each district. In addition, the Police force was to have a Palestinian Coastal Police 
unit. The total number of policemen were not to exceed 30 000, 12 000 in the West Bank, and 
18 000 in Gaza. The PLC Basic Law simply stated that ―the President is the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Palestinian forces‖, meaning the security forces and the police (Art 55). Moreover, 
―Security Forces and the Police shall be regulated by law‖ (Art 75.2).  
The Roadmap called for a restructuring and modernization of the Ministry of the Interior. 
The Preventive Security Services, the Police and the Civil Defense were to be ―attached‖ to the 
Ministry of the Interior, ―so that this Ministry will be in charge of all matters relating to internal 
security according to the law‖. Furthermore, the role of the Ministry of the Interior was to be 
―reactivated‖. The Roadmap explicitly stated that ―All Palestinian Security organizations are 
consolidated into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister‖ (emphasis added). 
Parsons points out that the amendment introduced a division of labor between president and the 
cabinet, but without clearly delimiting the respective powers of the two. The 2003 amendment 
retained the president as commander-in-chief of the Palestinian forces (Art 39). In addition, Art 
69.7 stated that the cabinet is to ―be responsible for maintaining public order and internal 
security‖. The 2003 amendment came to be interpreted as giving the president the responsibility 
for ―national security‖.226 This argument was widely used to justify support for the Presidential 
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Guard after the Hamas electoral victory in 2006, when the Ministry of Interior came under the 
leadership of a Hamas cabinet. To my opinion, this dichotomy seems rather constructed, as the 
mandate of the Palestinian security forces was not intended to reach beyond internal security.  
Legislative efforts 
The Basic Law required additional legislative work in order to effectively define the distribution 
of competencies between the president and the cabinet in security matters and to set down 
procedures for parliamentary oversight. Art 84.2 of the Amended Basic Law states that ―The Law 
shall regulate the Security Forces and the Police‖. In the 1990s, the Law for the Civil Defense and 
other laws related to special aspects of security, such as the Law of Public Meetings and the Law 
on Firearms and Ammunition were approved. However, there is no basic security legislation 
which deals with the security sector as a whole.  
In 2005, the Authority started work to on an overarching legislative framework for all the 
security services, but the drafting process was badly coordinated. Azmeh Shueibeh represented 
the political movement Fida227 in the first PLC and was member of the PLC Legal Committee. 
According to Shueibeh: ―We [the PLC] finished at least some of the laws while the cabinet is still 
preparing others… The government is not united. [… ] The president and the prime minister are 
not working together by a homogenous policy on this issue.‖228 Draft laws were brought in by the 
security agencies themselves, and were not necessarily linked to the national security law in the 
sense that duties, functions and command structures might overlap, or the drafts may contradict 
each other.229 These drafts were submitted by the agencies in an attempt to protect their influence 
and supporting groups.230 According to Shueibeh, the intelligence worked to convince the PLC 
that the intelligence apparatus was to be accountable to the PA president.231 Simultaneously, the 
president was reportedly preparing a different draft that would render all agencies accountable to 
the prime minister. Due to factional strife, the work was not completed. 
The first PLC did manage to pass a Pensions Law. The aim of the Pensions Law was 
political and it was enacted specifically to get rid of old security commanders.232 The remaining 
security laws were still not completed when the term of the first PLC expired. After the 
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inauguration of the second and Hamas dominated PLC in 2006, the PA faced international 
sanctions and internal strife. A wave of public strikes in August 2006 caused a halt in 
parliamentary work, especially the drafting of security sector laws, and also in other sectors. Some 
continued their work, but not in issues which were related to security. The process of legal reform 
vis-à-vis the security sector ground to a halt.233 
The need to control the security forces had been at the heart of the national consensus 
document that had been drafted during the summer of 2006, the so-called Prisoner‘s Document.234 
The Prisoner‘s Document was an inter-factional document drafted by Palestinian leaders in Israeli 
jails and was supposed to form the foundation for a political program for a national unity cabinet. 
Among the issues that were addressed in the Prisoner‘s Document, security was paramount. The 
document refers to ―The need to reform and develop the Palestinian security system in all its 
branches in a modern manner‖ and calls for an end to ―the state of security chaos and lawlessness, 
ending the public show of arms and parades and confiscating any weapons that harm the 
resistance and distort its image or those that threaten the unity of Palestinian society‖. The need to 
regulate the security forces was reiterated in the Mecca Agreement, which was negotiated 
between Fatah and Hamas in February 2007 and paved the way for a national unity cabinet. 235  
Contesting competencies 
One of the fields where the competition between the president and the cabinet played out was in 
the National Security Council (NSC). After the 2003 amendment the NSC provided the president 
with an arena where he could exert his influence and exercise his power as Commander in Chief 
alongside the prime minister. The NSC was established as part of the 2003 reform effort, but had 
an historical precursor in the so-called Higher Council of National Security (HCNS). From the 
establishment of the PA, the security reported directly to the president. On the organizational 
level, local security chiefs reported to the governors, who were appointed by the president, and 
who reported directly to him. In theory the various bodies were to be subordinate to the HCNS, 
consisting of the security chiefs and the president himself. In reality, they all reported directly and 
separately to Arafat.236 Revamping and downsizing the HCNS was part of the reform effort, and 
the HCNS was replaced by the NSC. This organ was to consist of the president, the prime 
minister and the ministers of finance, interior and foreign affairs, a member of the PLO Executive 
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Committee, and the heads of the various security forces. The NSC was to oversee the 
implementation of security sector reforms, but was not to have any direct command role.237 
Initially, Arafat had stalled the activation of the NSC, but after the appointment of the prime 
minister in 2003, he found it to be an efficient tool to undermine the authority of the cabinet and 
the interior minister. 238  
During the 2002-2003 reform wave it became clear that the Ministry of Interior would be 
a potentially powerful position. Until June 2000, Arafat had reserved this portfolio to himself. In 
order to placate the international community, he then relinquished the portfolio to Fatah returnee 
and former commander of the Palestine Liberation Army Abdul Razzaq al-Yahiya. Beginning 
with Al-Yahiya, a series of interior ministers would find that they were unable to exert authority 
over the security apparatus. Attempts at making senior appointments, fire powerful personnel or 
imposing financial discipline were simply ignored. When Abbas became prime minister in 2003, 
Arafat asked him to appoint Hani al-Hassan as interior minister in his 2003 cabinet. Instead of 
complying with the president‘s wishes, Abbas decided to take this portfolio himself. In addition, 
Abbas appointed Mohammed Dahlan as state minister for security and tried to transfer full control 
of the security apparatus to him.239 As member of the Fatah Revolutionary Council and former 
head of the Preventive Security Service in Gaza, Dahlan had established himself as a powerful 
figure. As minister for security, he was for all practical purposes given control over the Ministry 
of Interior which was headed by Prime Minister Abbas in his capacity as minister of interior. 
Dahlan immediately started implementing structural reforms, made a series of appointments and 
started rebuilding the police and Preventive Security forces. In order to counter the influence of 
Dahlan and Prime Minister Abbas, Arafat decided to make use of the NSC.  
The NSC started giving instructions to the heads of the security forces – and to Dahlan – 
to prepare for the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.240 A group of Arafat loyalists also demanded that 
some of the security powers of Dahlan be transferred to the NSC. In another attempt at subverting 
Dahlan and by extension Prime Minister Abbas, Arafat in August 2003 appointed Jibril Rajoub as 
his National Security Adviser. Rajoub had been head of the Preventive Security Forces in the 
West Bank and was reportedly on bad terms with Dahlan. On Arafat‘s insistence, the NSC 
temporarily assumed the function of reorganizing and commanding the security forces. This 
arrangement was cemented after the resignation of Abbas and the appointment of Qureia as prime 
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minister and Hakam Balawi as interior minister. In November 2003, the Ministry of Interior 
officially lost its jurisdiction in security matters to the NSC, and the heads of the Civil Police and 
Preventive Security were ordered to report to Arafat in his capacity as head of the NSC. The NSC 
is not mentioned in the Basic Law, and the Basic Law does not allow for questioning of the 
president. In lack of an overarching National Security Law, the NSC and the security apparatus 
remained outside the scope of parliamentary control.241 The NSC remained operative until 
Arafat‘s demise in November 2004. During that time, they held more than a dozen meetings, but 
did not achieve anything of effect.242 After Arafat was succeeded by Abbas, the NSC remained 
defunct due to problems between President Abbas and Prime Minister Qureia. According Harb, 
―the council is asleep, because the two haven‘t agreed‖.243  
After becoming president in February 2005, Abbas initially sought to continue the 2002-
2003 reform efforts. On 14 April 2005, he issued a presidential decree to merge the various 
security services to come under the authority of three branches: the National Security Forces, the 
Interior Ministry, and the General Intelligence Agency. He also decided to re-establish the NSC. 
When the Basic Law was being amended in 2005, one of the rejected proposals included the 
establishment of a NSC ―with the task of deciding on security policies and strategies with its 
works to be organized and defined by a law‖. The NSC was to be headed by the president with the 
prime minister was to assume the post of deputy head. When the proposal was rejected, Abbas 
established the NSC by decree on 25 September 2005.244 The move was criticized by Harb and 
Shikaki. They argued that the president ―sought to bypass normal legislative process while 
dramatically changing the system of government‖ by giving ―the president control over NSC and 
thereby all aspects of security‖, while ―the Basic Law clearly stipulates that law and order and 
internal security are the responsibilities of the cabinet‖.245 They further warn that the minister of 
interior ―may find himself no longer accountable to the PLC‖. They argue that: 
The timing of the request by Abbas and some Fateh parliamentarians, just before the parliamentary elections, 
raises serious concerns that Fateh and the president, fearing a strong Hamas showing in the January 2006 
elections, are trying to weaken the legislature and strengthen the president in a desperate attempt to maintain 
Fateh‘s dominance over the political system.246  
 
However, it has also been argued that the NSC should be reactivated and broadened as part of a 
comprehensive security sector reform that includes professionalization of the command level and 
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integration of all partisan militias and disarmament of local gangs.247 In such an effort, the NSC is 
envisioned as the ―supreme arbiter of security policy‖.248 After Abbas reestablished the NSC in 
2005, it did meet on occasions before the second PLC elections, but after Hamas assumed power, 
the president did not make use of the restructured NSC. In the words of Hamas Interior Minister 
Said Siyam (2006-2007): ―President Abbas is the head of the National Security Council but since 
we assumed office he has not convened it even once. In fact, he has not once chaired a cabinet 
meeting even though it is his government.‖249  
Instead of exerting authority through the NSC, president Abbas reinforced his own 
Presidential Guard, whose original mandate was to protect the president. The Presidential Guard 
was made a separate force in 2006, and after the January 2006 elections, it became part of an 
internationally supported effort of bolstering president Abbas against Hamas.250 The Presidential 
Guard was reportedly to monitor the borders between the Palestinian areas to Egypt and Israel, 
and to be used to stop Palestinians from launching home-made projectiles at Israeli towns and 
cities. Israel has indirectly supported the Presidential Guard by allowing it to import weapons 
from Jordan and Egypt, while the USA and EU supported the Presidential Guard with material 
support such as training programs and equipment.  
Like his predecessors, Interior Minister Said Siyam was unable to control the security 
apparatus. The presidency made the security forces directly subordinate to the presidency and not 
the Ministry of Interior, contrary to what Abbas had demanded when he himself was prime 
minister. In March 2006, the Abbas appointed a Director General for security, specifically to 
restrict the security powers of the interior minister.251After realizing that the cabinet would be 
unable to assert their authority over the security forces via the Interior Ministry, Siam announced 
the establishment of a parallel security force, the Executive Support Force in April 2006.252 The 
Executive Force was built mostly from members of the Hamas armed wing, the al-Qassam 
Brigades, but it included some members from allied militant factions. Hamas‘ armed wing, the al-
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Qassam Brigades, are estimated to 15 000 members. It remained uncertain to what extent the 
Brigades overlapped with the Executive Force.253 
According to Siam, the Executive Force was designed to strengthen existing security 
forces, as they were professionally and politically incapable of exercising their mandate.254 
However, Fatah saw the Executive Force mainly as an instrument for internal confrontation.255 
Fatah spokesmen argued that Hamas sought to ―set up a loyalist presence within the 
establishment‖ and ―establish [Hamas] as a legitimate security force through which it can 
implement its own programs [in] an attempt to circumvent the existing security establishment and 
provide legal cover for the activities of the Al Qassam Brigades, especially on the internal 
front‖.256 Fatah and President Abbas strongly opposed the establishment of the new force and 
issued a decree where he stated that the new force was illegal and ordered all security chiefs to 
consider the cabinet‘s decision as if it had never been made. In response, the Ministry of Interior 
declared its intention to increase the Executive Force to 12 000 members.257 During the spring, 
Abbas deviated from his earlier assertions that the Executive Force was illegal, and on 15 June, he 
formally incorporated the militia into the Palestinian police forces.258 On the ground, however, 
relations remained tense. Talks about what to do with the Executive Force remained largely 
inconclusive, and it was in fact not integrated with the other forces as demanded by the president 
and Fatah. Friedrich observes that in spite of sporadic cooperation with regard to law and order, 
―it would be difficult to say that there is a real working relationship between the Executive Force 
and the Fatah related forces‖.259  
The legal basis for the Hamas led Executive Force has been subject to different 
interpretations. The minister of interior refers to the authority of the cabinet over law and order. 
The other interpretation is that no Palestinian institution can set up security forces without the 
approval of the president, who is the supreme authority according to Art 39 of the Basic Law, 
stating that he is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.260 It has also been argued that the 
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2003 cabinet is responsible for internal security, whereas the president under Art 39 is responsible 
for national security.261  
While the Executive Force was run by the interior, it was not at all clear to what extent the 
Presidential Guard is accountable to parliament, the cabinet and the judiciary. Friedrich points out 
that: ―In the Basic Law, there are provisions as to how the PLC can oversee the performance of 
the government, but with regard to the president it the terms of accountability are less clear.‖262 
Hamas‘ forces represented a tradition of armed resistance, whereas the Fatah dominated security 
structures were established by the Oslo Accords with the objective of fighting violence and 
terrorism. These forces have also been involved in crackdowns on Hamas. When Hamas took 
power, the Presidential Guard was estimated to about 2500 men with a stated ambition to double 
in size.263 The decision by the US, EU and Israel to directly or indirectly support the Presidential 
Guard was legitimized by the listing of Hamas as a terror group by both USA and the EU.   
After the dissolution of the first Haniyeh Cabinet, former Interior Minister Siam talked to 
Maan News Agency about his time as minister. Echoing the defeat of all his predecessors, he 
stated bitterly: ―I did not fail, they made me fail. […] I was not given the chance to work properly 
and that is why nobody can judge if I succeeded or if I failed.‖ 264 On 17 March 2007, the second 
Haniyeh Cabinet – the so-called National Unity Government – was granted confidence by the 
PLC, and Hani al-Qawasmeh (Independent) was appointed interior minister. The Mecca 
Agreement included the resurrection of the NSC as ―a higher national security council that 
represents the terms of reference to all security services‖. The agreement further tasks the PLC 
with finalizing the law pertaining to this council. Al-Qawasmeh had previously worked as a 
bureaucrat in the Ministry of Interior, and he was appointed as nonpolitical figure. However, after 
only a few months later, the unity cabinet collapsed due to a military takeover by Hamas‘ 
Executive Force in Gaza and the Fatah dominated National Security Forces in the West Bank.  
The events that led to the collapse of the National Unity Cabinet are too complex for a 
thorough outline. Its prelude, however, followed a familiar pattern. On 18 March, the day after the 
formation of the unity cabinet, Abbas appointed Dahlan as his national security adviser with 
enhanced powers.265 As chief of preventive security in Gaza, Dahlan had masterminded a series of 
crackdowns on Hamas in the 1990s and was seen as the man chosen by the USA to lead a 
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campaign to reverse the 2006 elections. Meanwhile, on 10 April, the U.S. Congress authorized a 
60 million dollar package to improve the state of Palestinian President Abbas‘ security staff, the 
Presidential Guard. 266The funds could be used for basic and advanced training, nonlethal 
equipment, upgrade facilities, capacity building and technical assistance and the office of Abbas‘ 
national security advisor. Hamas interpreted the appointment of Dahlan to this post as a signal of 
Fatah‘s lacking commitment to the Mecca Accords and their intent to engineer the Unity 
Cabinet‘s failure and by extension force new elections for the PLC.  
On 14 April 2007, Fatah and Hamas endorsed a security plan presented by al-Qawasmeh 
to enforce a unified command within the security forces. Key Fatah lieutenants ignored the plan. 
On 11 May, Dahlan‘s ally and newly appointed head of Preventive Security in Gaza, Rashid Abu 
Shbak, deployed security forces on the main roads of northern Gaza without consulting al-
Qawasmeh. Following this incident, al-Qawasmeh chose to resign, stating his lacking authority to 
fulfil his mandate due to insubordinate and uncooperative commanders. In an interview with ICG, 
he stated that: ―I reached the conclusion that the whole security situation is not being dealt with 
seriously.‖267 After the military takeover in Gaza by the Executive Force, Prime Minister Ismail 
Haniyeh and the National Unity Cabinet were dismissed on 14 June, and emergency cabinet under 
former minister of finance, Salam Fayyad (Third Way268) was installed by presidential decree. On 
23 June 2007, Abbas dissolved the NSC.269  
Security developments in light of the 2003 amendment 
The 2003 amendment was part of a broader reform effort that aimed to redistribute power over the 
security apparatus and consolidate the various forces under the Ministry of Interior. However, the 
security chiefs and the president joined forces in order to render the 2003 amendment cosmetic. 
The 2003 reform was immediately counteracted by President Arafat and loyalists in the security 
forces who preferred to report directly to the president. They managed to transfer power from the 
cabinet to the newly established NSC, which was not subject to any law and could not be held 
accountable. The 2003 Roadmap had primarily been a response to the violent second intifada that 
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Israel and the USA did not feel that Arafat made a sufficient effort to suppress. The NSC did not 
emerge as an arena where the president and the prime minister cooperated. Instead, it remained an 
ad hoc instrument for the president to subvert the cabinet. The real power over the security 
apparatus remained with the security chiefs themselves, and with an unaccountable president. In 
other words, power was not redistributed, and the cabinet was not able to assert itself as an 
alternative center of power. In spite of the reform attempts, the security sector became 
increasingly fragmented into a host of formal and informal security orders. The proliferation of 
weapons and forces came to be known as the falatan, Arabic for «security chaos» and 
«lawlessness».270 The security chaos caused widespread internal concern as ordinary Palestinians 
were caught in the crossfire between the factions. In the words of Khalil Shaheen, head of the 
Economic and Social Rights Unit at the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) in Gaza, ―it 
was something like Chicago. Everywhere you had shooting‖.271  
After the 2006 elections, the international community abandoned the 2003 reforms 
altogether in their effort to isolate the Hamas cabinet. The decision by the international 
community to support President Abbas and the Presidential Guard contradicted the stated aims of 
previous reforms. This reflects the diverging agendas as to what reform really is. Security sector 
reform can be seen as an effort to enhance accountability and transparency. However, if the 
number one priority is to have a strong Palestinian security apparatus that can clamp down on 
armed resistance, the issue of accountability becomes secondary. This obstructs Palestinian 
reform efforts. In the words of Friedrich: 
Take for example of the institution of the prime minister: The post of the prime minister was created in 2003 
to sideline Arafat. The idea was to strengthen the cabinet and weaken president, to take authority from Arafat. 
In this context, responsibility for internal security was given to the minister of interior. That had always been 
a demand by Palestinian reformers, and it became a real option when it was put on the international agenda. 
Now with Hamas in power, there is external pressure to do the opposite, to take authority away from the 
government and the prime minister.‖272  
 
In neither redistributing power nor making power subject to a popular mandate the 2003 reform 
did not amount to a significant security reform. The opposite of significant reform would be 
cosmetic reforms, which according to Ottaway are specifically designed to provide the impression 
of reform, while at the same time preventing reform.273 Arafat loyalists never committed to the 
reform in the first place and intended for it to be of minimal consequence. Because Arafat played 
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a pivotal role in promoting a reform that he did not intend to adhere to, the reform was in one 
sense cosmetic. That does not preclude that the reform coalition comprehended reformists who 
were genuinely concerned with reigning in the security apparatus. They were, however, unable to 
impose their vision on the security apparatus as the international community first lost interest and 
then proceeded to reverse the reform. The logic of Amended Basic Law in its quality as a legal 
text no longer conformed to the logic that had motivated the various groups that constituted the 
reform coalition. The reform coalition that had coalesced around the need to weaken Arafat 
gradually unraveled. 
One of the keys to successful constitutional reform lies with the PLC, who has not been 
able to make use of the provisions in the Basic Law to play its full role. The prisoner‘s document 
expressed a mutual understanding that the various armed forces and the security apparatus needed 
to be coordinated, and that legislation was needed in this effort. The document called for the PLC 
―to continue issuing laws that regulate the work of the security apparatus in its various branches 
and to work towards issuing a law that bans the exercise of political and partisan action by 
members of the security services‖. The broad representation of the various factions within the 
second PLC represented an unprecedented potential for new security legislation to be 
implemented, had this effort been encouraged. Such a supporting legal framework might have 
served to impose parliamentary oversight over the security apparatus. This would have enabled 
the reform to be significant according to Ottaway‘s criteria that reform should make power subject 
to a popular mandate.274 Domestically, this was seen as a pressing issue. In the long term, 
however, power has been retransferred to the Presidency, which the PLC cannot hold accountable 
under the Basic Law.  
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Sometimes you should forget the law – the Basic Law and try to have a compromise with Farouq 
Qaddoumi. 
- Qaddura Fares 
6. 2003-2007: Reforming diplomacy 
The Oslo Accords had imposed strict limitations to the jurisdiction of the PA. One area explicitly 
exempt from the PA‘s competency was the field of negotiations and foreign affairs. However, a 
less publicized aspect of the 2003 reforms was the attempt to restructure the Palestinian 
diplomatic corps. This was done by working around the restrictions of the Oslo Accords in 
establishing a Palestinian ministry of foreign affairs and attempting to redress and professionalize 
the diplomatic corps under the cabinet and a newly appointed minister of foreign affairs.  
While the effort to reform the security forces has been subject to comprehensive research 
as well as journalistic coverage, the effort to reform the field of diplomacy is less known. The 
articles referring to foreign affairs in the Basic Law were not specifically amended in the 2003 
amendment. Nonetheless, when Abbas stepped down as prime minister in the fall of 2003, he 
dedicated much of his resignation speech to the PLC to share his frustration over the cabinet‘s 
unability to exert influence in this field. Initially a main reason for this had been the overlap 
between the PA and the PLO and the failure of President Arafat to resolve the power struggle that 
arose between the cabinet and the PLO political office in Tunis. As president, Abbas tried to 
rectify this neglect, but the effort was shelved as Hamas was swept to power by the 2006 
parliamentary elections. At this point, the international community flatly refused to deal with the 
Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Referring to the Oslo Accords, the donors stated that they 
would only deal with Abbas in his capacity as PLO chairman.  
In explaining these developments, we gain a broader understanding of the 2002-2003 
reforms and the forces that have affected the ability of the Basic Law to affect political outcomes. 
This chapter concerns the impact of the reforms on the organization of Palestinian foreign affairs 
and the distribution of competencies between the PLO, the president and the cabinet in the field of 
diplomacy. The question is what role the cabinet has been able to play in the field of diplomacy, 
and how this plays into the role of the PLO. I will first give an outline of the formal distribution of 
authorities between the PLO and the PA. I will then present realities on the ground and how the 
reforms attempted to deal with this situation. Lastly, I will give an account of the experiences of 
the foreign minister under the first Haniyeh Cabinet in light of the stated goals of the 2002-2003 
reforms.  
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Constitutional framework 
The PA was not actually to build new institutions from scratch, but to integrate the various 
institutions that had emerged inside and outside the occupied territories. In exercising their 
functions, PA officials could claim a variety of historical sources or antecedents on which to 
draw.275 The Oslo Channel helped Arafat, Fatah and the PLO in consolidating their grip on the 
nascent institutions.276 On the face of it, the division of labor between the PA and the PLO was 
relatively clear. The PA was in itself the result of an agreement between the PLO and Israel. The 
PLO was to maintain its role as the sole representative of the Palestinian people inside and outside 
of the PA, whereas the PA was to build institutions and administer the territories in the interim 
period. From that would follow that the PLO, and not the PA, was mandated to negotiate a 
permanent deal. The supreme body of the PLO is the Palestine National Council (PNC), which is 
the parliament of the PLO. Between 1964 and 1998, the PNC held 22 sessions, but has not 
convened since then.277 This body was never elected, and the holding of PNC elections was a key 
commitment in the Cairo Declaration and the Prisoner‘s Document. The PNC has maintained 
roughly the same composition since it was established in 1964. Between PNC sessions its 
authority is vested in the PLO Central Council. The Central Council has in turn conferred upon 
the PLO Executive Committee the right to monitor the negotiations with Israel, but retained the 
right to ratify all agreements.278 
The mandate given to the PA by the 1995 Interim Agreement between Israel and the PLO 
specifically excludes ―foreign relations‖. The PA was to abstain from ―the establishment abroad 
of embassies, consulates or other types of foreign missions and posts or permitting their 
establishment in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, the appointment of or admission of diplomatic 
and consular staff, and the exercise of diplomatic functions‖ (Art IX.5a). However, the Interim 
Agreement stipulates that ―the PLO may conduct negotiations and sign agreements with states or 
international organizations for the benefit of the council‖ in the following cases: economic 
agreements under the provisions of the Interim Agreement, ―agreements with donor countries for 
the purpose of implementing arrangements for the provision of assistance to the council‖, 
―agreements for the purpose of implementing arrangements for the provision of assistance to the 
council‖, or ―agreements for the purpose of implementing the regional development plans‖ laid 
out in the Declaration of Principles or ―agreements entered into the framework of the multilateral 
negotiations‖, and cultural, scientific and educational agreements‖ (Art IX.5a, b).  
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Early drafts of the Basic Law specifically stated that the Basic Law was not to ―affect the 
powers and duties of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its organs including its powers to 
represent the Palestinian people in foreign and international relations and relations with foreign 
governmand [sic.] international organizations‖ (Art 103, 1994 PLO draft; and Art 117, 1995 PLO 
draft). Neither the 2002 PLC Basic Law nor 2003 Amended Basic Law addressed the issue of 
negotiations, but Art 40 in the Amended Basic Law states that:  
The President of the National Authority shall appoint and terminate the services of the National Authority‘s 
delegates to foreign countries, international organizations and foreign agencies. The President shall accept the 
credentials of foreign delegates to the Palestinian National Authority.
 
 
 
Juxtaposed with Art IX.5, forbidding ―the establishment abroad of embassies, consulates or other 
types of foreign missions and posts or permitting their establishment in the West Bank or the 
Gaza Strip, the appointment of or admission of diplomatic and consular staff, and the exercise of 
diplomatic functions‖ it seems that the Basic Law‘s Art 40 would contravene the Interim 
Agreement on this point. Butenschøn and Vollan argue that:  
―The responsibility for negotiations with Israeli continues to be located at the office of the president, not in 
his capacity as president of the PA, but in his capacity as the Chairman of the PLO. Like his predecessor 
Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas holds both positions, but it is only as PLO leader that he is mandated to 
negotiate with Israel. This is also recognized by the Hamas-led government that came to power after the 2006 
PLC elections.
279
  
 
But even though the Oslo Accords are clear in this respect, there is nothing explicit in the text of 
Art 40 to indicate that the president acts in the capacity of PLO chairman. It was not in fact clear 
in which capacity Arafat exercised any of his authorities. Such an interpretation would also 
conflict with the principle of free and direct elections for president, as it would formally require 
the two posts to be inhabited by one and the same. In addition, Art 40 refers to ―the National 
Authority‘s delegates to foreign countries‖, while the Interim Agreement states that the PA is not 
to establish any kind of missions and posts abroad. It would also be superfluous to address this 
issue in the Basic Law, that really only concerns the competencies of the PA. By default, the PLO 
operates beyond the reach of the Basic Law and its chairman would not need for the Basic Law to 
assign this authority.  
Brown has furthermore pointed out that ―PLC deputies were happiest when ignoring the 
Oslo Accords altogether‖.280 Independent member of the first PLC, Abdul Jawad Saleh, states that 
in drafting the Basic Law, the PLC ―has not constrained itself by the Oslo Agreement‖.281 
Paragraph 40 may in fact have echoed the first PLC‘s vision of the new Palestinian political entity 
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as one ―that differed little from existing democratic states‖.282 As President Arafat was in fact also 
PLO chairman, the distinction would at the time be seen as having no real practical effect. 
According to Barry Rubin, the real high command of the PA was a conjunction of the PLO 
Executive Committee, the Fatah Central Committee and the cabinet and executive branch 
personnel.283 Power did shift from the PLO to the PA. In the words of Qaddura Fares, Fatah 
member of the first PLC: ―The main institution should be the Executive Committee – not the 
government, not the PLC. But the reality was that we had the Authority, and the Authority had the 
power.‖284 However, the PLO kept its symbolic position of the higher reference and sole 
representative. 
Reform attempts 
The blurred lines between the PA and PLO would eventually manifest itself also in the confused 
organization of Palestinian representations. According to Abbas, an attempt to address this issue 
was made in 1996, when it was agreed the Palestinians were to be represented by two delegations. 
There would be a Palestinian delegation to be headed by Yasser Arafat. This delegation would 
among others include Farouq Qaddoumi (Fatah), head of PLOs political bureau in Tunis, and 
Palestinian negotiator and PLO Executive Committee member Yasser Abed Rabbo (Fida). In 
addition, there would be a delegation of foreign affairs to be headed by Shaath, who held the 
portfolio of Planning. The matter was never really settled, and this dualism caused confusion and 
frustration. In the words of Abbas: ―People complained, saying that ―we have two foreign 
ministers, two badges, two chairs, two cars, and two hotel suites. More seriously, we had two 
separate - and sometimes conflicting - political messages. Who represents the PLO? Who speaks 
for you? Who expresses your policies?‖ 285 
The issue of representation gained urgency after the second intifada, when Israeli and U.S. 
officials chose to abstain from direct dealings with the PLO chairman. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon made repeated threats to assassinate or expulse Arafat, who was now dismissed as an 
obstacle to peace. It was then decided that the president and the prime minister would sit on a 
PLO committee to agree on the red lines in negotiations that Arafat was now excluded from.286 In 
2002, Arafat convened the PLO Executive Committee in order to clarify matters. According to 
Abbas, it was then agreed that the jurisdictions would be shared between Minister of Planning, 
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Shaath, and Qaddoumi, leader of the PLO political office.287 Shaath was to represent the 
Palestinians in the Arab League and all matters dealing with Europe, while Qaddoumi would deal 
with Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Countries Conference and UN and African summit 
meetings. Abed Rabbo was to convey this message to Qaddoumi in Tunis, but Qaddoumi was not 
notified until Abbas appointed his cabinet in 2003. The portfolio of planning and international 
was retained with by Nabil Qassis (Independent) at the helm. In addition, Nabil Shaath was 
appointed minister of foreign affairs.
288
 In order to separate between separate between 
negotiations and the PA, Saeb Erekat (Fatah) replaced Abbas as head of the PLO negotiation team 
and was awarded observer status in the cabinet.289  
By attempting to transfer authority over the diplomatic services to the newly established 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the reforms indirectly framed the PLO, which was authorized to 
negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians. The PLO had gradually come to be considered by the 
international community as ―something part of the militant history, part of the old discourse, part 
of the past‖.290 According to political scientist Bassem Ezbidi from Bir Zeit University, foreign 
governments, and particularly the Europeans, pressed towards reforming the Foreign Service: 
―The reform on that level was basically meant to end the linkage between the PLO as a 
revolutionary notion, end its domination and its monopoly over selecting and determining the 
Foreign Service members – which meant giving the initiative to the PA in order to determine this 
field of activities.‖291  
In his speech, Abbas describes how ―all hell broke loose in Tunis‖ when news of the 
appointment of Shaath as foreign minister reached Qaddoumi.292 The constitutional framework 
did not serve to clarify matters, and Arafat chose not to take a clear stand in the matter. 
Meanwhile, Shaath and Qaddoumi engaged in a struggle over the control of the diplomatic 
services. According to Abbas, the result was that no one ultimately knew who was responsible for 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ―The only victim of this fiasco is Palestinian diplomacy, and our 
envoys abroad. We can do nothing, while neither Qaddomi nor Abu Ammar nor Shaath want to 
do anything. We have 89 [sic.] embassies in foreign countries, by the way, while Jordan for 
example has only 45.‖ 
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Under the Oslo Accords, the PA was not supposed to have a foreign ministry. The PA 
established the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation in order to handle international 
assistance to the PA. However, in 2003, the PA transformed this ministry into a Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 293 The ministry joined existing PLO structures to conduct diplomacy and foreign 
affairs. According to Parsons, the PLO maintained about 100294 diplomatic missions abroad, as 
well as functioning permanent missions to the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic 
Conference and the UN.295 The Ministry‘s own website stated that: ―After the formation of the 
fifth Palestinian government, a new Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established. This Ministry 
undertakes all the duties associated with a typical foreign ministry in a sovereign country, in the 
course of managing Palestine‘s foreign relations that serves its national interests.‖ 
Finally, the text asserts that: ―As in its capacity as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Ministry has a key role in all negotiations held on behalf of the Palestinian National Authority and 
the State of Palestine‖. In light of Abbas‘ statement that ―the PA does not have the power to 
negotiate‖,296 it seems reasonable to conclude that things were in fact not clarified. After Abbas‘ 
resignation as prime minister, his successor Ahmad Qureia kept Shaath, Qassis and Erekat in their 
respective positions, but the question of foreign affairs was never really solved. As long as Arafat 
was alive, the diplomatic corps mostly worked in close coordination with the PA, while 
Qaddoumi was able to play a role whenever Arafat found it expedient.297  
When Abbas reappeared on the PA scene as president in February 2005, he kept Qureia 
on as prime minister. Palestine‘s ambassador to the UN, Nasser al-Qudwah, was appointed 
foreign minister in the first technocrat cabinet in PA history. As president, Abbas initially threw 
his weight behind al-Qudwah as PA foreign minister. In 2005, the PLC enacted the Diplomatic 
Corps Law, regulating Palestinian diplomatic activity, its powers and the administrative and 
financial aspects of its operation.298 The Diplomatic Corps Law regulates the nomination, 
promotion and training of diplomats. The nomination is left to the president upon a 
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recommendation from the minister of foreign affairs (Art 7).299 Asem Khalil points out that there 
is no reference to the head of the PLO‘s Political Bureau in the nomination process. Art 3 states 
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to represent Palestine in foreign countries and to 
consolidate the relationship with states and international organization. The ministry is also to 
oversee diplomatic missions politically, administratively and financially. Under the new law, al-
Qudwah appointed a number of ambassadors to PA embassies in Arab and other foreign 
countries.300 In a countermove, Qaddoumi renamed several ambassadors.301 Abbas pressed ahead 
with the reforms, and in November 2005, 29 new ambassadors were sworn in by president 
Abbas302 Many of the ambassadors refused to leave their posts, and per January 2006, the situation 
was still unresolved.303  
Bypassing the cabinet 
In 2006, events took an unexpected turn with the electoral victory of Hamas in January and the 
appointment of Mahmoud al-Zahhar (Hamas) as foreign minister in the first Haniyeh Cabinet. 
This choice was particularly controversial as al-Zahhar was not a technocrat, but one of the co-
founders of Hamas and part of the Hamas leadership in Gaza. Israel, the USA and the EU joined 
in a boycott of the new cabinet and stated that they would only negotiate with Abbas in the 
capacity of PLO chairman, as stipulated in the Oslo Accords. There would be no dialogue with 
the cabinet, in which all other factions refused to participate. Meanwhile, al-Zahhar made several 
unsuccessful attempts to lead diplomatic missions, but was ―reminded that these contacts are part 
of the heritage of Oslo.‖304 In May 2006 al-Zahhar was only a member of the Palestinian 
delegation to the conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Malaysia. The delegation was led 
by Qaddoumi, who insulted al-Zahhar by stating that: ―I would train you and then I will turn over 
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the whole process to you. And you be the minister of foreign affairs.‖305 Al-Zahhar left after only 
one day, having informed Reuters that he would ―not stand side by side with a man that does not 
represent the Palestinian government‖.306 After this, al-Zahhar and Hamas reportedly retracted 
their decision to participate at a higher level. During the same month, it was reported that Abbas 
planned to meet with Qaddoumi in Tunisia ―in an effort to end the divisions‖ between the PA and 
the PLO regarding the diplomatic missions. In June 2006, Abbas issued a presidential decree, 
appointing Qaddoumi as Palestinian foreign minister.307 He also sent a letter to all diplomatic 
missions stating that Qaddoumi was ―the sole‖ foreign minister representing Palestine.308 Al-
Zahhar, on the other hand, stated his refusal to recognize the PLO before it is reformed. He 
reportedly said to the United Arab Emirates newspaper al-Bayan that Palestinian representation 
would be via the Palestinian government, and not the PLO‘s political department. Al-Zahhar went 
as far as saying that the government is the government of the Palestinians ―all of them, 
everywhere, until the PLO‘s role is activated and reformed‖.309 According to the Palestinian 
Independent Commission for Citizens‘ Rights in their Annual Report for 2006, the government 
stated that ―one of the most fundamental problems hampering its work on foreign affairs is the 
overlap of powers between the Presidency and the government‖.310 The PA president would 
frequently meet with foreign delegations without including the ministers in his own delegation – 
also in meetings with parties who did not boycott the Haniyeh Cabinet.  
The first Haniyeh Cabinet lasted from March 2006 until March 2007, during which the 
EU, Israel and the USA maintained a total of boycott of the cabinet. In order to avoid a total 
economic collapse of the Palestinian economy, the EU and the World Bank established a 
Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) whereby funds were channeled directly to the 
presidency and personnel in key public sectors while bypassing the Hamas led cabinet. 
Meanwhile Fatah and Hamas negotiated to agree on the composition and platform for a national 
unity cabinet in the hope that the international society would accept a cabinet where also Fatah 
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was included. On 17 March 2007 the National Unity Cabinet was sworn under the premiership of 
Haniyeh. Al-Zahhar was replaced by Ziyad Abu Amr (Independent) as PA foreign minister. Even 
though the donor community still refused to deal with Hamas members, Abu Amr and Finance 
Minister Fayyad were able to meet with representatives of several Western countries personally 
and worked actively to persuade the donor community to lift the blockade against the PA. In this 
effort, he worked parallel with PLO chief negotiator, Erekat.  
On 14 May 2007, the USA informed the EU that funds could now be channeled to the 
Palestinians through a PLO account managed by the finance minister. In their report on this news 
item, Reuters quoted a letter to the EU by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 
Affairs David Welch: ―While our financial regulations with regard to transactions with the PA 
(Palestinian Authority) government remain in place, these restrictions do not apply to the PLO.‖311 
Consequently, the cash flow was reversed from the PA and back to the PLO. TIM and the PLO 
account were used to channel funds directly to the president and the PLO respectively. PA 
employees would now get paid, but restrictions on the cabinet were to remain in place. The 
objective according to Reuters was to ―ensure that banks felt comfortable transferring funds to the 
PLO and, in turn, to strengthen Palestinians like Fayyad and Abbas who favor a negotiated two-
state solution to the conflict‖.312 On 14 June 2007 Hamas took military control of the Gaza Strip 
and Abbas dismissed the National Unity Cabinet. A new cabinet was established in Ramallah 
with Fayyad as prime minister. This set off a constitutional crisis that will be dealt with in a later 
chapter. However, the international community was quick to support Fayyad‘s cabinet as the new 
face of the PA. Subsequent dealings with the Palestinians have taken place with the PA as the 
opposite party. 
Palestinian diplomacy in light of the 2002-2003 reforms 
The 2002-2003 reforms aimed at professionalizing not just the security apparatus, but also the 
diplomatic corps under the cabinet and the foreign minister. This part of the reforms deviated 
from the intention of the Oslo Accords and aimed at sidelining the PLO, which was associated 
with Arafat. The effort had been only partially completed when Hamas took power and was then 
immediately reversed. With the reversal of the 2002-2003 reforms in the field of negotiations the 
PA in some ways moved closer to its roots as a function of an agreement with the PLO and Israel. 
Simultaneously, the language of Oslo was revived in order to undercut Foreign Minister al-
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Zahhar. In theory, this was not illegitimate, neither according to PLO statutes nor the Oslo 
Accords. However, neither did it amount to a clarification of the division of labor between the PA 
and the PLO.  
As a liberation movement for the total body of Palestinians on both sides of the Green 
Line, it seems reasonable that the PLO is not subject to a Basic Law that governs the undefined 
territories of the PA. However, neither the Basic Law nor the PLC standing orders or any other 
PA legal framework provides for any formal mechanisms for separating the roles of the PA and 
the PLO, or for separating the roles of individuals who maintain positions in both entities. The 
uncertainty surrounding the establishment of PA allowed Arafat to activate PLO institutions 
selectively, and for specifically political purposes.313 This has so far provided two sitting 
presidents with the possibility to lean on multiple sources of legitimacy in dealing with their 
cabinets and the PLC. The PLO can at any time be revived and be used as a tool to subvert the 
cabinet – and vice versa. After the 2006 PLC elections, editor Ali Alumina of the Electronic 
Intifada commented acidly on the renewed claims that it is the PLO, and not the PA, ―that is the 
true representative of Palestinians‖: 
This could be convincing except for the fact that since signing the 1993 Oslo Accord, Fatah leaders have 
dismantled the PLO as a truly representative body and invested all their efforts into building up the PA as 
their powerbase. Once they lost their grip on the PA, they suddenly rediscovered the PLO.
314
 
 
This follows the same pattern of personalized and deinstitutionalized politics that was conducted 
by Arafat and the old PLO elite.315 Significant reforms would be reforms that countered this 
strategy and strengthened institutions on behalf of institutions. In vacillating between the PA and 
the PLO, the international community has in fact contributed to the deinstitutionalizing of 
Palestinian politics. This has allowed for an ad hoc and personalized approach to Palestinian 
institution building that downplays the importance of formal institutions, of which the Basic Law 
forms a vital part.  
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SUMMARY PART II 
The 2003 amendment of the Basic Law aimed at strengthening the cabinet vis-à-vis the president 
and as far as possible resolve the issue of residual powers in favor of the cabinet. In a more subtle 
manner, the 2002-2003 reforms also targeted the PLO by creating an empowered cabinet that 
could emerge as an independent and distinct player in the Palestinian political system. The 
reforms were challenged almost immediately, initially by Arafat, later by PA internal power 
struggles, and finally by the international community. The 2002-2003 reforms were immediately 
eroded by President Arafat and his allies in the security forces who wanted to report directly to 
him. They were further eroded as the decision of Hamas to enter the political institutions first led 
Fatah members to prepare for electoral competition, and then to bolster their power within the 
post-election institutions. Strengthening Abbas was seen as one way of achieving those goals. 
Arafat was criticized for consciously blurring the lines between the PA and the PLO in 
order to maximize his own room for maneuvering. Whenever feasible, he would evoke his 
prerogatives as PLO chairman. Even though Abbas was perceived as more orderly and reform 
minded than Arafat had been, he has eventually come to follow the same pattern. The 
international community has blurred the lines even further by not clarifying in what capacity they 
deal with Palestinian representatives and on what legislative basis. This hampers genuine reform 
efforts. 
External pressure to follow up on the reforms subsided as the truce addressed the security 
concerns that had been a crucial motivation for the international community. The erosion of the 
2003 amendment was therefore largely ignored. In addition, President Mahmoud Abbas was 
perceived as a moderate negotiating partner, and the international community did not press for 
measures that would constrict his powers. This indicates the personalized agenda that really 
underlay the reforms. The need to secure moderate allies among the Palestinians was given 
priority over Palestinian institutional development. The international boycott of the Hamas cabinet 
and the unity cabinet following the 2006 elections led to a further reversal of the 2003 
amendment. Efforts by the president and the PLO to undercut it were welcomed by the 
international community. The cabinet was unable to exercise its powers as awarded in the 2003 
amendment, and the constitutional reform cannot be seen as significant. 
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PART III: REASSERTING THE PRESIDENCY 
The results of our elections have led to the creation of a new political reality, in which Hamas 
won the majority in the PLC. Therefore, it will be tasked with the formation of the new 
government. 
- President Mahmoud Abbas 
7. 2006: Passing the High Constitutional Law 
In January 2006, Hamas was brought to a resounding electoral victory, securing a comfortable 
majority in the PLC. For the first time, the PA‘s cabinet and prime minister would belong to a 
different party than the president. The very movement, which once represented the radical 
alternative to the entire political system as embodied in the PA institutions, would now govern 
through them. In the initial chapters of this thesis, I discussed how political actors sought to 
translate their aims into constitutional proposals and amendments. When the presidential party, 
Fatah, lost their majority in the PLC, this course of action would no longer be possible. Fatah 
started to prepare for their new role as an opposition party, and their focus shifted from 
influencing the actual constitutional framework to promoting a favorable interpretation of it.  
On 13 February 2006, only days before the inauguration session of the second PLC, the 
outgoing PLC passed a new law for a Palestinian constitutional court. The law had been in the 
making for several years. Yet, the law was passed with last minute amendments that strengthened 
the presidential role in nominating high constitutional court judges. Moreover, the outgoing PLC 
made administrative decisions to establish new PLC posts, to which they appointed Fatah 
members. The tumultuous last session made world headlines as incoming PLC members vowed 
to overturn the decisions immediately. I will here present the decisions made by the outgoing PLC 
in their last session and discuss whether they were concurrent with the 2003 reforms.  
Constitutional framework 
All Basic Law drafts have provided for a high constitutional court. The Amended Basic Law 
outlines the mandate of the High Constitutional Court in Art 103.1. Among others, the court is to 
consider the constitutionality of laws and regulations, and the interpretation of the Basic Law. 
According to plan, the High Constitutional Court was to be established by a separate piece of 
legislation, the High Constitutional Court Law (Art 103.2). The High Constitutional Court Law 
was to specify appointment procedures, the formation of the courts and the number of its 
members. Pending such legislation and the establishment of a constitutional court, the Palestinian 
High Court was to assume the duties of the High Constitutional Court (Art 104). Such a law had 
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been in the making, but had still not been completed when the 2006 elections took place. In their 
last session, five days before the scheduled constitutional oath taking of the new PLC, the 
outgoing PLC passed the High Constitutional Court Law with new amendments proposed by 
president Abbas. 316  
There might be slight variations in the competencies of constitutional courts, but they 
generally have the power to declare laws unconstitutional and void. Such courts can be seen as a 
―neutral arbiter‖ who can enforce the constitution ―in a depoliticized manner‖.317 Constitutional 
courts can however, be a two-edged sword. Constitutional theorists continually grapple with the 
so-called ―countermajoritarian dilemma‖ that emerges when courts by way of judicial review can 
strike down acts of a democratically elected legislature.318 Brown has pointed out that the ability 
of regimes to pursue their own interpretations of constitutional texts, which are often vague, has 
allowed them to ―rob constitutional provisions of any limiting power‖.319 Procedures for 
appointment of judges and bringing cases before the court as well as the constitutional text itself 
are of crucial importance in determining whether or not a constitutional court will be able to 
contribute in the consolidation of constitutionalism.  
Drafting the High Constitutional Court Law 
I have not been able to find a coherent account of how the drafting process of the High 
Constitutional Court Law proceeded, but a combination of media reports, human rights reports 
and personal correspondence with Brown seems to indicate that it went approximately like this: In 
December, the PLC legal committee had gathered to discuss changes in the first draft concerning 
the formation of the Court, the number of members and conditions for membership in order to 
prepare the draft for a second hearing in the PLC.320 On 23 January 2005, president Abbas sent a 
letter to then PLC Speaker Rawhi Fattouh, indicating that he had approved a draft sent to the 
Presidential Office by the PLC Legal Committee. However, it turned out that this was not the 
same text that had been approved by the PLC. According to Haaretz, a second reading took place 
on 24 January 2006, the day before the elections.321 The draft was subsequently referred to Abbas 
for his comments. According to Brown, Abbas returned the law and new amendments secretly to 
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the PLC speaker after the 25 January elections. The final revisions transferred significant powers 
to the president by allowing Abbas to appoint judges to the High Constitutional Court without 
PLC approval. The president would merely be obliged to consult with the Supreme Judicial 
Council and the minister of justice. 322 The High Constitutional Court Law No. 3 of 2006 was 
passed by the PLC by 41-3 votes and one abstention. 323  
Incoming Hamas parliamentarians were observers to the session on 13 February, and 
vowed to overturn the legislation. In the first session after the inauguration session, 69 of 120 
present MPs voted to revoke the laws, and Fatah members withdrew in protest. Erekat argued that 
the second parliament had no right to overturn the previous parliament‘s legislation. Azzam al-
Ahmad, leader of Fatah‘s parliamentary faction accused Hamas of using their majority ―to 
infringe the law on behalf of their interests‖.324 The Hamas dominated second PLC, however, 
claimed that the first PLC‘s actions had been illegal. According to Brown, Hamas representatives 
argued that the session itself was not legal, as there was not a quorum. The minutes from the 
session reportedly stated that there was a quorum, but the new PLC claimed that a filmed version 
of the session shows that this was in fact not correct. On these grounds, the new PLC refused to 
approve the minutes of the outgoing PLC‘s last session. Fatah, on the other hand, asserted that the 
only the outgoing PLC could pass judgment on its own action. Secondly, they argued that even if 
the incoming PLC could change the minutes, it would have to be done at the session immediately 
following the last session of the outgoing PLC. According to Hamas, this did not happen because 
the first session was a ceremonial session where the new PLC was sworn in.325  
Eventually, the second PLC passed a motion to refer the legislation to the High Court, 
acting as the Constitutional Court. 326 On 19 December 2006 the High Court acting as the 
Constitutional Court,327 annulled Hamas‘ revocation.328 The court reportedly ruled that the second 
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PLC had no authority to call off any resolutions of the previous parliament.329 Hence, the High 
Constitutional Court Law is valid. The PLC speaker was reportedly rebuffed by the Chief Justice 
after having declared that the ruling was political.330 As of 30 January 2007, Abbas was rumored 
to have begun such consultations to appointed judges for the new court.331 
The last decisions made by the outgoing PLC were criticized on both procedural and 
constitutional grounds. I have not been able to obtain an English translation of the High 
Constitutional Court Law. The following is based on media reports and information from PCHR. 
In a press release dated 16 February 2006, the PCHR criticized Article 5 of the new law, 
concerning the initial forming of the court. The article states that the court‘s chief justice and 
judges are to be appointed by a presidential decree ―in consultation‖ with the Higher Judicial 
Council and minister of justice. 332 The PHRC argued that the High Constitutional Court Law and 
the amendments made by the outgoing PLC were inconsistent with both the Amended Basic Law 
and the Judicial Authority Law. Art 99 of the Basic Law states that judges are to be appointed by 
the procedures defined in the Judicial Authority Law, which states that ―filling judicial vacancies 
is done through a decision by the president of the PA based on nominations by the Higher Judicial 
Council‖ (Art 18333). The PCHR pointed out that there is ―a clear difference between 
‗consultation‘ and ‗nomination.‘‖ The law was also amended by Abbas in the last minute, and 
these amendments weakened the court‘s mandate compared to earlier drafts. Previous drafts 
authorized the High Constitutional Court to monitor the constitutionality of ―laws, decrees, 
presidential decisions, cabinet decisions, and regulations‖. In the amended version, the court‘s 
jurisdiction is limited to ―monitoring the constitutionality of law and regulations‖. In other words, 
after the electoral loss of the president‘s party, presidential decrees and decisions were explicitly 
removed from the mandate of the Constitutional Court. Incoming PLC member Abdel Aziz 
Dwaik (incoming Speaker of the second PLC) described the move as a ―bloodless coup‖.334 
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The PCHR also criticized the timing of the session and the nature of decisions made. In 
addition to passing a crucial piece of legislation, the first PLC added to the already pervasive 
duplication of structures by creating new administrative posts in the PLC. The new posts in 
question were those of Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General in the PLC. However, the 
Basic Law already provides for a presidency office in the PLC (Art 50). The presidency office is 
to be elected in the first session of the PLC, so the outgoing PLC did overstep its boundaries. The 
PCHR further pointed out that even though the Basic Law does not set a timeframe for the 
constitutional oath of a new PLC following legislative elections, the PLC Bylaws states that ―the 
president of the PA shall invite the PLC to a session in the first regular term in the second week 
following the announcement of the official results of the elections‖ (Art 2.a). This was not done, 
and the outgoing PLC was allowed to ―continue its work, and hold a final session that was not 
necessary‖. While the PCHR recognized that the session was ―held in accordance with Basic Law 
and its amendments‖, they argued that it was ―unacceptable‖ for the outgoing PLC to decide on 
issues such as staff recruitment more than two weeks following elections: ―PCHR concludes that 
this must be seen as an attempt by an outgoing majority to pass laws and decisions before they 
themselves would become a minority in the PLC.‖335 
We have seen that the PLC in their outgoing session transferred powers to the presidency. 
Exempting presidential decisions from the scope of judicial review severely weakens the 
accountability of the executive as a whole, particularly in situations where the president‘s party 
would simultaneously dominate the legislative and the executive. It is highly questionable 
whether the High Constitutional Court will be able to play a constructive role in ensuring the 
constitutionality of laws or in settling disputes between the various branches of government.  
The High Constitutional Court Law in light of the 2003 amendment 
The importance of the High Constitutional Court Law does not lie in the functioning of the actual 
court. In the conflicts that later arose between the president and the prime minister during 2006, 
so-called ―expert committees‖ were established to discuss the constitutionality of decisions made 
by the president and the cabinet.336  In their Annual Report for 2006, the PICCR states that the 
High Constitutional Court had not been activated, 337 although there were rumors that Abbas had 
consulted with potential judges after the ruling that the High Constitutional Court was not 
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unconstitutional.338 However, the amendments that were made fit into a general pattern whereby 
the president was strengthened. The High Constitutional Court Law must be seen in light of a 
series of decisions that aimed to strengthen the control of the presidency over various security and 
civil institutions, once the result of the elections was declared.339  
In his initial months as president in 2005, Abbas moved to transfer a number of 
competencies from PLO institutions and the presidency to the PA cabinet level. This was in line 
with the 2003 amendment, which stipulated that the president was only to exercise his powers as 
specified within the Basic Law, whereas all other executive power fell to the cabinet. After the 
results of the elections made it clear that Hamas would take on cabinet power, these decisions 
were reversed. Previous chapters have shown how the presidency was reinforced in the areas of 
security and foreign affairs. These were not the only affected areas. The civil aviation and 
transport authority, which had been transferred to the presidency by Arafat, was transferred to the 
Ministry of Transport by President Abbas in 2005. After the elections, civil aviation was 
retransferred to the Presidential Office.340 A decision to transfer the PLO‘s Palestinian News 
Agency (WAFA) to the Ministry of Information was reversed, and WAFA was brought back 
under the control of the PLO Executive Committee Chairman. The State Information Service had 
been transferred from the presidency to the Ministry of Information, was brought back to the 
presidency. In addition, the decision to move the Palestinian TV and Radio Station as well as the 
Palestinian Satellite Channel from the PLO Executive Committee and the PA Presidency into the 
portfolio of Ministry of Information was cancelled. Finally, the presidential decree transferring the 
Palestinian National Commission for Education, Culture & Science to the Council of Ministers 
was revoked, and the commission remains under the auspices of the PLO Education and Higher 
Education Department. 341 These decisions reduced the cabinet‘s responsibilities in direct 
contravention of the 2003 amendment. 
The High Constitutional Court Law was the last example of an attempt by Fatah in their 
capacity of being the majority party to embed their interests in the constitutional framework. After 
the inauguration of the second PLC, the legislative process stagnated due to a combination of 
internal power struggles and the international boycott of the Hamas led institutions. Strategies 
shifted from influencing the constitutional texts into establishing one‘s own interpretation of it as 
authoritative. This is the topic of the next chapter.
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… to stress that higher national interests call for respecting the “Basic Law” of the PNA … 
- The Prisoner‘s Document 
8. 2006-2007: Interpreting the Basic Law  
Following the parliamentary elections of January 2006, Abbas tasked Ismail Haniyeh of the 
winning Hamas party with the formation of a new Palestinian cabinet. After his appointment as 
prime minister, Haniyeh invited all the political factions represented in the PLC to join the 
cabinet, but they declined the invitation. Consequently, the Palestinian cabinet came to consist of 
a combination of Hamas members and technocrats close to Hamas. The US, the EU and Israel 
immediately demanded that the new cabinet would explicitly abstain from violence, recognize the 
existence of Israel, and respect previous accords with Israel. They also stated that they would not 
engage with the new cabinet, but only deal with President Abbas in his capacity as PLO chairman. 
As it became clear that their demands would not be met, the United States, the EU and Israel took 
the lead in imposing economic sanctions on the cabinet while supporting the presidency by 
depositing funding directly into the bank account of president Abbas and employees in key public 
sectors. The sanctions and Hamas‘ refusal to comply with international demands combined with a 
desire on behalf of strong elements within Fatah to regain their power led to a number of public 
confrontations.  
Immediately after the elections, Abbas took a reconciliatory tone towards Hamas. While 
asking Hamas to change their attitude towards Israel, he indicated his wish to cooperate with the 
new PLC. In his inauguration speech to the second PLC, he stated: ―You will find from my part 
all the cooperation and encouragement you need, because the national interest is our first and final 
goal, and is above any individual or faction‖342 However, he proceeded to challenge the 
government‘s authority in several ways that were significant to the Basic Law. The issues that 
were raised mainly pertained to the prerogatives of the president. From January 2006 until fall 
2007, Abbas moved to call for a popular referendum, threatened to dismiss the PLC, issued a 
number of decrees while the PLC was still in session, declared a state of emergency and installed 
a caretaker cabinet without the confidence of the PLC.  
The conflict between Fatah and Hamas after the elections grew increasingly violent, but it 
has also had a legal dimension. Parallel to fighting in the streets the parties also fought a PR war 
in the media. Central to this propaganda effort were arguments related to the Basic Law. From the 
very beginning, representatives of Hamas and Fatah respectively hurled accusations at each other, 
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both claiming that decisions made by the opposing party‘s actions were contrary to the Basic 
Law. Instead of simply ignoring the Basic Law, both parties tried to obtain acceptance for their 
interpretation of it, while discrediting the other as acting unconstitutionally.  
Jon Elster has described a well-institutionalized order as one where the ―rules according to 
which political and distributional conflicts are carried out are relatively immune from becoming 
themselves the object of such conflicts‖.343 After the assumption of power by Hamas, the rules of 
the political game in the PA became contested. By introducing a divided majority with a Hamas 
majority in parliament and a Fatah president, the 2006 elections marked a turning point in 
Palestinian political history. This exacerbated already existing conflicts within the executive and 
put the Basic Law to a test in significant areas and provided the first opportunity to observe the 
constitutional mechanisms at play under circumstances that had not been predicted by the drafters.  
On 14 June 2007 events culminated as Abbas dismissed the National Unity Cabinet, 
declared a state of emergency and installed an emergency cabinet with Fayyad as prime minister 
in the West Bank. The remnants of the National Unity Cabinet in Gaza refused to recognize the 
new cabinet and maintained their rule over Gaza under the deposed Prime Minister Haniyeh. In 
the following days, declarations of recognition and support for the Fayyad Cabinet came from the 
EU, the USA and the Quartet, while the deposed Haniyeh Cabinet remained isolated in Gaza. 
Brown has pointed out that: ―The question […] is not whether the constitution will be 
enforced but whose interpretation of it will be authoritative‖.344 This chapter returns to the first 
main question of how various political interests influenced Palestinian constitutional 
development. Whereas the first part dealt with the effect of the various interests on the Basic Law 
in its quality as a legal text, this chapter discusses how political actors influence constitutional 
development by trying to establish their own interpretation of the Basic Law as authoritative. 
What were the main constitutional debates, and how did they relate to the 2003 amendment of the 
Basic Law? How did the conflict affect the ability of the Basic Law to impact on politics?  
Constitutional issues  
Calling for referendums 
The first Haniyeh government (March 2006-March 2007) was faced with overwhelming 
challenges. These included the imposition of international sanctions, massive strikes that were 
motivated by political considerations, lacking payment of salaries, and an increasing level of 
violence. Despite this, the government refused to back down. On the ground, violence escalated 
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among the various fractions. In response to the precarious situation, Palestinian faction leaders in 
Israeli jails joined in writing the first version of the Prisoners‘ Document. 345 The document 
contained a number of political declarations that were meant to serve as basis of consensus among 
the factions, and to provide a starting point for negotiations to form a national unity cabinet with 
ministers drawn from all the political factions represented in the PLC. Even though the document 
was signed by all faction leaders in jail, the document was not accepted by the Hamas cabinet. 
The disagreement over the Prisoner‘s Document was related to recognition of Israel and former 
agreements made with Israel, and the right to armed resistance.  
On 6 June 2006, Abbas gave Hamas an ultimatum, stating that he would call a referendum 
on the document if Hamas would not endorse it.346 Haniyeh responded by sending a letter to 
Abbas stating that the planned referendum lacked a constitutional basis.347 He continued to write 
that it would have been better to conduct a referendum on the Oslo Accords. The day after, on 10 
June, Abbas issued a presidential decree setting 26 July as the date for the referendum on the 
Prisoner‘s document. The referendum was to answer ―either Yes or No‖ to the following 
question: ―Do you agree to the national conciliation document ―Prisoners Document?‖ The decree 
was issued on a decision by the PLO Executive Committee a few days earlier. Even though the 
Law of Elections did not open for referendums, Abbas referred to the Law of Elections for the 
procedural side of the matter: The referendum was to be held according to ―the provisions of 
Elections Law no. 9 for 2005 and the relevant regulations shall be applied on any issue not 
mentioned in the text of this decree and to the extent required by the referendum process‖. Any 
matter absent in the text was to be decided on by the Central Elections Commission. 348  
The Law of Elections regulates the elections for president and the PLC, but similar to the 
Basic Law, it contains no reference to referendums. Hamas consistently rejected the referendum 
and repeated that it lacked a constitutional base. In spite of this controversy, the parties decided to 
continue the national dialogue. On 28 June the parties agreed to a new version of the Prisoners‘ 
Document, and the referendum debate was shelved. Three questions had been at stake: Would 
such a referendum at all be legal? Supposing it were, should the result be binding or not, and 
would the right of initiative lie with the president or the prime minister?   
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The absence of referendums in the Basic Law led Hamas to the conclusion that the 
presidential decree was illegal. Fatah reached the opposite conclusion and argued that the 
president had the authority to call for a referendum as the Basic Law did not specifically forbid it. 
Fatah also argued that in any case the referendum would be considered advisory as opposed to 
binding. Hamas argued that a referendum would have to be rooted in constitutional provisions, 
and that the proposed referendum was an attempt at undemocratic blackmail of the people. Fatah 
legitimized their point of view by the absence of an explicit prohibition in the Basic Law. 
Axiomatic to their argument was that the right of initiation would lie with the president or the 
PLO Executive Committee. Hamas argued that the absence of referendums in the Basic Law 
amounted to making the referendum call illegal. Consequently, they did not proceed to debate the 
issue of initiation rights.  
Brown argues that: ―This remarkably expansive view of presidential authority – that the 
president may do anything not explicitly prohibited – seems unsupported by the Basic Law.‖ He 
refers to Art 38 of the Amended Basic Law, which specifically limits the president to exercise his 
powers as defined by the Basic Law. The amendment furthermore transfers powers from the 
president to the cabinet and defines the cabinet as the ―highest executive tool‖ (Art 63).  
Butenschøn and Vollan argue that it ―seems reasonable to assume that the President may 
ask the people for advice,‖ they also point out that in the cases of ad hoc referendums, it is usually 
the parliament who asks for advice.349 In this case, the majority of the PLC was opposed to the 
referendum. Further complicating the issue or referendums is that the carrying out of a 
referendum would depend on the cooperation of bodies that do not answer to the president, but to 
the cabinet, such as the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Education.350 Even if the president 
were to hold such a prerogative, the question remains whether or not the presidential decree would 
be a formality. Would the power of initiative lie with the prime minister, or would it be for the 
president to decide when and if a referendum would be politically expedient. It would also have to 
be established what role the PLC should play in ratifying the call for referendums and the eventual 
result. During the summer of 2006, the parties managed to reach an agreement on the Prisoners‘ 
Document, and Abbas did not go through with the referendum call. 
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Dismissing the parliament and holding early elections 
Once the parties had been able to conclude on a political platform based on the Prisoners‘ 
Document in the fall of 2006, new problems arose as Fatah and Hamas started negotiating on the 
composition of the unity cabinet. Hamas argued that Hamas as the biggest block should also hold 
the prime minister while Fatah argued that a Fatah prime minister was required in order to present 
a moderate face to the world. A cycle of negotiations and stalemate continued. The disagreement 
was related to the question of recognizing Israel and the distribution of ministerial posts. The 
conflict culminated on 16 December 2006, when Abbas called for new parliamentary and 
presidential elections upon a recommendation from the PLO Executive Committee.351  
Chief of the Legal Committee of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and Hamas 
bloc leader, Farad al-Ghool, argued that the president could dismiss the cabinet or resign himself, 
but that it would be illegal to dismiss the PLC.352 Al-Ghool contended that the PLO Executive 
Committee was trying to trick Arafat into violating the constitution, while stressing the need to 
adhere to the Basic Law and continue the national dialogue. Hamas leader Khalil al-Haiyeh 
Hamas considered it ―unacceptable that whenever the president is at odds with his government, he 
calls new elections every six months, thereby expending lots of money and effort.‖ 353 He further 
pointed out that early elections could only be a solution if Fatah was absolutely confident of 
winning.354 ―What will happen if Hamas wins the new presidential and legislative elections? Will 
that end the national project or do we enter a new show?‖ he asked rhetorically.  Hamas also 
resented the PLO Executive Committee‘s role in the matter. Deputy speaker of the Hamas block 
in the PLC, al-Yahiya Moussa, blasted the PLO Executive Committee, stating that: ―There is 
nothing in the Basic Law which allows the executive committee to interfere in the Palestinian 
Authority‘s affairs. The issue of elections is specified clearly in the law.‖355 
However, Abbas stopped short of announcing decree specifying a date for the elections, 
and Haniyeh got yet another three months to form a unity cabinet. Clashes and various initiatives 
to move the dialogue continued until February, when Saudi Arabia invited Abbas and Haniyeh to 
Mecca for a final round of negotiations. The parties finally managed to agree on the formation of 
a unity cabinet which was sworn in on March 2007. However, conflicts over the security forces 
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ripped at the cabinet and armed clashes between Fatah and Hamas related forces continued on the 
ground. On 13 June, Fatah withdrew its ministers from the National Unity Cabinet. The day after 
Hamas‘ military forces, the Executive Force and al-Qassam, brigades took military control of 
Gaza. Upon a recommendation by the PLO Executive Committee, President Abbas dismissed 
Prime Minister Haniyeh and his cabinet and declared a state of emergency on 14 June 2007. The 
following day, he appointed Fayyad as prime minister.  
The dismissal of the National Unity Cabinet rekindled the debate on whether the president 
was allowed to call for early parliamentary elections. Hamas rejected claims that this was within 
the president‘s prerogatives and raged at an alleged suggestion from PNC speaker Salim Zanoun 
to replace the PLC with the PLO Central Council and the Palestinian National Council.356  Bahar 
argued that Zanoun's statements were ―extreme violations of Palestinian democracy and the 
Palestinian Law‖. In referring to Art 113 of the Basic Law, he asserted that it is forbidden to harm 
the PLC in any ordinary or emergency circumstances. Fatah‘s parliamentary leader, Azzam al-
Ahmad, counterclaimed that under Art 43 the president under pressing circumstances, and while 
the PLC is not in session, can issue declarations and decrees that have the power of law. 
According to al-Ahmad, Abbas could make use of this article to call for early elections.357  
The second PLC was for weeks and months at a time unable to convene with the required 
quorum of 67 parliamentarians. Fatah knew that if the PLC was not able to function, this would 
enable the president to claim that new PLC elections were not only legitimate, but also necessary. 
This line of thinking is evident in al-Ahmad‘s statement that: ―If the PLC remains inactive, and 
the Palestinian forces [Hamas and Fatah] do not come to an understanding, it is very reasonable to 
call for early elections, and there is nothing in the Basic Law that prevents the idea.‖ 
It was in the interest of Hamas to root their argument firmly in the constitutional 
provisions. Art 113 of the Basic Law states that: ―The Palestinian Legislative Council may not be 
dissolved or its work hindered during a state of emergency, nor shall the provisions of this title be 
suspended. Furthermore, Art 47.3 of the Basic Law according to the 2005 amendment points out 
that: ―The term of the Legislative Council shall be four years from the date of its being elected 
and the elections shall be conducted once each four years in a regular manner.‖ The 2005 Law of 
Elections states that the president shall ―within at least three months prior to the expiry of the 
council‘s term in office, issue a decree calling for presidential and legislative elections throughout 
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the Palestinian territories indicating the date thereof‖ (Art 7). Moreover, Art 2.2 of the Law of 
Elections sets the council‘s term to four years commencing from the election date, and stipulates 
that ―Elections shall be held periodically every four years‖ (Art 2.4). In spite of claims that the 
Basic Law is not clear in this issue, Brown states that the Basic Law is in fact both clear and 
definitive:  
There is no loophole—under existing constitutional provisions, Abu Mazin has no more basis for early 
parliamentary elections than President George W. Bush has for ordering new Congressional elections if he 
does not like the result. Parliamentary elections before 2010 would require that the constitution be amended - 
which only the Hamas dominated Legislative Council could do.
358
  
 
If early elections were an option, it would as the issue or referendums raise certain questions: To 
what extent should the prime minister be involved, and should the president be able to initiate new 
elections against the will of a cabinet that enjoys parliamentary confidence? In binding the 
president to exercise his duties ―as specified in this law‖ (Art 38), the Amended Basic Law 
assigns all power that is not specifically defined in the Basic Law to the cabinet. Even though the 
Law of Elections states that the call for elections is to come from the president (Art 7), the logic of 
the 2003 amendment would indicate the cabinet and or the PLC should play role in making such a 
decision.  
Dismissing the cabinet 
Two days after Abbas declared a state of emergency on 14 June 2007, Fayyad and his so-called 
emergency cabinet took oath in Ramallah. The decisions were immediately endorsed by the 
Quartet.359 The EU presidency explicitly supported ―President Abbas‘ decision, in keeping with 
the Palestinian Basic Law, to dismiss the government and to appoint a caretaker government for 
the Palestinian territories‖. The internationally backed Fayyad Cabinet started exercising power in 
the West Bank, while the remnants of the National Unity Cabinet in Gaza refused to step down.  
The reason why Hamas refused to relinquish power to the new cabinet was not that they disputed 
the right of the president to dismiss the cabinet. The disagreement was related to the correct 
procedure for the formation of a new cabinet. Acting PLC Speaker360 Ahmad Bahar (Hamas) 
explicitly conceded that ―Haniyeh‘s government is considered resigned‖, but also stated that ―it 
must continue its duties as a transitional government, until a new government is formed with the 
approval of the PLC.‖361 Abbas claimed that under the Basic Law, the president could appoint an 
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―emergency cabinet‖ which would be legitimate for 30 days before being presented to the PLC. 
This perception was supported by the Quartet. However, the Basic Law does not include specific 
provisions for emergency cabinets. The source of the reference to the ―30 days‖ is most likely Art 
110 which states the procedure for declaring a state of emergency: ―The President of the National 
Authority may declare a state of emergency by decree when there is a threat to national security 
caused by war, invasion, armed insurrection or in times of natural disaster, for a period not to 
exceed thirty (30) days.‖ 
As 13 July and the end of the 30 days was approaching, Abbas asked the PLC to convene 
a special session to grant confidence to the new cabinet.362 However, the PLC was not able to 
obtain the required quorum as the entire Fatah block was absent.363 Instead, Fayyad stepped down 
and was immediately reappointed as prime minister in a caretaker capacity. After the failed PLC 
session, Bahar wrote a letter to the president, requesting him to replace Fayyad with another 
figure.364 He argued that the caretaker government had not won the confidence of the PLC. This is 
required according to Article 66, which states that: 
Once the Prime Minister selects the members of the government, the Prime Minister shall submit a request to 
the Legislative Council to hold a special session for a vote of confidence. […] The session shall be held no 
later than one week from the date of submission of the request.  
 
Bahar had previously argued that a government requires PLC confidence in order to be legal, and 
that the unity cabinet ―remains legal as a transitional government, until a new government gains 
the PLC‘s confidence‖.365 He reiterated that according to Art 79.4 the prime minister, or any other 
minister, may not start their duties before gaining the approval of the PLC.  
The Legislation Office of the Cabinet in Ramallah offered a different perspective. Former 
Minister of Justice, Abdul Karim Abu Salah, head of the Legislation Office, issued a statement 
where he referred to Art 6 of the Basic Law, which states that: ―The principle of the rule of law 
shall be the basis of government in Palestine. All governmental powers, agencies, institutions and 
individuals shall be subject to the law.‖ Under paragraph six, the Hamas takeover of Gaza was 
illegal, and the results of it are null and void, Abu Salah stated. He further more argued that Art 
113 of the Basic Law gives the president ―the right to suspend the Basic Law completely, 
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including chapter 5, which is related to the executive authority‖.366 Article 113, however, reads 
like this: ―The Palestinian Legislative Council may not be dissolved or its work hindered during a 
state of emergency, nor shall the provisions of this title be suspended.‖ It is hard to see how Abu 
Salah could reach the conclusion that this article authorizes the president to suspend the Basic 
Law. The logic seems to be that the Hamas takeover in Gaza hinders the PLC in doing its work, 
and therefore the president is entitled to ignore chapter five, which also deals with cabinet 
formation and the requirement of PLC approval. The Basic Law does not specify procedures for 
what should happen in the event of a cabinet dissolution by the president. However, in the event 
of a declaration of no confidence by the PLC, Art 78.3 of the Amended Basic Law states that: 
Upon the completion of the term of the Prime Minister and the government, they will temporarily exercise 
their powers in the capacity of a caretaker government, during which they may make decisions only insofar 
as they are necessary for the conduct of executive affairs until a new government is formed. 
 
Brown points out that the exact meaning of ―term‖ in Arabic refers to the government‘s wilaya – 
i.e. its authority to govern – having ended.367 This would also apply to dismissal by the president 
and that a state of emergency would not warrant an exception. Art 79.4 explicitly states that a no 
minister may assume power without an affirmative vote of confidence by the PLC. This was also 
the argument posed by Hamas as Haniyeh insisted to continue in a caretaker capacity until the 
new cabinet had obtained confidence in the PLC.368 While Fatah argued that the president under 
the state of emergency would be allowed to suspend the parts of the Basic Law, in this particular 
instance the articles concerning the executive, Hamas demanded that Articles 66 and 79 regarding 
parliamentary confidence be kept.  
Attorneys Anis al-Qassem and Yugin Qatran, who participated in the early drafting of the 
Basic Law, supported Hamas‘ position that Abbas could not appoint a new government with 
parliamentary approval. A third drafter, Ahmed el-Khalidi, warned that Palestinian democracy 
was ―in retreat‖.369 In an e-mail to Reuters, al-Qassem stated that: ―As to the powers of the 
president in a state of emergency, the only power specifically given to him is to declare the state 
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of emergency in the manner provided in Article 110. He cannot issue decrees suspending any 
provisions of the Basic Law.‖370 The 2003 amendment did not directly address the role of the 
PLC. However, when Abbas dismissed the cabinet and installed a cabinet which derives its 
legitimacy directly from a presidential endorsement, this undermines not only the PLC, but also 
the position on Prime Minister Fayyad and his cabinet, who now depend solely on the good will 
of the president. This is a serious backlash to a reform which aimed to turn the cabinet into the 
highest executive tool. By early 2008, Fayyad‘s cabinet had still not been able to obtain 
confidence in the PLC. 
Table 3. Failed PLC sessions in July 2007371 
Date Convened by 
Boycotted 
by 
Thursday 5 July 
2007 
Acting PLC Speaker Ahmad Bahar called for an opening session in an 
exceptional round.  
Fatah 
Wednesday 11 July 
2007 
Abbas called for the opening session in the second round of the new term 
to elect a new Speaker. 
Hamas 
Sunday 22 July 2007 Bahar called for a session to request confidence for the emergency cabinet.  Fatah 
 
Declaring a state of emergency and ruling by decree 
In addition to dismissing the cabinet on 14 June 2007, Abbas declared a state of emergency in the 
PA. In the Arab world, emergency provisions in the constitution are generally supplied by an 
emergency law that fills in the details left vague in the constitution.372 In the Palestinian case, there 
is no relevant legislation except from Articles 110-114 in the Basic Law. The president may 
declare a state of emergency by a decree when there is a threat to national security caused by war, 
invasion, armed insurrection, or a time of natural disaster for a period not to exceed thirty (30) 
days (Art 110.1). The president needs an approval of two thirds of the PLC in order to extend the 
state of emergency (Art 110.2). The decree must state the purpose of the state of emergency and 
define what territories it applies to (Art 110.3). The PLC is authorized to review all or some of the 
procedures implemented during the state of emergency (Art 110.4). Art 113 states that the PLC 
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cannot be dissolved or suspended during states of emergency, and this provision may not be 
suspended.  
The declaration of Abbas to declare a state of emergency was not contested by Hamas, but 
there were disagreements as to the president‘s prerogatives once the state of emergency had been 
declared. During the summer of 2007, Abbas issued a string of decrees, such as disbanding armed 
militias, revoking the NGO law, and dissolving the NSC.373 The decrees were controversial, and 
one of the consequences was the disbanding of more than 100 Hamas affiliated charities.374 The 
president‘s right to issue decrees with the power of law only applies when the PLC is not in 
session. The president‘s legislative powers are defined in Art 43 of the Amended Basic Law, 
which states that:  
The President of the National Authority shall have the right, in cases of necessity that cannot be delayed, and 
when the Legislative Council is not in session, to issue decrees that have the power of law. These decrees 
shall be presented to the Legislative Council in the first session convened after their issuance; otherwise they 
will cease to have the power of law. If these decrees are presented to the Legislative Council, as mentioned 
above, but are not approved by the latter, then they shall cease to have the power of law.  
 
 
The prerogatives of the president to issue decrees when the PLC is not in session unleashed a 
dispute as to the legality of a number of PLC sessions. During the spring of 2007 there had been 
increasing concern on behalf of individual PLC members that the PLC was unable to obtain a 
quorum. On 21 April, PLC member Jamil Majdalawi (PFLP) argued that the PLC should resign if 
they would continue to fail at holding regular sessions.
375
 The failure of the PLC to obtain quorum 
was partly due to the difficult security situation, but according to Khreisha, it was also a conscious 
tactic on behalf of Fatah and Hamas respectively to prevent legislation that would be contrary to 
their interests.
376
 During the summer of 2007 the contending parties played a technical game 
involving the nitty-gritty of the Standing Orders for the PLC, which regulate the internal workings 
of the PLC. The dispute concerned the call of President Abbas to start a second period of the PLC. 
According to Art 16 of the Standing Orders, the PLC sessions are organized in two periods lasting 
for four months, the first starting in the week of May, and the second in the first week of 
September. According to Art 52 of the Amended Basic Law, the president is to open the first 
ordinary session of the PLC and deliver an opening speech. Art 16 of the Standing Orders 
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stipulate that the ―President of the PNA will call the Council to convene its ordinary annual 
session.‖ Opening the second period would require a new leadership for the PLC to be elected, 
and Fatah was keen to replace the Hamas-elected leadership with its own people. Fatah 
parliamentarian Azzam al-Ahmad argued that the PLC‘s first session, which had started on 3 
March 2007 and lasted for four months, ended on Wednesday 5 July. Consequently, any PLC 
session planned after 4 July would be illegal. From Al-Ahmads perspective, Fatah was not 
boycotting the PLC, but refused to attend an unlawfully convened assembly.‖377Several attempts 
to convene the PLC during July 2007 failed. Ibrahim Khreisha, Secretary-General of the PLC,378 
argued that since Hamas rejected the presidential appeal to start a second period, it was impossible 
to hold PLC sessions. Fatah further argued that the inactivity of the PLC authorized the president 
to issue decrees which are binding by law. Khreisha warned that the inactivity of the PLC would 
authorize the president to take on ―some of the authorities which are not found in the Basic 
Law‖.379 
Abbas exercised one such authority on 3 September 2007, when he issued a decree to 
replace the 2005 Law of Elections with a new elections law.380 The decree stipulated the 
annulment of Elections Law No. 9 of 2005 and adopts a complete proportional system with all the 
occupied territories as one electoral unit, as requested by the PLO. The decision also requires all 
presidential and party candidates to commit to the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people, to the Declaration of Independence, and to the Basic Law (Art 36). Hasan 
Khreisha (Independent), second-deputy speaker of the PLC criticized the move and argued that 
―nobody can force decisions on the PLC, as ratifying decisions is the PLC‘s prerogative, and that 
―Neither the president, nor anyone else, has the right to impose laws on the PLC‖. Khreisha said 
that the PLO‘s Central Council asked the PLC to adopt a system of proportional representation in 
elections, and that the PLC has the right to accept or reject the suggestion.381 He furthermore 
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stated that ―Abu Mazin's [Abbas] decision does not apply to the PLC since it is not one of the 
PLO's institutions. 
The president‘s move to adopt a new election law was also criticized by the PCHR in 
Gaza. In a press release issued on 4 September 2007, they argued that Art 43 concerning the 
prerogative of the president to issue decrees with the power of law in cases of necessity did not 
apply as the decision did not fill a legal vacuum, but was used to cancel an efficient law. They 
further argued that it is for the PLC to cancel or mend legislation, not the president: ―Thus, this 
article (43) should not be employed to usurp the powers of the legislature by the executive under 
the pretext that the PLC is not convened.‖382 The failure of the PLC to convene was also criticized 
from the smaller parties. Pending the failure to grant confidence to the Fayyad cabinet, PLC 
member Mustafa Barghouti (al-Mubadara383) urged PLC members to attend the session. He 
warned that a continued boycotting of sessions would lead to a marginalizing of the role of the 
PLC. He was not heard.384 
As the summer and early fall went by without the PLC being able to form a quorum. 
Hamas alone would have been able to form a quorum were it not for the fact that 41 of their 
parliamentarians had been jailed in a series of operations beginning with Israel‘s Operation 
Summer Rain in Gaza in the summer of 2006.385 During the fall of 2007 Hamas unilaterally 
changed the PLC Standing Orders by adding a rule that authorizes jailed PLC members to vote by 
attorney. Art 7 of the Standing Orders does in fact state that ―every parliamentary block shall have 
the right to set its own internal by-laws, provided that they do not contradict with the provisions of 
this standing orders and law‖. However, Art 114 states that the Standing Orders can only be 
amended after a proposal submitted either by the PLC speaker or one third of the council. It 
would further have to be passed with an absolute majority of the whole PLC. As the council has 
not been able to meet the quorum in the first place, Hamas amended the Standing Order 
unilaterally and with a minority vote.386 Nonetheless, Hamas argues they have legitimately created 
a rule that allows jailed members to authorize delegates to vote on their behalf on the PLC, thus 
allowing Hamas parliamentarians to meet the quorum and review the president‘s decisions. 
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Whereas the deposed Prime Minister Haniyeh deemed the meeting a ―historic‖ sign that the PLC 
had ―succeeded to … counter the Israeli occupation‘s policies‖, PLC Secretary-General Ibrahim 
Khreisha denounced the session as an illegal move to ―dedicate the rule of authority gained 
through military coup and inter-Palestinian division.‖387One of the first decisions made by the 
Hamas led PLC was to declare all the president‘s decrees to be illegitimate. 
A complete reversal 
The quarrel between the president and the prime minister was deeply rooted in the Basic Law in 
the sense that both parties legitimized their actions by referring to them as ―constitutional‖ while 
accusing the other of being ―unconstitutional‖. Abbas advisers lay claim to various ―constitutional 
rights‖ on behalf of the president, whereas the deposed Haniyeh cabinet in Gaza has based its rule 
on the military takeover in Gaza by the Executive Force. Neither of the two cabinets can claim 
constitutional legitimacy. However, in the constitutional disagreements between the president and 
the cabinet, Hamas‘ positions have generally been more attuned to the Basic Law. This is due to 
the Basic Law‘s constitutionalist limitations on the presidency and the strong role awarded to the 
cabinet and the PLC, where Hamas held the majority. All constitutional options open to the 
president would require a compromise with Hamas.388  
Consequently, Hamas had a stronger interest than Fatah in ensuring that intra-executive 
and executive-legislative dealings took place within the provisions of the Basic Law. This was 
evident from the changes that were made from the first to the second version of the Prisoner‘s 
Document. The 11 May version states that there should be ―regular meetings‖ between the 
government and the presidency ―to settle any disputes that might arise through brotherly dialogue 
based on the temporary constitution and for the sake of the higher interests…‖ By contrast, the 28 
June version called for ―regular meetings to achieve and reinforce cooperation and integration 
according to the provisions of the Basic Law and the higher national interests‖. Hamas had less to 
gain in downplaying the Basic Law in favor of ―brotherly dialogue‖ based on creative 
interpretations of the ―preliminary constitution‖. Fatah pursued their interest by promoting 
interpretations that favored the presidency, while Hamas emphasized articles that protected the 
role of the PLC, where they represented the majority.  
After the 2006 elections, the corrosion of the 2003 amendment accelerated as the 
presidency was reinforced beyond the limits of the Basic Law. Abbas claimed power of initiative 
in calling for referendums, issued decrees while the PLC was in session, installed a caretaker 
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cabinet without requiring it to obtain PLC confidence, and revoked the Law of Elections and 
imposed a new elections law by decree. Concurrently, the presidency was reinforced by financial 
support, international backing and material support for the Presidential Guard. The international 
community has been generally supportive how Abbas, his advisers and the PLO Executive 
Committee have interpreted the Basic Law.389 However, as the conflict escalated, also Hamas 
were willing and able to bend the rules to their own advantage. Allowing imprisoned Hamas 
members to vote by proxy, which had never been legal according to Palestinian law, was one 
example to that.390 The establishment of a parallel PLC in Gaza can only contribute to maximize 
the persistent confusion and institutional duplication.  
Ottaway has argued that significant reforms must challenge fundamental assumptions 
about power and have the potential to bring about a paradigm shift.391 A significant result of the 
2003 amendment would have shifted the power of initiative from the presidency to the cabinet. 
However, after the elections, the president was able to move forward as a main engine in 
Palestinian politics. The constitutional debates concerned whether or not referendums were 
possible within the Basic Law, or whether parliament could be dissolved. Few questioned whether 
the underlying logic of the Amended Basic Law permitted the right of initiative to lie with the 
president in such cases. Palestinian politics in the West Bank is currently conducted much along 
the lines of the nonconstitutionalist presidency envisioned in the early PLO drafts of the Basic 
Law, with the PLO as ―the higher reference‖ and a president who ―exercises his powers through 
Resolutions and Decrees‖ (Art 57, 1994 PLO draft). We also see attempts at implementing some 
of the proposals that the PLC had rejected in 2005, such as conducting referendums, and 
dissolving the PLC.  
Palestinian constitutional development from 2003 until 2006 fits the pattern of 
liberalization described by Adam Przeworski as ―a process whereby the power apparatus allows 
some political organization and interplay of interests but maintains intact its own capacity to 
intervene […] Liberalization is a controlled opening of the political space, continually contingent 
upon the compatibility of the outcomes of politics with the interests or values of the authoritarian 
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power apparatus.‖ Under such circumstances, the potential of the Basic Law to bring about the 
transfer of power from a group of individuals to a set of rule remains extremely limited. 
Meaningful reform in a Palestinian context would have implied the transfer of power from 
individuals to institutions. Adam Przeworski has argued that democracy is a form of political 
organization where power is ―devolved from a group of people to a set of rules‖, and where ―no 
one can be certain that their interests will ultimately triumph‖.392  
Constitutions have the potential to provide for, but also to prevent, this organizational 
form. When Palestinian reform has not led to the transfer of power from groups and individuals to 
institutions, the fault is not in the Basic Law, but in the political context. Reform has been a way 
of bolstering individuals by temporarily vesting power in the institutions that have been controlled 
by these individuals. Under authoritarian rule, there is always an individual, an organization, party 
or group with an ―effective capacity to prevent political outcomes that would be highly adverse to 
their interests.‖ The electoral victory of Hamas in 2006 was such an ―adverse‖ outcome. Political 
actors both within and outside of the PA had the will and exercised their power to reverse the 
outcome of political processes that were perceived as detrimental to their interests. Power was 
retransferred to the presidency, because this office at the time was inhabited by a moderate. 
Ottaway has pointed out that international involvement in reforms tend to promote 
cosmetic rather than significant reform, as: ―It is the distant actors that may be satisfied with 
façade changes.‖393 Constitutional development in the PA confirms this contention. By pressing 
reforms only when it has been politically advantageous and otherwise ignoring constitutional 
issues the international community effectively contributed to the subversion of significant reform 
within the PA. The Palestinian cabinet is now completely dependent on and appointed by the 
president. This situation is a far cry from the empowered reform cabinet provided for in the 
Amended Basic Law. Political concerns led the international society to completely disregard the 
2003 reform and isolate the Palestinian cabinet. In supporting the caretaker cabinet of Fayyad, the 
international community also abandoned the principle of parliamentary confidence. Large parts of 
the political coalition that had made the 2002-2003 reforms possible – that is the US, the EU and 
parts of the Fatah leadership have realigned to ―rebuild an unfettered presidency‖.394 
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SUMMARY PART III  
After the 2006 elections, the influence of power politics on Palestinian constitutional development 
changed its nature from legislative drafting to the interpretation of the constitutional texts. As long 
as Fatah had a majority in the PLC, they had been able to ingrain their interests and values in the 
legislative framework. As a minority in the PLC, they were no longer able to do so. Focus shifted 
to obtaining hegemony in the interpretation of the Basic Law. This was evident in the effort 
invested in passing the High Constitutional Court Law after the election results were declared. By 
introducing last minutes changes that allowed the president to appoint judges without PLC 
approval, Fatah obtained a tool that could potentially enable them to wield considerable influence. 
The measure would allow Abbas to compose a constitutional court that would be likely to 
interpret the Basic Law in favor of the president‘s opinion. Although the High Constitutional 
Court was not activated, constitutional issues have been hotly debated since the 2006 elections.  
With the isolation of two successive PA cabinets the PLO Executive Committee asserted 
itself as a constitutional interpreter by forming committees to study the Basic Law and making 
public calls for dismissing the cabinet and dissolving parliament. The international community 
consistently backed Abbas‘ and the PLO Executive Committee‘s interpretations of the Basic Law. 
These interpretations place the right of initiative in a number of issues with the president and 
allocate all residual powers with the president. It is hard to see how this support is founded in the 
actual constitutional texts.  
When the spirit of this amendment was no longer concurrent to the interests of the 
majority within Fatah and the international community, the reforms were gradually reversed. 
After Fatah‘s electoral loss in 2006 it was no longer possible to do so by passing constitutional 
amendments in parliament. Instead, a massive effort was launched to establish an interpretation of 
the Amended Basic Law that completely disregarded the institutional aspect of the 2003 reform. 
Abbas initially worked to complete the reform effort, but the decision of Hamas to run for 
elections led Fatah and the international society to go against the reforms that they had earlier 
pressed for. The result has been the return to a nonconstitutionalist presidency with a president 
who acts independently from the Basic Law and a prime minister who is not accountable to a 
functioning PLC, but to the president who appointed him. Palestinian institutions have moved 
outside of all legal channels. To be sure, the the Basic Law was frequently referred to as a 
legitimizing tool, but when Abbas moved beyond the limitations of his prerogatives, few ventured 
to press the point that these limitations had been constitutionally imposed and should be adhered 
to irrespective of who was president at any given time. 
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Main conclusion: The civilizing force of hypocrisy? 
This thesis has aimed to discuss how the convergence of international and domestic interests has 
influenced Palestinian constitutional development. Focus has been on the nature of the executive 
branch and how intra-executive relations evolved after the 2003 amendment of the Basic Law. 
The main questions were whether the PA has evolved in the direction of constitutionalist or 
nonconstitutionalist rule and whether the 2003 constitutional amendment constituted part of a 
significant or a cosmetic reform. 
Political actors within and outside the PA have pursued three constitutional strategies to 
realize their goals: influencing, ignoring and interpreting the legislative framework. Before the 
establishment of an elected legislative council in 1996, the PLO initially sought to draft a Basic 
Law that would maximize executive flexibility and create a weak parliament with a vaguely 
defined role. As the drafting proceeded over the 1990s and the PLO lost control of the drafting 
process to the PLC, the Basic Law gradually evolved in the direction of stronger constitutionalism 
by imposing gradually stronger and more defined limitations on the executive. The 
constitutionalist nature of the Basic Law led the Palestinian leadership to ignore it, and the 
legislation was not ratified until 2002.  
After less than a year, the Basic Law was amended as part of a broader of reform effort to 
empower the cabinet, enhance fiscal transparency and consolidate the security forces in three 
branches. The international community had pushed for this reform, partially because the donor 
community wanted to see their funding put to better use, and partly because Arafat was no longer 
perceived as a moderate and constructive force in Palestinian politics. This affected the priorities 
that were set. Although the reforms responded to demands from the Palestinian reform camp, the 
external support for the reform drive was not motivated by the lack of constitutional rule, but by 
the PA‘s inability to exercise a monopoly of arms. Whereas the internal reform coalition wanted 
to render Arafat more accountable, the external reform coalition wanted to usurp his power to the 
greatest extent possible. With the 2003 constitutional amendment, a prime minister was 
established, and power was redistributed within the executive in favour of the cabinet. This shifted 
the axis of conflict from the president versus parliament to the president versus the cabinet.  
Arafat actively sought to render the reform cosmetic by appearing to accept the 
amendment while obstructing the practical consequences of the transformation from a presidential 
to a semi-presidential system. In 2004, President Arafat died and was replaced by Mahmoud 
Abbas, who was perceived as a moderate Palestinian in the West, and there was no obvious 
advantage in pressing for limitations on his presidential powers. Under both Arafat and Abbas, 
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parliament and the cabinet generally backed down in conflicts with the president and did not make 
full use of the constitutional tools provided to them by the Basic Law. Cabinet power was 
infringed upon by the president as well as by powerful figures within the bureaucracy and the 
security apparatus. After the amendment, a series of prime ministers and cabinet ministers proved 
unable or unwilling to perform as an ―empowered‖ reform cabinet. 
After the death of President Arafat in 2004, his successor, Mahmoud Abbas, emerged as 
the main promoter of reform. Among others, he initiated an effort to complete important pieces of 
legislation relating to the judiciary, the diplomatic services and the security sector. His ability to 
promote reform was, however, diluted by the continued power struggles within Fatah and the 
gradual realization that Fatah would be exposed to severe competition within the institutions that 
they had previously dominated. Due to the politicized agenda that underlay the reform in the first 
place and the controversial foreign policy agenda of Hamas, there was no external backing to 
continue the reforms. In the balance between adherence to democratic ideals and security needs, 
the international community had long vacillated between supporting the PLC, while at the same 
time demanding executive actions that were not rooted in the parliamentary process. Neither 
before nor after the death of President Arafat was the 2003 amendment able to affect a 
redistribution of powers or make power subject to a popular mandate. Hence, the amendment 
cannot be seen as part of a significant reform. The erosion of the 2003 reform, acutely expressed 
in the proposals to reinforce the presidency by way of an amendment the Basic Law in 2005, 
shows a lack of commitment to one constitutional project.  
This might have changed dramatically in 2006, when Fatah lost the parliamentary 
majority to Hamas. The fact that the Islamic opposition could legally win a parliamentary election 
in the Arab world underscores that Palestinian constitutional law itself does not prevent the 
emergence of a competitive political environment where ―everyone must subject their interests to 
competition and uncertainty.‖395 Unlike the first PLC, the second PLC challenged the president on 
many occasions. In order to compensate for their lost dominance of the PA apparatus, the Fatah 
power elite for their part realigned within the PLO and rallied behind the president. From that 
moment on, the 2003 amendment was actively reversed by Abbas and the PLO Executive 
Council. Strategies to influence constitutional development shifted from affecting the Basic Law 
as a text into establishing a favorable interpretation of it. Hamas pursued interpretations that 
would be favorable to the cabinet and the PLC. Fatah pursued interpretations that favored the 
presidency. In this they were supported by the international community. By boycotting the PA 
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while redirecting the flow of finance directly to the President and a PLO account administered by 
Salam Fayyad the international community actively reversed former reforms aimed at 
empowering the cabinet. Personalization of politics was directly encouraged by the international 
community, who dealt with Mahmoud Abbas in whatever capacity was feasible. The need to 
secure donor funds necessitated the continued vacillation between sources of legitimacy that had 
been the hallmark of Arafat‘s ruling strategy. 
In public discourse, the 2002-2003 reforms were portrayed as promoting democracy, but 
Palestinian constitutional development indicates that the concept of democracy needs to be 
detached from the concept of institution building, of which constitution making forms a vital part. 
An analysis of the actual content of the 2003 amendment and the Roadmap will indicate that these 
reforms were aimed at organizing and enhancing state power in the face of (armed) opposition 
groups who did not share the political vision for Palestine espoused by Fatah, the international 
community and Israel. Reform has also been aimed at strengthening different parts of the elite, 
more specifically Fatah and nonviolent secular movements within political life and the NGO 
sector.  
In a regional historical perspective, these goals conform to Brown‘s description of 
nonconstitutionalist Arab constitutions that were drafted in the face of strong external pressure or 
pre-independence. Achieving these goals would not necessarily lead to nonconstitutionalist rule, 
but they would also not preclude it. The political context surrounding the PA provided many 
incentives for nonconstitutionalist rule, and even though the Basic Law had strong 
constitutionalist potential, the targeted areas for reform did not include mechanism that would 
maximize constitutionalism and minimize nonconstitutionalism. Reforms of the existing 
constitutional framework aimed to redistribute of power within the executive and did not pertain 
to the prerogatives of the PLC. Furthermore, the 2002-2003 reforms that motivated the 2003 
amendment could not and did not intend to solve the core problem of lacking internal democracy 
within Palestinian political institutions. This means that the cabinet remained weak in the face of 
opposition from powerful groups and individuals on the domestic scene who refused to relinquish 
their positions. Another reason is that neither the traditional ruling party nor the international 
community respected the outcome of the electoral process that did find place. Assuming that the 
target was to professionalise Palestinian institutions by creating an ―empowered reform cabinet‖, 
the result has been the opposite. The West Bank and Gaza are currently effectively split, 
Palestinians are on the brink of civil war, the economy is on the verge of collapse, the PLC is 
dysfunctional, and there is a strong case for arguing that none of the two self proclaimed cabinets 
are ruling on any sort of constitutional platform.  
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One of Abbas‘ incentives to persuade Hamas to participate in parliamentary elections in 
2006 had been the notion that once they were part of the legislative process they would not ignore 
the laws that resulted from this process. After Hamas came to power, it became evident that they 
had made themselves acquainted with the constitutional framework, and that they intended to use 
it for leverage. An emerging consensus to adhere to the Basic Law was also evident in the 
Prisoner‘s Document, which emphasized that ―higher national interests call for respecting the 
‗Basic Law‘ of the PNA‖. If conflict is seen as vital to develop and nurture acceptance for a 
constitutional framework, this was a genuine opportunity for constitutionalism to take root within 
the PA. At this point, international influence over Palestinian constitutionalism turned from 
inconsistency to obstruction. External boycott and the direct support of the presidency and the 
Presidential Guard eventually tipped the scale in favor of Abbas and his Fatah party. 
One of the great obstacles to constitutionalist rule in the PA has been the will to ignore the 
Basic Law by either operating outside legal channels or evoking parallel sources of legitimacy, 
such as the PLO. I have pointed out that the president, the cabinet and the security forces all tried 
to influence the legal framework by contributing to draft laws. For a variety of reasons, not to 
mention the practical hurdles of the occupation, the legislative process in the PA has not been very 
efficient. But even in instances where politically relevant elites have been able to complete 
relevant pieces of legislation, they have not pressed for the implementation of these laws. 
Examples are the High Constitutional Court Law, which in spite of all the bravado surrounding its 
completion, has not resulted in the activation of such a court. Another example is the 2003 
amendment, which the international community gradually abandoned after Arafat‘s death in 2004. 
Lastly, the efforts of the security forces to integrate in the legislative framework that they are to 
report to the president indicates that they are not oblivious to the potential importance of 
legislation, even though the security chiefs have been the first to ignore it.  
The result of the 2006 elections would make it impossible to ignore constitutional issues 
in this way. As the conflict between the president and the cabinet played out, it became clear that 
Hamas was well versed in Palestinian constitutional law. In the media there were frequent reports 
of arguments from various figures within the PLC, the PLO and the presidency relating to 
constitutional matters. Jon Elster has written about the civilizing force of hypocrisy. The concept 
refers to the idea that actors who are discussing under public scrutiny may be force or induced to 
―refrain from the most blatant expressions of self-interests.‖396 Elster also points out that ―a perfect 
match between an obvious private interest and an impartial equivalent will often be perceived as 
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too crude to be taken seriously.‖ In this thesis, I have not just presented the parties‘ arguments. I 
have also made the case that Hamas positions were to a larger extent than Fatah‘s founded in the 
Basic Law and the 2003 amendment. Once entrenched in the PA, it was easier for Hamas to find 
plausible equivalents between the Basic Law and their interests as a movement and as the 
dominant forces in the cabinet and the parliament. In Fatah‘s case plausible impartial equivalents 
were to a lesser extent to be found in the Basic Law.  
To my opinion, three instances were particularly crude. One was the notion that the PLC 
could be dismissed by way of early elections. The other was the installing of a new cabinet 
without parliamentary confidence, and the third was the imposition of a new electoral law by 
decree. In these instances it was argued that the constitutional framework was unclear or that it 
contained loopholes, when in fact it was clear. The result has been the return to a 
nonconstitutionalist presidency with a president who acts independently from the Basic Law and a 
prime minister who is not accountable to a functioning PLC. The situation led second PLC deputy 
speaker Hassan Khreisha (Independent) to conclude that: ―There is no longer anything legal in the 
Palestinian arena, the only legal entity which remained was the PLC. However, the PLC has now 
fallen prey to the Hamas – Fatah disagreement.‖397  
It is not unreasonable for politicians to seek legitimacy for their actions by resorting to 
constitutional law – on the contrary, I find it highly promising that they did. With each public 
reference to the Basic Law, the cost of ignoring it was increased. Once Abbas threatened to 
dismiss the prime minister as it was his constitutional prerogative to do so, he started walking 
down ―the slippery slope‖, whereby an orchestrated reform effort may have unintended 
consequences.398 Whether or not Fatah would have accepted their defeat had it not been for 
international backing of their movement and direct pressure on Abbas to sideline the cabinet we 
will never know. Consequently, the full potential of the Basic Law has never been tested. In 
conclusion, domestic power struggles and external interests have converged in such a way as to 
produce de-institutionalization, personalization and cosmetic reform in the PA. 
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of Mustafa Barghouti‘s electoral list, Independent Palestine (al-Mubadara). Conducted in 
English. 
Jamal Zaqout, Gaza, 29 June 2005. 
Member of the National Islamic Forces Committe, Fida and the Geneva Group. Conducted 
in English. 
Ghazi Hamad, Gaza, 30 June 2005.  
Editor of opposition paper Al-Rizala and former leader of the Islamic Salvation Party, 
spokes man for the Ismail Haniyeh cabinet. Conducted in English. 
Salah Abdel Shafi, interview, Gaza, 1 July 2005. 
Director of the Economic Development Group in Gaza. Conducted in English. 
Khalil Shaheen, interview, Gaza, 3 and 5 July 2005. 
Head of the Economic and Social Rights Unit at the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights in 
Gaza. Conducted in English. 
Ammal T. Hamad, Gaza 3 July 2005. 
PLC Women and Children Unit. Fatah member. Recommended by Bertinussen. Hamad 
brought her own interpreter. 
Issa Nashar,  Gaza, 4 July 2005. 
Hamas political leader in Rafah. Appointment set up by G. Hamad, who also interpreted. 
Khalid Batsh, interview, Gaza, 5 July 2005. 
Spokesman for Islamic Jihad in Gaza. Conducted with professional interpreter. 
Ashraf Ajram and Talal Awqal, Gaza, 5 July 2005 
Local journalists from al-Ayyam. Awqal interpreted for Ajram, whom I also met the day 
after with a professional interpreter. 
 Jarrar Qudwah, Gaza, 6 July 2005. 
Director General, General Control Authority of the General Control Authority in Gaza.. 
Conducted in English. 
Hisham Abdl Razeq, Gaza 6 July 
Fatah Revolutionary Council. Minister of Prisoners (1998-June 2002, October 2002-
October 2003). Conducted with professional ineterpreter. 
Sami Abu Zuhri, interview, Gaza 6 July 2006. 
Hamas spokesman in Gaza. Recommended to me by Ziyad Abu Amr. Conducted with 
professional interpreter. 
Adli Sadeq, Gaza, 8 July 2005. 
Assistant Deputy Minister Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2005 and columnist in Al-Hayat 
Al-Jadida. Fatah member. Conducted with professional interpreter. 
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Mudar Qassis, Ramallah 11 July 2005.  
Director of Bir Zeit Institute of Law. Conducted in English. 
 Bassem Ezbidi, interview, Ramallah, 13 July 2005. 
Associate researcher at MUWATIN in Ramallah and professor of political science in Najah 
University in Nablus. Conducted in English. 
Roland Friedrich, interview Ramallah, 14 July 2005 and e-mail 28 January 2007. 
Author of Security Sector Reform in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, PASSIA, 
Jerusalem 2004.  Conducted in English. 
Sakhr Habash, Ramallah, 14 July 2005. 
Fatah Central Committee and Fatah Revolutionary Council. Conducted in English. 
Jihad Harb, Ramallah, 16 and 24 July 2005. 
Researcher at Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. Harb brought 
his own interpreter. 
Azmeh Shueibeh, interview, Ramallah, 16 July 2005.  
Member of the first PLC for Fida. Minister of youth and sport from 1994 to 1996. 
Conducted in English. 
George Giacaman, Ramallah, July 16 2005. 
Cofounder and Director of Muwatin, the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy in 
Ramallah. Conducted in English. 
Mohammad Yaghi, interview, Ramallah, 18 July 2005. 
Executive director of the Palestinian Center for Mass Communication, project manager for 
the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah. Conducted in English. 
Mohammed al-Hourani, Ramallah, 18 July 2005. 
Member of the first PLC for Fatah. Member of the Fatah Revolutionary Council. 
Conducted in English. 
Hani al-Hassan, Ramallah, 19 July 2005. 
Fatah Central Comitte. Minister of Interior (2002-2003). Commissioner of Fatah Office of 
Mobilisation and Organization in Ramallah. Conducted in English. 
Ahmad Sayyad, Ramallah, 20 July 2005. 
Chairman of the Palestinian Bar Association. Conducted in English. 
Qaddura Fares, interview, Ramallah, 21 July 2005. 
Member for Fatah in the first PLC. Minister without portfolio (2003-2005). Conducted in 
English. 
Ibrahim Barghouti, Ramallah, 21 July 2005. 
Director of Musawa, Palestinian Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal 
Profession.Barghouti brought his own interpreter. 
Abdul Jawad Saleh, interview, Ramallah, 23 July, 2005. 
Independent member of the first PLC. Minister of agriculture (1996 to 1998). Conducted in 
English. 
Khalida Jarrar, phone interview, September 2006. 
PFLP member of the second PLC.  
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Appendix I Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Frontpage of the website the Palestinian Ministry of 
Affairs 18 January 2006, retrieved from The Internet 
Archive, http://web.archive.org/web/20060118064206/ 
http://www.mofa.gov.ps/ 
accessed 28 January 2008.  
 
The ―Background‖ section presenting the ministry as a 
regular foreign ministry had at this point remained 
unchanged since the summer of 2003, when the ministry 
was presented as Ministry of Planning and International 
Cooperation. (See ―Background‖ as it appeared on 27 
July 2003, and then again on 27 September, 2003, 
http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://mofa.gov.ps accessed 
28 January 2008. 
 
Frontpage of the website the Palestinian Ministry of 
Affairs 29 January 2006, retrieved from The Intenet 
Archive, http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20060206233953/http://www.mofa.gov.ps/ accessed 28 
January 2008.  
 
The website was still under modification by 16 April 
2007. 
 
 
Frontpage of the website of the Palestinian Ministry of 
Affairs as it has been appearing since some point 
between 16 April and 16 May 2007.  
 
I have not been able to trace the first entry, but it seems 
reasonable to assume that the relauncing of the website 
can be related to the National Unity Cabinet and the 
appointment of  Ziad Abu Amr as foreign minister. 
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Appendix II Background, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Background text as it appeared on MOFA‘s website on 27 September 2003, retrieved from the 
Internet Archive, http://web.archive.org/web/20031008113519/ 
www.mofa.gov.ps/about_mofa/index.asp (last accessed 28 January 2008): 
 
For political reasons, the Oslo accords limited the PA foreign relations scope, nevertheless, the PA 
established The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) to handle 
international assistance to the Palestinian Territories and developed its assigned mandate to be the 
ministry responsible for the foreign relations portfolio. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
After formation of the fifth Palestinian government, a new Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
established. This Ministry undertakes all the duties associated with a typical foreign ministry in a 
sovereign country, in the course of managing Palestine’s foreign relations that serves its national 
interests. These functions includes the following functions: 
 
 Organizing of diplomatic and consular representation between the Palestinian National 
Authority and foreign states and Intentional and regional organizations; 
  
 Establishing cooperation relationships with international and regional organizations and 
groupings; 
  
 Maintaining contacts with other states through the various embassies and PLO 
representative offices around the globe. 
  
 Establishing regular contact and cooperation with foreign representative offices in 
Jerusalem and other embassies designated to the PA; 
  
 Participating in international conferences and international organizations meetings; 
  
 Concluding economic, cultural, scientific, educational, and technical agreements with 
other states and international institutions; 
  
 Sourcing financial and technical assistance from other friendly states, donors, and 
international funding agencies and negotiating loan and grant agreements to finance the 
Palestinian Development Plan (PDP); 
  
 Overseeing Palestinian citizens interests in other states and taking measures to protect 
their rights pursuant to international agreements and treaties. 
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 MOFA has significantly rationalized and consolidated the activities of most of the 
representative offices around the globe. Yet, these functions continue to exact a 
considerable financial burden and toll on the PA’s budget. The Ministry has introduced a 
variety of cost cutting programs including encouraging a system of non-resident 
ambassadors as well as the use of email as a standard practice to reduce communications 
expenses. Nevertheless, as a result of the complicated political situation, the remaining 
embassies and representative offices were deemed to be vital to promoting Palestinian 
interests. Accordingly, the Ministry will continue to develop the capacities and 
competencies of these embassies in preparations for the Palestinian State. 
 
 The overall coordination of International assistance to the Palestinian people. 
 
 Expatriate Affairs and PALSTA Network MOPIC established the Expatriate Palestinians 
department as a mean to tab the resources and support of Diaspora Palestinian 
communities around the World and to encourage investment in Palestine. Many 
Palestinians who immigrated to Europe and the Americas had established successful and 
influential communities particularly in Central and South America. MOPIC organizes 
annual Diaspora conferences designed to develop the networking relationships between 
the expatriates and their home communities as well as to promote private sector and joint 
venture local-expatriate investment projects.  
 
 As in its capacity as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry has a key role in all 
negotiations held on behalf of the Palestinian National Authority and the State of 
Palestine. 
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Summary 
The topic of this thesis is the interplay between political context and Palestinian constitutional 
development from the inception of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1993 until the aftermath of 
the collapse of the National Unity Cabinet in June 2007.  
 
The 2006 parliamentary elections brought a Hamas majority in the Palestinian Legislative 
Council. This offset a conflict between the Fatah backed president and the Hamas backed prime 
minister which culminated in 2007 with the split between Gaza and the West Bank. The recent 
conflicts between Fatah President Mahmoud Abbas and the deposed Hamas Prime Minister 
Ismail Haniyeh are here placed in a broader context of Palestinian constitutional history. 
 
The Basic Law was written in the intersection between local power struggles and great power 
politics. Both the U.S. and the European countries pursued multiple agendas and interests where 
democracy was one of several competing goals. My first main question is how these various 
interests have affected Palestinian constitutional development. More specifically, I aim to discuss 
the development of the executive as envisioned in the Basic Law, and whether the PA has evolved 
in the direction of constitutionalist or nonconstitutionalist rule. 
 
In 2003 the Basic Law was amended and the Palestinian political system was changed from a 
presidential to a semi-presidential system by furnishing the executive with a prime minister. The 
amendment transferred a number of competencies from the presidency to the cabinet. The second 
main question is whether the cabinet has been able to exercise its powers as laid out in the 
Amended Basic Law.  
 
By comparing various drafts for the Palestinian Basic Law, the thesis traces the relations between 
the president and the cabinet as laid out in the Basic Law. The thesis shows that the 2003 
amendment was systematically reversed in a process that was initiated by President Yasser Arafat, 
but that continued under the more reform minded President Mahmoud Abbas.  
 
The lacking ability of the PA executive to impose order on the security forces is well known. This 
thesis shows that the reversal of the 2003 reforms affected a broad specter of competencies that 
had been awarded to the cabinet by the constitutional amendment. 
